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THE DOCTRINE OF PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY ILLUSTRATED.

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THE

DOCTRINE

OF

Philoſophical Neceſſity

ILLUSTRATED;

BEING AN

APPENDIX

TO THE

DISQUISITIONS relating to MATTER and SPIRIT.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

An ANSWER to ſeveral PERSONS who have controverted the PRINCIPLES of it.

By JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL.D. F.R.S.

VOL. II.

THE SECOND EDITION ENLARGED.

The gen'ral ORDER, ſince the whole began,
Is kept in NATURE, and is kept in MAN. POPE.

BIRMINGHAM,
PRINTED BY PEARSON AND ROLLASON, FOR J. JOHNSON,
NO. 72, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD, LONDON.
MDCCLXXXII.

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and *philoſophy*; and by the help of the latter, we are able to demonſtrate the excellence of the moral precepts of the former. And the more we underſtand of human nature, which is an immenſe field of ſpeculation, barely opened by our revered maſter Dr. Hartley, the more clearly, I doubt not, ſhall we perceive how admirably is the whole ſyſtem of revealed religion adapted to the nature and circumſtances of man, and the better judges ſhall we be of that moſt important branch of its evidence, which reſults from conſidering the effects which the firſt promulgation of it had on the minds of thoſe to whom it was propoſed, both Jews and Gentiles. Let us then ſtudy the *Scriptures*, *Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory*, and the *Theory of the Human Mind*, in conjunction; being ſatisfied, that, from the nature of the things,

things, they muſt, in time, throw a great and new light upon each other.

Permit me, dear Sir, to flatter myſelf that, as you have followed the great Dr. Hartley in his application to *theological*, *mathematical*, and *philoſophical* ſtudies, and alſo in his profeſſion of the theory and practice of *medicine*, you will ſtill purſue his footſteps, in applying the elements of all theſe branches of ſcience to the farther inveſtigation of the phenomena of the *human mind*, which is a great and ample field, worthy of your ſuperior talents.

Hoping to enjoy your communications, and valuable friendſhip, together with that of our common and moſt excellent friend Mr. Lindſey, whoſe views of theſe things are

English
Kingston
3-13-26
3/806

TO

JOHN JEBB, M. D.

DEAR SIR,

I FLATTER myſelf that you will permit me to take this opportunity of perpetuating, as far as I am able, the very high regard that I entertain for a perſon who has diſtinguiſhed himſelf as you have done, by an attachment to the *unadulterated principles of chriſtianity*, how unpopular ſoever they may have become through the prejudices of the weak or the intereſted part of mankind, and who has made the ſacrifice that you have made to the *cauſe of truth* and the *rights of conſcience*.

 I think

I think myſelf happy in concurring, as I hope, with your ardent zeal for the cauſe of *civil and religious liberty* in their full extent; and I am convinced that to act as you have done is the proper method that a *chriſtian* ought to take in order to promote it. It is our buſineſs, whenever called upon, to bear our teſtimony to whatever we apprehend to be *truth* and *right*, and upon no occaſion to ſwerve from our real principles (which would be equivalent to denying Chriſt, or being aſhamed of him, and his cauſe before men) whether we ſee that any good will reſult from what we may ſuffer by ſuch a profeſſion, or not. We ought to content ourſelves with acting under the *expreſs orders* of one who is the proper jndge of what is expedient for his intereſt and his church, as well as for our happineſs; and we may reſt aſſured, that we

can

can only ſuſtain a *temporary loſs* by ſuch an implicit, but reaſonable obedience.

Could we only, my friend, expand our minds fully to conceive, and act up to, the great principle aſſerted in this treatiſe (of the truth of which we are both of us convinced) nothing more would be wanting to enable us to exert this, and every other effort of *true greatneſs of mind.*

We ourſelves, complex as the ſtructure of our minds, and our principles of action are, are links in a great connected chain, parts of an immenſe whole, a very little of which only we are as yet permitted to ſee, but from which we collect evidence enough that the whole ſyſtem (in which we are, at the ſame time, both *inſtruments* and *objects*) is under an un-

erring direction, and that the final result will be moſt glorious and happy. Whatever men may intend, or execute, all their deſigns, and all their actions, are ſubject to the ſecret influence and guidance of one who is neceſſarily the beſt judge of what will moſt promote his own excellent purpoſes. To him, and in his works, all ſeeming *diſcord* is real *harmony*, and all apparent *evil*, ultimate *good*.

This world, we ſee, is an admirable *nurſery for great minds*. Difficulties, oppoſition, perſecution, and evils of every other form, are the neceſſary *inſtruments* by which they are made, and even *the captain of our ſalvation*, was himſelf *made perfect through ſuffering*. A mixture of pleaſing events does, likewiſe, contribute to the ſame end; but of the due proportions in this mixture we are no judges.

Con-

Conſidering, however, in whoſe hands are the ſeveral ingredients of the *cup* of mortal life, we may be aſſured that it will never be more bitter, than will be neceſſary, to make it, in the very higheſt degree, ſalutary.

You and I, Sir, rejoice in the belief, that the whole human race are under the ſame *wholeſome diſcipline*, and that they will all certainly derive the moſt valuable advantages from it, though in different degrees, in different ways, and at different periods; that even the perſecutors are only giving the precedence to the perſecuted, and advancing them to a much higher degree of perfection and happineſs; and that they muſt themſelves, for the ſame benevolent purpoſe, undergo a more ſevere diſcipline than that which they

they are the means of adminiſtering to others.

With this perſuaſion we cannot but conſider every *being*, and every *thing*, in a favourable light. Every perſon with whom we have any connexion is a *friend*, and every event in life is a *benefit*; while God is equally the father, and the friend, of the whole creation.

I hope, dear Sir, we ſhall always be careful to ſtrengthen and extend theſe great and juſt views of the glorious ſyſtem to which we belong. It is only by loſing ſight of theſe principles that we adopt *mean purpoſes*, and become ſlaves to *mean paſſions*, as alſo that we are ſubject to be chagrined and unhinged by ſeemingly croſs accidents in life.

So

So long as we can practically believe that there is but *one will* in the whole univerſe, that this one will, excluſive of all *chance*, or the interference of any other will, diſpoſes of all things, even to their minuteſt circumſtances, and always for the beſt of purpoſes, it is impoſſible but that we muſt rejoice in, and be thankful for, all events, without diſtinction. And when our will and our wiſhes ſhall thus perfectly coincide with thoſe of the ſovereign Diſpoſer of all things, *whoſe will is always done, in earth, as well as in Heaven*, we ſhall, in fact, attain the ſummit of perfection and happineſs. We ſhall have a kind of *union with God* himſelf; his will ſhall be our will, and even his power our power; being ever employed to execute our wiſhes and purpoſes, as well as his; becauſe they

they will be, in all reſpects, the ſame with his.

Theſe heart-reviving and ſoul-ennobling views we cannot, my friend, in this imperfect ſtate, expect to realize and enjoy, except at intervals; but let us make it our buſineſs to make theſe happy ſeaſons of philoſophical and devout contemplation more frequent, and of longer continuance. Let them encroach more and more on the time that we muſt give to the buſtle of a tranſitory world; till our minds ſhall have received ſuch a laſting impreſſion, as that its effect may be felt even in the midſt of the greateſt tumult of life, and inſpire a ſerenity and joy, which *the world can neither give nor take away.*

In theſe principles alone do we find a perfect coincidence between *true religion* and

are the ſame with ours, and with whom, in *principle* and *object*, we cannot be too ſtrictly united, and that, mindful of the apoſtolical advice, we ſhall always *conſider one another to provoke unto love and to good works.*

I remain,

Dear Sir,

your affectionate friend,

and fellow labourer,

CALNE,
Aug. 1, 1777.

J. PRIESTLEY.

THE

THE

PREFACE.

I DID not originally intend to write a ſeparate treatiſe on the ſubject of *Philoſophical Neceſſity*, but only to conſider the objection made to it from the ſentiments of praiſe and blame, and the uſe of rewards and puniſhments, which is generally reckoned to be the greateſt difficulty on the ſubject, in an Appendix to my *Diſquiſitions relating to Matter and Spirit*. There would have been a ſufficient propriety in this; becauſe, if man, as is maintained in that treatiſe, be wholly a *material*, it will not be denied but that he muſt be a *mechanical* being. As, therefore, every thing belonging to the doctrine of materialiſm is, in fact, an argument for the doctrine of neceſſity, and, conſequently, the doctrine of neceſſity is a direct inference from materialiſm, the de-

fence of that inference would naturally accompany the proof of the propoſition from which it was deduced.

But, for the ſame reaſon, I thought there would be a propriety in conſidering, in that Appendix, the view that has been given of this ſubject by Dr. Price, in his *Review of the Principles of Morals*, which is a very capital work of its kind. After this I was led to add another Eſſay on *the Nature of the Will*; and thus was brought by degrees to write, in ſeparate Eſſays, all that is now before the reader; when, finding that it was too much to accompany another work, I diſtributed it into convenient ſections, and reſerved it for a volume by itſelf, but ſtill conſidering it as an *Appendage to the Diſquiſitions*.

I am far, however, from giving it out as a *complete treatiſe* on the ſubject; though I have conſidered it in a great variety of views, imagining I could throw ſome new light upon them, either by ſuggeſting new con-

conſiderations, or at leaſt expreſſing myſelf with greater clearneſs. Thoſe perſons who have not yet entered upon the diſcuſſion of this great queſtion, I would refer to ſuch writers as Mr. Collins, Dr. Jonathan Edwards, and Dr. Hartley. They will alſo find ſome things very well written on it by Mr. Hume, and Lord Kaims, eſpecially in his *Sketches on Man*.

Conſidering the many excellent treatiſes that have been written on this ſubject, and with how much clearneſs and ſolidity the argument has been handled, it may ſeem rather extraordinary, that the doctrine of philoſophical liberty ſhould have any adherents among perſons of a liberal education, and who are at all uſed to reflection. To repeat what I have ſaid on a former occaſion, I can truly ſay that, "If I were to take "my choice of any metaphyſical queſtion "to defend againſt all oppugners, it ſhould "be the doctrine of Philoſophical Neceſ-"ſity. There is no truth of which I have "leſs doubt, and of the ground of which

"I am more fully ſatisfied. Indeed, there "is no abſurdity more glaring to my un- "derſtanding than the notion of philoſo- "phical liberty*."

It muſt, therefore, be the *conſequences* of the doctrine at which perſons are ſtaggered. I have, on this account, diſcuſſed more particularly than I believe has been done before, various things relating to the conſequences, real or imaginary, of the doctrine of neceſſity. And, whereas it has of late been imagined to be the ſame thing with the Calviniſtic doctrine of *predeſtination*, I have ſhown, pretty much at large, the eſſential difference between the two ſchemes. I have alſo endeavoured to ſtate in a juſt light what we are to think of thoſe paſſages of the *ſacred writers* that have been ſuppoſe to make for or againſt the doctrine of neceſſity.

I the leſs wonder, however, at the general heſitation to admit the doctrine of ne-

* Remarks on Dr. Beattie, &c. p. 169.

ceſſity

ceſſity in its full extent, when I conſider that there is not, I believe, in the whole compaſs of human ſpeculation, an inſtance in which the indiſputable conſequences, both theoretical and practical, of any ſimple propoſition are ſo numerous, extenſive, and important. On this account, though I believe every perſon, without exception, would not heſitate to admit all the *premiſes*; there are very few, indeed, who are not ſtaggered, and made to pauſe, at the proſpect of the *concluſions*: and I am well aware that, notwithſtanding all that ever can be advanced in favour of theſe concluſions, great and glorious as they really are in themſelves, it requires ſo much ſtrength of mind to comprehend them (that I wiſh to ſay it with the leaſt offence poſſible) I cannot help conſidering the doctrine as that which will always diſtinguiſh the real moral philoſopher from the reſt of the world; at the ſame time that, like all other great and practical truths, even thoſe of chriſtianity itſelf, its *actual influence* will not always be ſo great, as, from theory, it might be ex-

pected to be. If the doctrine have any bad effects, it is a proof with me that it was never clearly underſtood; juſt as all the miſchiefs that have been occaſioned by chriſtianity have ariſen from the corruptions and abuſes of it.

I have taken ſome pains to trace the *hiſtory* of the controverſy concerning liberty and neceſſity, but I have not been able to ſucceed to my wiſh. What the ancients have ſaid on the ſubject is altogether foreign to the purpoſe; their *fate* being quite a different thing from the *neceſſity* of the moderns. For though they had an idea of the certainty of the final event of ſome things, they had no idea of the neceſſary connexion of all the preceding means to bring about the deſigned end; and leaſt of all, had they any juſt idea of the proper *mechaniſm of the mind*, depending upon the certain influence of motives to determine the will; by means of which the whole ſeries of events, from the beginning of the world to the conſummation of all things, makes one connected

chain

chain of cauſes and effects, originally eſtabliſhed by the Deity. Whereas, according to the ancient heathens, fate was ſomething that even the gods often endeavoured in vain to reſiſt. Whenever they ſuppoſed that any particular event was *decreed*, or *determined* upon, by any ſuperior being, their idea was, that, if the event did not come to paſs by means of natural cauſes, that ſuperior Being would occaſionally and effectually interpoſe, ſo as, at any rate, to make ſure of the event.

The *predeſtination* of chriſtians and Mahometans is the ſame thing as the *fate* of the heathens. The Divine Being, they ſuppoſed, had determined that a certain train of events ſhould abſolutely take place, and that he generally provided ſupernatural means to accompliſh his deſigns. This alſo appears to have been the notion of predeſtination as maintained by Luther, Calvin, and all the early reformers; and the ſame may be affirmed of the Janſeniſts among the Roman Catholics.

After the moſt diligent inquiry that I can make, it appears to me that Mr. Hobbes was the firſt who underſtood and maintained the proper doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity; and I think it no ſmall honour to this country, that, among ſo many capital truths of a philoſophical nature, this owes its diſcovery to England. And it is truly wonderful, conſidering that he was probably the firſt who publiſhed this doctrine, that he ſhould have propoſed it ſo clearly, and have defended it ſo ably, as he has done.

On his firſt mentioning the ſubject, which was only occaſionally, in his *Leviathan*, he diſcovers a perfect knowledge of the true principle of it. His ſhort paragraph is ſo comprehenſive of the whole ſcheme and argument, that I ſhall in this place quote it intire *.

" Liberty and neceſſity are conſiſtent. As " in the water that hath not only liber- " ty, but a neceſſity of deſcending in the

* P. 108.

" channel,

" channel, ſo likewiſe, in the actions which
" men voluntarily do, which, becauſe they
" proceed from their will, proceed from li-
" berty; and yet, becauſe every act of man's
" will, and every deſire, and inclination,
" proceedeth from ſome cauſe, and that
" from another cauſe, in a continual chain
" (whoſe firſt link is in the hand of God,
" the firſt of all cauſes) proceed from ne-
" ceſſity. So that to him that could ſee
" the connexion of thoſe cauſes, the ne-
" ceſſity of all mens voluntary actions would
" appear manifeſt. And therefore God,
" that ſeeth and diſpoſeth all things, ſeeth
" alſo that the liberty of man, in doing
" what he will, is accompanied with the
" neceſſity of doing that which God will,
" and no more nor leſs. For though men
" may do many things which God does not
" command, nor is therefore the author of
" them, yet they can have no paſſion, will,
" or appetite to any thing, of which appe-
" tite God's will is not the cauſe. And
" did not his will aſſure the neceſſity of
" man's will, and conſequently of all that

" on

"on man's will dependeth, the liberty of "men would be a contradiction and impe- "diment to the omnipotence and liberty of "God."

I am rather ſurprized that Mr. Locke, who ſeems to have been ſo much indebted to Mr. Hobbes for the clear view that he has given us of ſeveral principles of human nature, ſhould have availed himſelf ſo little of what he might have learned from him on this ſubject. It is univerſally acknowledged that his chapter on *power*, in his *Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding*, is remarkably confuſed; all his *general maxims* being perfectly conſiſtent with, and implying, the doctrine of neceſſity, and being manifeſtly inconſiſtent with the liberty which, after writing a long time exactly like a neceſſarian, he attributes to man.

But the obſcurity that was thrown on this ſubject by Mr. Locke was effectually cleared up by Mr. Collins, in his *Philoſophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty*, pub-

publiſhed in 1717. This treatiſe is conciſe and methodical, and is, in my opinion, ſufficient to give intire ſatisfaction to every unprejudiced perſon. I wiſh this ſmall tract was reprinted, and more generally known and read. It will, however, remain, and do the greateſt honour to the author's memory, when all the quibbling anſwers to it ſhall be forgotten. It was in conſequence of reading and ſtudying this treatiſe, that I was firſt convinced of the truth of the doctrine of neceſſity, and that I was enabled to ſee the fallacy of moſt of the arguments in favour of philoſophical liberty; though I was much more confirmed in this principle by my acquaintance with *Dr. Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind*, a work to which I owe much more than I am able to expreſs.

I was not, however, a ready convert to the doctrine of neceſſity. Like Dr. Hartley himſelf, I gave up my liberty with great reluctance; and in a long correſpondence which I once had on the ſubject, I maintained very ſtrenuouſly the doctrine of liberty,

ty, and did not at all yield to the arguments then propoſed to me. My correſpondent importuned me to permit him to publiſh the letters; but though I was at that time very young, not having entered upon a courſe of academical learning, I had the prudence not to conſent to his propoſal.

With theſe previous remarks, I ſubmit to the candour of the reader what I have been able to advance on the great and glorious, but unpopular doctrine of *Philoſophical Neceſſity*.

PRE-

PREFACE

TO THE

SECOND EDITION.

IN this edition I have inſerted in their proper places the *Additional Illuſtrations* that were printed in my *Diſcuſſion* of this ſubject with Dr. Price. I have alſo ſubjoined the *Letters* addreſſed to ſeveral perſons, that were printed in that publication. I alſo wiſh that my *Letters to Mr. Palmer* may be conſidered as a part of this work. They may be conveniently bound together; and then this volume and my *Diſcuſſion with Dr. Price* will contain all that I have publiſhed on this ſubject.

My diſcuſſion of this argument with Dr. Price was brought to its proper cloſe, each of us having advanced what we thought to

to be ſufficient in ſupport of our reſpective hypotheſes. I am ſorry that this has not been the caſe with reſpect to the controverſy with Mr. Palmer, as he has declined anſwering the *queſtions* I put to him; though they were ſuch as, I think, our readers muſt perceive, were calculated to bring the controverſy to a ſatisfactory and ſpeedy termination. The inferences that will be unavoidably drawn from his conduct, it is his buſineſs to conſider, if he have any value for the doctrine he contends for. I ſhould not have left any favourite opinion of mine in that ſituation.

It will alſo be a ſubject of regret with my readers, as it is with myſelf, that *Dr. Horſeley* did not think proper to reply to the *Letter*, which I addreſſed to him, in anſwer to his animadverſions on this treatiſe. It has not been my fault, if able men have not been engaged in the diſcuſſion of this important ſubject.

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THE

THE DOCTRINE OF PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY ILLUSTRATED.

SECTION I.

Of the true STATE OF THE QUESTION *reſpecting Liberty and Neceſſity.*

ONE of the chief ſources of the difference of opinion reſpecting the ſubject of *liberty and neceſſity*, and likewiſe of much of the difficulty that has attended the diſcuſſion of it, ſeems to have been a want of attention to the proper *ſtating of the queſtion*. Hence it has come to paſs, that the generality of thoſe who have ſtood forth in defence of what they have called *liberty*, do, in fact, admit every thing

that is requiſite to eſtabliſh the doctrine of neceſſity; but they have miſled themſelves, and others, by *the uſe of words*; and alſo, wanting ſufficient *ſtrength of mind*, they have been ſtaggered at the conſequences of their own principles. I ſhall, therefore, begin with ſome obſervations, which, I hope, may tend to throw light upon the nature of the ſubject in debate, and help the reader to underſtand what it is that, as a neceſſarian, I contend for.

In the firſt place, I would obſerve, that I allow to man all the liberty, or power, that is *poſſible in itſelf*, and to which the ideas of mankind in general ever go, which is the *power of doing whatever they will, or pleaſe*, both with reſpect to the operations of their minds, and the motions of their bodies, uncontrolled by any foreign principle, or cauſe. Thus, every man is at liberty to turn his thoughts to whatever ſubject he pleaſes, to conſider the reaſons for or againſt any ſcheme or propoſition, and to reflect upon them as long as he ſhall think proper; as well as to walk wherever he pleaſes, and to do

do whatever his hands and other limbs are capable of doing.

Mr. Hobbes has given the following clear and happy illuſtration of this ſubject. "Li-"berty," ſays he *, "is the abſence of all "impediments to action, that are not con-"tained in the nature and intrinſic quality "of the agent. As for example, water is "ſaid to deſcend freely, or to have liberty "to deſcend, by the channel of the river, "becauſe there is no impediment that way, "but not acroſs, becauſe the banks are im-"pediments. And though the water can-"not aſcend, yet men never ſay it wants *li-"berty* to aſcend, but the *faculty* or *power*; "becauſe the impediment is *in the nature of "the water*, and *intrinſically*. So alſo we "ſay, he that is tied wants the liberty to "go, becauſe the impediment is not in *him*, "but in his *bands*; whereas we ſay not ſo "of him that is ſick or lame, becauſe the "impediment is *in himſelf*."

* See his Works, p. 483.

In acknowledging in man a liberty to do whatever he pleaſes, I grant not only all the liberty that the generality of mankind have any idea of, or can be made to underſtand, but alſo all that many of the profeſſed advocates for liberty, againſt the doctrine of neceſſity, have claimed. "How needleſs, "ſays Mr. Wollaſton *, to me ſeem thoſe "diſputes about *human liberty*, with which "men have tired themſelves and the world. "—Sure it is in a man's power to keep his "hand from his mouth. If it is, it is alſo "in his power to forbear exceſs in eating "and drinking. If he has the command of "his own feet, ſo as to go either this way "or that, or no whither, as ſure he has, "it is in his power to abſtain from vicious "company and vicious places, and ſo on."

Again he ſays †. "I can move my hand "upwards or downwards, &c. juſt as I will, "&c. The motion, or the reſt of my hand, "depends upon my will, and is alterable "upon thought, at my pleaſure. If then

* Religion of Nature, p. 112. † P. 346.

"I will

"I will, as I am ſenſible I have a *power* of "moving my hand, in a manner which it "would not move in by thoſe laws which "mere bodies, already in motion, or under "the force of gravitation, would obſerve, "this motion depends ſolely upon my *will*, "and *begins* there." I would obſerve, however, that it by no means follows, that becauſe the motion depends upon the *will*, it therefore *begins* there; the will itſelf being determined by ſome motive.

Mr. Locke acknowledges that, properly ſpeaking, freedom does not belong to the *will*, but to the *man*; and agreeable to the definition of liberty given above, he ſays*, "As far as a man has power to think or not "to think, to move or not to move, ac-"cording to the preference or direction of "his own mind, ſo far is a man free." The will, he acknowledges, is always determined by the moſt *preſſing uneaſineſs*, or *deſire*†; as he alſo acknowledges, that it is *happineſs*, and *that alone*, that moves the

* Eſſay, vol. I. p. 193. † P. 204.

deſire *. And all the liberty that he contends for, and for the exiſtence of which he appeals to experience, is a liberty that I am far from diſclaiming, viz. a liberty of *ſuſpending our determinations*.

"The mind," ſays he †, "having, in "moſt caſes, as is evident in experience, a "power to ſuſpend the execution and ſa-"tisfaction of any of its deſires, and ſo of "all, one after another, is at liberty to con-"ſider the objects of them, examine them "on all ſides, and weigh them with others. "In this lies the liberty a man has. He "has a power to ſuſpend the proſecution of "this or that deſire, as every one daily may "experience in himſelf. This ſeems to me "the ſource of all liberty. In this ſeems "to conſiſt that which is, as I think, im-"properly called *free will*."

I would only obſerve with reſpect to this, that a determination to ſuſpend a volition, is, in fact, *another volition*, and therefore,

* P. 209. † Ibid.

according

according to Mr. Locke's own rule, muſt be determined by the moſt preſſing uneaſineſs, as well as any other. If any man voluntarily ſuſpends his determination, it is not without ſome motive, or reaſon; as, for inſtance, becauſe he is apprehenſive of ſome ill conſequence ariſing from a haſty and inconſiderate reſolution. On the other hand, if he determines immediately, it is becauſe he has no ſuch apprehenſion. In fact, all the liberty that Mr. Locke contends for, is perfectly conſiſtent with the doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity, though he does not ſeem to have been aware of it.

All the *liberty*, or rather *power*, that I ſay a man has not, is that of *doing ſeveral things when all the previous circumſtances* (including the *ſtate of his mind*, and his *views of things*) are preciſely the ſame. What I contend for is, that, with the ſame ſtate of mind (the ſame ſtrength of any particular paſſion, for example) and the ſame views of things, (as any particular object appearing equally deſirable) he would always, voluntarily, make the ſame choice, and come to the ſame

determination. For inſtance, if I make any particular choice to-day, I ſhould have done the ſame yeſterday, and ſhall do the ſame to-morrow, provided there be no change in the ſtate of my mind reſpecting the object of the choice.

In other words, I maintain, that there is ſome *fixed law of nature reſpecting the will*, as well as the other powers of the mind, and every thing elſe in the conſtitution of nature; and, conſequently, that it is never determined without ſome real or apparent *cauſe*, foreign to itſelf, i. e. without ſome *motive of choice*, or that motives influence us in ſome definite and invariable manner; ſo that every volition, or choice, is conſtantly regulated, and determined, by what precedes it. And this *conſtant* determination of mind, according to the motives preſented to it, is all that I mean by its *neceſſary determination*. This being admitted to be the fact, there will be a neceſſary connection between all things paſt, preſent, and to come, in the way of proper *cauſe and effect*, as much in the intellectual, as in the natural world; ſo that

that, how little ſoever the bulk of mankind may be apprehenſive of it, or ſtaggered by it, according to the eſtabliſhed laws of nature, no event could have been otherwiſe than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*, and therefore all things paſt, preſent, and to come, are preciſely what the Author of nature really intended them to be, and has made proviſion for,

SECTION II.

Of the Argument in favour of the Doctrine of Neceſſity from the conſideration of CAUSE AND EFFECT.

TO eſtabliſh the concluſion defined in the preceding ſection, nothing is neceſſary but that, throughout all nature, the ſame conſequences ſhould invariably reſult from the ſame circumſtances. For, if this be admitted, it will neceſſarily follow, that at the commencement of any ſyſtem, ſince the ſeveral parts of it, and their reſpective ſituations,

ſituations, were appointed by the Deity, the firſt change would take place according to a *certain rule*, eſtabliſhed by himſelf, the reſult of which would be a *new ſituation*; after which, the ſame laws continuing, another change would ſucceed, according to the ſame rules, and ſo on for ever; every new ſituation invariably leading to another, and every event, from the commencement to the termination of the ſyſtem, being ſtrictly connected; ſo that, unleſs the fundamental laws of the ſyſtem were changed, it would be impoſſible that any event ſhould have been otherwiſe than it was; juſt as the preciſe place where a billiard ball reſts, is neceſſarily determined by the impulſe given to it at firſt, notwithſtanding its impinging againſt ever ſo many other balls, or the ſides of the table.

In all theſe caſes the circumſtances preceding any change, are called the *cauſes* of that change; and ſince a determinate event, or effect, conſtantly follows certain circumſtances, or cauſes, the connection between the cauſe and the effect is concluded to be *invariable*, and therefore *neceſſary*.

This

This chain of cauſes and effects cannot be broken, but by ſuch a proviſion in the conſtitution of nature, as that the ſame event ſhall not certainly follow the ſame preceding circumſtances. In this caſe, indeed, it might be truly ſaid, that any particular event might have been otherwiſe than it was, there having been no certain proviſion in the laws of nature for determining it to be *this* rather than *that*. But then this event, not being preceded by any circumſtances that determined it to be what it was, would be *an effect without a cauſe*. For a *cauſe* cannot be defined to be any thing but *ſuch previous circumſtances as are conſtantly followed by a certain effect*; the *conſtancy* of the reſult making us conclude, that there muſt be a *ſufficient reaſon* in the nature of the things, why it ſhould be produced in thoſe circumſtances. So that, in all caſes, if the reſult be different, either the circumſtances muſt have been different, or there were no circumſtances whatever correſponding to the difference in the reſult; and conſequently the effect was without any cauſe at all.

Theſe

Theſe maxims are univerſal, being equally applicable to all things that belong to the conſtitution of nature, corporeal, or mental. If, for inſtance, I take a pair of ſcales loaded with equal weights, they both remain in equilibrio. By throwing an additional weight into one of the ſcales, I make a change in the circumſtances, which is immediately followed by a *new ſituation*, viz. a depreſſion of the one, and an elevation of the oppoſite ſcale; and having obſerved the ſame effect before, I was able to foretel that this depreſſion of the one ſcale, and elevation of the other, would be the certain conſequence. It could not be otherwiſe while the ſame laws of nature were preſerved. In order to its being poſſible for it to have been otherwiſe, the laws of nature muſt have been ſo framed, as that, upon throwing in the additional weight, the ſcale might, or might not, have been depreſſed; or it might have been depreſſed without any additional weight at all. But in this caſe, there would have been an effect without a cauſe; there having been no *change of circumſtances*

ſtances previous to the change of ſituation, viz. the depreſſion of the ſcale. In fact, this is the only reaſon why we ſay that ſuch an effect would have been produced without a cauſe.

In every determination of mind, or in caſes where volition or choice is concerned, all the previous circumſtances to be conſidered are the *ſtate of mind* (including every thing belonging to the *will itſelf*) and the *views of things* preſented to it; the latter of which is generally called the *motive*, though under this term ſome writers comprehend them both. To diſtinguiſh the *manner* in which events depending upon *will* and *choice* are produced, from thoſe in which no volition is concerned, the former are ſaid to be produced *voluntarily*, and the latter *mechanically*. But the ſame general maxims apply to them both. We may not be able to determine *a priori* how a man will act in any particular caſe, but it is becauſe we are not particularly acquainted with his *diſpoſition of mind*, *preciſe ſituation*, and *views of things*. But neither can we tell

tell which way the wind will blow to-morrow, though the *air* is certainly ſubject to no other than neceſſary laws of motion.

A particular determination of mind could not have been otherwiſe than it was, if the laws of nature reſpecting the mind be ſuch, as that the ſame determination ſhall conſtantly follow the ſame ſtate of mind, and the ſame views of things. And it could not be poſſible for any determination to have been otherwiſe than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*, unleſs the laws of nature had been ſuch, as that, though both the ſtate of mind, and the views of things, were the ſame, the determination might, or might not, have taken place. But in this caſe, the determination muſt have been an effect without a cauſe, becauſe in this caſe, as in that of the balance, there would have been *a change of ſituation without any previous change of circumſtances*; and there cannot be any other definition of an effect without a cauſe. The application of the term *voluntary* to mental determinations cannot

cannot poſſibly make the leaſt difference in this caſe.

If the laws of nature be ſuch, as that, in given circumſtances, I conſtantly make a definite choice, my conduct through life is determined by the Being who made me, and placed me in the circumſtances in which I firſt found myſelf. For the conſequence of the firſt given circumſtances was a *definitive voluntary determination*, which bringing me into other circumſtances, was followed by another definite determination, and ſo on from the beginning of life to the end of it; and upon no ſcheme whatever can this chain of ſituations of mind, and conſequent mental determinations, or of cauſes and effects, be broken, but by a conſtitution which ſhall provide that, in given circumſtances, there ſhall no definite determination follow; or that, without any change in the previous circumſtances, there ſhall be a ſubſequent change of ſituation; which, as was obſerved before, would be an effect without a cauſe, a thing impoſſible, even to *divine power*, becauſe impoſ-

ſible

ſible to *power abſtractedly conſidered*. Beſides, if *one* effect might take place without a ſufficient cauſe, another, and all effects, might have been without a cauſe; which entirely takes away the only argument for the being of a God.

It may, perhaps, help to clear up this matter to ſome perſons, to conſider that the term *voluntary* is not oppoſed to *neceſſary*, but only to *involuntary*, and that nothing can be oppoſed to neceſſary, but *contingent*. For a voluntary motion may be regulated by *certain rules* as much as a mechanical one; and if it be regulated by any certain rules, or laws, it is as neceſſary as any mechanical motion whatever. Though, therefore, a man's determination be *his own*, the cauſes of it exiſting and operating within himſelf, yet if it be ſubject to any fixed laws, there cannot be any circumſtances in which two different determinations might equally have taken place. For that would exclude the influence of all laws.

There

There may be circumſtances, indeed, in which a variety of determinations, though confined within certain limits, might take place; but thoſe are *general* circumſtances. Circumſcribe the circumſtances, and a number of the poſſible determinations will be precluded; and when the circumſtances are ſtrictly limited, the determination can be no other than preciſely one and the ſame; and whenever thoſe preciſe circumſtances occur again (the inclination of mind being the ſame, and the views of things preciſely the ſame alſo) the very ſame determination, or choice, will certainly be made. The choice is, indeed, a man's own making, and voluntary; but in voluntarily making it, he follows the laws of his nature, and invariably makes it in a certain definite manner. To ſuppoſe the moſt perfectly voluntary choice to be made without regard to the laws of nature, ſo that with the ſame inclination, and degree of inclination, and the ſame views of things preſented to us, we might be even voluntarily diſpoſed to chooſe either of two different things at the ſame moment of time,

is juſt as impoſſible as that an involuntary or mechanical motion ſhould depend upon no certain law or rule, or that any other effect ſhould exiſt without an adequate cauſe.

What is moſt extraordinary is, that there are perſons who admit this indiſſoluble chain of circumſtances and effects, ſo that nothing could have been otherwiſe than it is, and yet can imagine that they are defending the doctrine of philoſophical liberty, and oppoſing the doctrine of neceſſity. The author of *Letters on Materialiſm*, ſays *, that "the moral influence of motives is as *cer-* "*tain*, though not *neceſſitating*, as is the phy- "ſical cauſe." But this is a diſtinction merely *verbal*. For the only reaſon that we can have to believe in any *cauſe*, and that it acts *neceſſarily*, is that it acts *certainly*, or *invariably*. If my mind be as *conſtantly* determined by the influence of motives, as a ſtone is determined to fall to the ground by the influence of gravity, I am conſtrained to conclude, that the *cauſe* in the one caſe acts as neceſſarily as that in the other. For

* P. 171.

there

there muſt be an *equally ſufficient reaſon* for equally conſtant and certain effects.

No leſs fallacious is it to ſay, with this writer *, that "motives do not impel or "determine a man to act; but that a man, "from the view of the motives, determines "himſelf to act." For if he certainly and conſtantly determines himſelf to act according to motives, there muſt be a ſufficient *reaſon* why motives have this influence over him. If, in fact, he never do act contrary to their influence, it can only be becauſe he has *no power* ſo to do; and, therefore, he is ſubject to an abſolute neceſſity, as much upon this as upon any other method of ſtating the queſtion. By ſuch poor evaſions do ſome perſons think to ſhelter themſelves from the force of conviction.

I do not think it at all *neceſſary* to add any thing to what I have advanced above, in illuſtration of the argument from the nature of *cauſe and effect*. But becauſe this is the great, and the moſt concluſive argu-

* P. 166.

ment for the doctrine that I contend for, proving the contrary doctrine of *philoſophical liberty* to be abſolutely *impoſſible*; and I find that ſeveral perſons of excellent judgment in other reſpects, ſeem not to feel the force of it, I ſhall attempt a farther illuſtration of it, in order to remove, as far as I am able, the only remaining objection that I can imagine may be made to it; though I muſt aſk pardon of my other readers, for writing what will appear to them ſo very obvious and ſuperfluous.

It is univerſally acknowledged, that there can be no effect without an adequate cauſe. This is even the foundation on which the only proper argument for the being of a God reſts. And the neceſſarian aſſerts that if, in any given ſtate of mind, with reſpect both to *diſpoſition* and *motives*, two different determinations, or volitions, be poſſible, it can be ſo on no other principle, than that one of them ſhall come under the deſcription of *an effect without a cauſe*; juſt as if the beam of a balance might incline either way, though loaded with equal weights.

It

It is acknowledged, that the mechaniſm of the balance is of one kind, and that of the mind of another, and therefore it may be convenient to denominate them by different words; as, for inſtance, that of the balance may be termed a *phyſical*, and that of the mind a *moral* mechaniſm. But ſtill, if there be a *real mechaniſm* in both caſes, ſo that there can be only one reſult from the ſame previous circumſtances, there will be a *real neceſſity*, enforcing an abſolute certainty in the event. For it muſt be underſtood, that all that is ever meant by *neceſſity in a cauſe*, is that which produces *certainty in the effect*.

If, however, the term *neceſſity* give offence, I, for my part, have no objection to the diſuſe of it, provided we can expreſs, in any other manner, that property in cauſes, or the previous circumſtances of things, that leads to abſolute certainty in the effects that reſult from them; ſo that, without a miracle, or an over-ruling of the ſtated laws of nature, *i. e.* without the intervention of

a higher cauſe, no determination of the will could have been otherwiſe than it has been.

To evade the force of this argument from the nature of cauſe and effect, it is ſaid that, though, in a given ſtate of mind, two different determinations may take place, neither of them can be ſaid to be without a ſufficient cauſe; for that, in this caſe, the cauſe is *the mind itſelf*, which makes the determination in a manner independent of all influence of motives.

But to this I anſwer, that the mind itſelf, independent of the influence of every thing that comes under the deſcription of *motive*, bearing an equal relation to both the determinations, cannot poſſibly be conſidered as a cauſe with reſpect to either of them, in preference to the other. Becauſe, excluſive of what may properly be called motive, there is no imaginable difference in the circumſtances immediately preceding the determinations. Every thing tending to produce the leaſt degree of inclination to one

of

of the determinations more than to the other, muſt make a difference in the *ſtate of mind* with reſpect to them, which, by the ſtating of the caſe, is expreſſly excluded. And I will venture to ſay, that no perſon, let his bias in favour of a ſyſtem be ever ſo great, will chuſe to ſay in ſupport of it, that the mind can poſſibly take one of two determinations, without having for it ſomething that may, at leaſt, be called an *inclination* for it, in preference to the other; and that inclination, or whatever elſe it be called, muſt have had a cauſe producing it, in ſome previous affection of the mind.

In ſhort, let ever ſo much ingenuity be ſhown in ſtating this caſe, it is impoſſible not to come at length to this concluſion, that, in no caſe whatever, can the mind be determined to action, *i. e.* to a volition, without ſomething that may as well be called a *motive* as be expreſſed in any other manner. For the reaſon, or proper cauſe, of every determination muſt neceſſarily be ſomething either in the ſtate of the mind itſelf,

or in the ideas preſent to it, immediately before the determination; and theſe ideas, as they impreſs the mind, may, ſtrictly ſpeaking, be comprehended in what we mean by the *ſtate of mind*, including whatever there is in it that can lead to any determination whatever. Or, on the other hand, the ſtate of mind may be included in the meaning of the term *motive*, comprehending in the ſignification of it whatever it be that can *move*, or *incline* the mind to any particular determination.

It appears to me, that it may juſt as well be ſaid that, in the caſe of the balance above-mentioned, the beam may be the cauſe why, though equal weights be ſuſpended at the different ends of it, it may nevertheleſs incline one way or the other. For, excluſive of what neceſſarily comes under the deſcription either of *motive*, or *ſtate of mind*, the mind itſelf can no more be the cauſe of its own determination, than the beam of a balance can be the cauſe of its own inclination.

In

In the caſe of the beam it is immediately perceived that, bearing an equal relation to both the weights, it cannot poſſibly favour one of them more than the other; and it is ſimply on account of its bearing an equal relation to them both that it cannot do this. Now, let the ſtructure of the mind be ever ſo different from that of the balance, it neceſſarily agrees with it in this, that, excluſive of motives, in the ſenſe explained above (viz. including both the ſtate of mind and the particular ideas preſent to it) it bears as equal a relation to any determination, as the beam of a balance bears to any particular inclination; ſo that as, on account of this circumſtance, the balance cannot of itſelf incline one way or the other, ſo neither, on account of the ſame circumſtance, can the mind of itſelf incline, or determine, one way or the other.

In fact, an advocate for the doctrine of philoſophical liberty has the choice of no more than *two ſuppoſitions*, and neither of them can, in the leaſt degree, anſwer his purpoſe.

purpoſe. For he muſt either aſſert that, in a given ſtate of mind, the determination will certainly be *a* and not *b*; or it may be either *a* or *b*. If he adopts the former, he may juſt as well ſay at once, that the determination will *neceſſarily* be *a*, and that without a miracle it cannot be *b*. For any other language that he can poſſibly uſe, can do no more than ſerve to hide what might otherwiſe be obnoxious in the ſentiment, and will leave it ſtill true, that, without a miracle, or the intervention of ſome foreign cauſe, no volition, or action of any man could have been otherwiſe than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*, which is all that a neceſſarian contends for. And if, on the contrary, he chuſes to aſſert that, in the ſame ſtate of mind, the determinations *a* and *b* are equally poſſible, one of them muſt be *an effect without a cauſe*, a ſuppoſition which overturns all reaſoning concerning appearances in nature, and eſpecially the foundation of the only proper argument for the being of a God. For if any thing whatever, even a thought in the mind of man, could ariſe without an ade-

quate

quate cauſe, any thing elſe, the mind itſelf, or the whole univerſe, might likewiſe exiſt without a cauſe.

I own it is irkſome to enter into ſo minute a diſcuſſion of an objection, that appears to me to be ſo little deſerving of an anſwer; and it is only with a view to obviate every thing that *has been*, or that I can foreſee *may be* urged, with the leaſt plauſibility, that I have conſidered it at all. If this do not give ſatisfaction, I own I do not think it will be in my power to give ſatisfaction with reſpect to this argument, or any other. There does not appear to me to be, in the whole compaſs of reaſoning, that I am acquainted with, a more concluſive argument, than that for the doctrine of neceſſity from the conſideration of the nature of *cauſe and effect*.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Of the Argument for Neceſſity from the DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

AS it is not within the compaſs of *power* in the author of any ſyſtem, that an event ſhould take place without a cauſe, or that it ſhould be equally poſſible for two different events to follow the ſame circumſtances, ſo neither, ſuppoſing this to be poſſible, would it be within the compaſs of *knowledge* to foreſee ſuch a contingent event. So that, upon the doctrine of philoſophical liberty, the Divine Being could not poſſibly foreſee what would happen in his own creation, and therefore could not provide for it; which takes away the whole foundation of *divine providence*, and moral government, as well as all the foundation of *revealed religion*, in which *prophecies* are ſo much concerned.

That

That an event truly contingent, or not neceſſarily depending upon previous circumſtances, ſhould be the object of knowledge, has, like other things of a ſimilar nature, in modern ſyſtems, been called a *difficulty* and a *myſtery*; but in reality there cannot be a greater abſurdity, or contradiction. For as certainly as nothing can be known *to exiſt*, but what does exiſt, ſo certainly can nothing be known *to ariſe from what does exiſt*, but what does ariſe from it, or depend upon it. But, according to the definition of the terms, a contingent event does not depend upon any previous known circumſtances; ſince ſome other event might have ariſen in the ſame circumſtances.

All that is within the compaſs of knowledge in this caſe is, to foreſee all the different events that might take place in the ſame circumſtances; but which of them will *actually* take place cannot poſſibly be known. In this caſe all degrees of knowledge or ſagacity are equal. Did the caſe admit of *approximation* to certainty, in proportion to the *degree* of knowledge, it would

would be fully within the compaſs of infinite knowledge; but in this caſe there is no ſuch approximation. To all minds the foretelling of a contingent event is equally a matter of conjecture: conſequently, even infinite knowledge makes no difference in this caſe. For *knowledge* ſuppoſes an *object*, which, in this caſe, does not *exiſt*, and therefore cannot be *known to exiſt* *. If man be poſſeſſed of a power of proper *ſelf-determination*, the Deity himſelf cannot control it (as

* Having in my *Anſwer to Mr. Bryant*, which I ſhall probably never re-print, ſtated the argument from preſcience a little more diſtinctly, I ſhall inſert the ſubſtance of it in a note in this place.

Nothing can be *ſeen to be* what it is not, becauſe it would then *be* what it is not. The Deity himſelf cannot ſee black to be white, or white black; becauſe black is not white, nor is white black. If ſight, or perception, or knowledge in general, cannot change the antecedent nature of objects, neither can the divine perception, or knowledge. Otherwiſe the Deity might ſee two to be three, or three two.

If this be juſt; it muſt be true, and no preſumption, to aſſert, that the Deity himſelf cannot ſee that to be *certain*, which is in itſelf *contingent*, or that to be contingent,

(as far as he interferes, it is no ſelf-determination of the man) and if he does not *control* it, he cannot *foreſee* it. Nothing can be known at preſent, except *itſelf*, or its *neceſſary cauſe*, exiſt at preſent. Yet the whole hiſtory of revelation ſhews, that every determination of the mind of man is certainly fore-known by the Divine Being; determinations that took place from *natural* and *common cauſes*, where the mind was under no ſupernatural influence whatever; be-

tingent, which is abſolutely certain. Now, what is meant by any thing being *contingent*, but that it either *may*, or *may not be*? But for a thing to be *ſeen* as certain, it muſt in itſelf *be* certain; and, therefore, the poſſibility of its *not being* muſt be excluded. Conſequently, any event being foreſeen *certainly to be*, is incompatible with its being even *poſſible not to be*. Nothing, therefore, of which it can be truly ſaid that it either *may*, or *may not be*, can be an object of fore-knowledge, even to the Deity himſelf. To maintain the contrary is, in fact, the ſame thing as ſaying, that the ſame event is both contingent in itſelf, and yet certain to God; or that, though, in reality, it *may*, or *may not be*, yet, contrary to the nature and truth of things, he knows that it *certainly will be*. I therefore ſay, that if a man be poſſeſſed of a power of proper *ſelf-determination* (which implies, that the Deity himſelf cannot control it) the Deity himſelf cannot foreſee what the actual determination will be.

cauſe

cauſe men are *cenſured* and *condemned* for actions that were ſo foreſeen.

The death of our Saviour is a remarkable inſtance of this kind. This event was certainly foreſeen and intended, for it moſt particularly entered into the plan of divine providence; and yet it appears from the hiſtory, that it was brought about by cauſes perfectly natural, and fully adequate to it. It was juſt ſuch an event as might have been expected from the known malice and prejudice of the Jewiſh rulers, at the time of his appearance. They certainly needed no ſupernatural inſtigation to puſh them on to their bloody and wicked purpoſe; and Pilate, diſpoſed and ſituated as he was, needed no extraordinary impulſe to induce him to conſent to it, notwithſtanding his heſitation, and his conviction of the malice and injuſtice of the proceedings; and both he and the Jews were righteouſly condemned and puniſhed for it; which, I doubt not, will have the happieſt effect in the ſyſtem of the divine moral government.

This

This argument from the divine preſcience is briefly, but clearly ſtated, by Mr. Hobbes. "Denying neceſſity," ſays he *, "deſtroys "both the decrees and preſcience of Al- "mighty God. For whatever God has "purpoſed to bring to paſs by man, as an "inſtrument, or foreſees ſhall come to paſs, "a man, if he has liberty, might fruſtrate, "and make not come to paſs; and God "ſhould either not foreknow it, and not de- "cree it, or he ſhall foreknow ſuch things "ſhall be as ſhall never be, and decree what "ſhall never come to paſs."

Indeed, many of the moſt zealous advocates for the doctrine of philoſophical *liberty*, aware of its inconſiſtency with the doctrine of *divine preſcience*, have not ſcrupled to give up the latter altogether. With reſpect to ſuch perſons, I can only repeat what I have ſaid upon this ſubject in my *Examination of the Writings of Dr. Beattie*, &c. †

"Thus our author, in the blind rage of "diſputation, heſitates not to deprive the

* Works, p. 485. † P. 173.

" ever-bleſſed God of that very attribute,
" by which, in the books of ſcripture, he
" expreſſly diſtinguiſhes himſelf from all
" falſe Gods, and than which nothing can
" be more eſſentially neceſſary to the go-
" vernment of the univerſe, rather than re-
" linquiſh his fond claim to the fancied pri-
" vilege of *ſelf-determination*; a claim which
" appears to me to be juſt as abſurd as that
" of *ſelf-exiſtence*, and which could not poſ-
" ſibly do him any good if he had it."

What is more extraordinary, this power of *ſelf-determination* he arrogates to himſelf, without pretending to advance a ſingle rational argument in favour of his claim; but expects it will be admitted on the authority of his *inſtinctive common ſenſe* only. And yet, if a man expreſs the leaſt indignation at ſuch new and unheard-of arrogance, and in an argument of ſuch high importance as this, what *exclamation* and *abuſe* muſt he not expect?

SECTION

SECTION IV.

Of the cauſe of VOLITION, *and the nature of the* WILL.

IN all inveſtigations relating to human nature, the philoſopher will apply the ſame rules by which his inquiries have been conducted upon all other ſubjects. He will attentively conſider *appearances*, and will not have recourſe to more *cauſes* than are neceſſary to account for them.

He ſees a ſtone whirled round in a ſtring, and the planets perform their revolutions in circular orbits, and he judges, from *ſimilar appearances*, that they are all retained in their orbits by powers that draw them towards the centers of their reſpective motions. Again, a ſtone tends towards the earth by a power which is called *gravity*, and becauſe, ſuppoſing the planets to have the ſame tendency to the ſun, that the ſtone has to the earth, and to have been projected in tangents

to their preſent orbits, they would revolve exactly as they are now obſerved to do, the philoſopher, for that reaſon, concludes, that the force which retains them in their orbits is the very ſame power of gravity; and on this account only, viz. *not to multiply cauſes without neceſſity*, he refuſes to admit any other cauſe of the celeſtial motions.

Let us then conſider the actions of men in the ſame natural and ſimple view, without any apprehenſion of being miſled by it; and let it be enquired by what *rule* they are determined, or what are their *cauſes*.

Whenever any perſon makes a choice, or comes to any reſolution, there are two circumſtances which are evidently concerned in it, viz. what we call the *previous diſpoſition of the mind*, with reſpect to love or hatred, for example, approbation or diſapprobation, of certain objects, &c. and the ideas of external objects then preſent to the mind, that is, *the view of the objects* which the choice or reſolution reſpects.

Let

Let the objects be two kinds of fruit, *apples* and *peaches*. Let it be ſuppoſed that I am fond of the former, and have an averſion to the latter, and that I am diſpoſed to eat fruit. In theſe circumſtances, the moment that they are preſented to me, I take the apples, and leave the peaches. If it be aſked, *why* I made this choice, or what was the *reaſon*, *cauſe*, or *motive* of it? it is ſufficient to ſay, that I was fond of apples, but did not like peaches. In the ſame diſpoſition to eat fruit, and retaining my predilection for apples, I ſhould always, infallibly, do the ſame thing. The *cauſe* then of this choice was evidently my liking of apples, and my diſliking of peaches; and though an inclination, or affection of mind, be not gravity, it *influences* me, and *acts upon* me as certainly, and neceſſarily, as this power does upon a ſtone. *Affection* determines my choice of the apples, and *gravity* determines the fall of the ſtone. Through cuſtom we make uſe of different terms in theſe caſes, but our ideas are exactly ſimilar; the connexion between the two things, as *cauſe* and *effect*, being equally ſtrict and neceſſary.

As a philoſopher, therefore, I ought to acquieſce in this, and conſider *motives* as the proper *cauſes* of volitions and actions. And the more I examine my own actions, or thoſe of others, the more reaſon I ſee to be ſatisfied, that all volitions and actions are preceded by correſponding motives.

In all *regular deliberations* concerning any choice, every reaſon or motive is diſtinctly attended to, and whatever appears to be the ſtronger, or the better reaſon, always determines us. In theſe caſes, the *choice* and the *motive*, correſpond preciſely to an *effect* and its *cauſe*. In caſes that do not require a formal deliberation, i. e. in caſes ſimilar to thoſe in which I have often determined before, the moment I perceive my ſituation, I determine inſtantly, without attending diſtinctly, as before, to all the motives or reaſons. But this *inſtantaneous determination* cannot be ſaid not to be produced by motives, becauſe it is, in fact, only the ſame *mental proceſs abridged*, the action which was formerly connected, or aſſociated, with the ideas preſented to it by means of motives,

tives, being now itſelf immediately connected with thoſe ideas, without the diſtinct perception of the motives which formerly intervened.

This proceſs is exactly ſimilar to the aſſent of the mind to geometrical propoſitions that are not ſelf-evident; for example, that *all the inward angles of a right-lined triangle are equal to two right angles.* I do not perceive the truth of this, till the reaſon of it is explained to me; but, when this has been once done, I afterwards, without attending to the reaſon, and even, perhaps, without being able to aſſign it, if it were demanded of me, habitually conſider the two expreſſions as denoting the ſame quantity, and I argue from them accordingly.

Beſides, ſince every *deliberate choice* is regulated by motives, we ought, as philoſophers, to take it for granted, that *every choice* is made in the ſame manner, and is ſubject to the ſame rules, and therefore determined by motives, by ſomething that may be called liking or diſliking, approving or diſ-

approving, &c. depending upon the previous ſtate of the mind with reſpect to the object of choice; ſince the mere *facility*, or *readineſs*, with which a choice is made, cannot make it to be a thing *different in kind* from a choice made with the greateſt deliberation, and which took up ſo much time, that every circumſtance attending it could be diſtinctly perceived.

Moreover, we ſee evidently, not only that men are determined to act by certain motives, but that the *vigour* of their actions correſponds alſo to, what may be called, the *intenſity* of their motives. If a maſter be actuated ſimply by his anger, he will beat his ſervant more violently, and continue the correction longer, in proportion to the *degree* of his anger, or the apprehended cauſe of his diſpleaſure; and kindneſs operates exactly in the ſame manner, a ſtronger affection prompting to greater, and more kind offices, than a weaker.

Alſo oppoſite motives, as cauſes of love and hatred, are known to balance one another,

other, exactly like weights in oppoſite ſcales. According to all appearance, nothing can act more invariably, or mechanically. Is it poſſible, then, that a philoſopher, obſerving theſe conſtant and uniform appearances, ſhould not conclude, that the proper cauſe of a man's actions, are the motives by which he is influenced? Strengthen the motive, and the action is more vigorous; diminiſh it, and its vigour is abated; change the motive, and the action is changed; intirely withdraw it, and the action ceaſes; introduce an oppoſite motive of equal weight, and all action is ſuſpended, juſt as a limb is kept motionleſs by the equal action of antagoniſt muſcles. As far as we can judge, *motives* and *actions* do, in all poſſible caſes, ſtrictly correſpond to each other.

It cannot but be allowed by the moſt ſtrenuous advocates for metaphyſical liberty, that motives have *ſome real influence upon the mind.* It would be too manifeſt a contradiction to all experience, to aſſert, that all objects are indifferent to us, that there is nothing in any of them that can excite *de-*

ſire

ſire or *averſion*, or that deſire or averſion have no influence upon the *will*, and do not *incline us* to decide on what is propoſed to us. Now can it be ſuppoſed that the will, whatever it be, ſhould be of ſuch a nature, as both to be properly influenced, or acted upon, by motives, and likewiſe by ſomething that bears *no ſort of relation to motive*, and conſequently has a mode of action intirely different from that of motive? This cannot but appear exceedingly improbable, if not impoſſible.

Every other faculty of the mind has one uniform mode of operation, or affection. The *paſſions* are all excited by the view of proper objects, the *memory* is employed in retaining the ideas of things formerly impreſſed upon the mind, and the *judgment* in diſtinguiſhing the agreement or diſagreement of ideas; whereas, according to the modern metaphyſical hypotheſis, the *will* is of ſuch a nature, as to be influenced ſometimes by the paſſions or motives, and ſometimes in a manner in which neither paſſion nor motive have any thing to do, and of which

which it is not pretended that any idea can be given, but by ſaying, that it is *ſelf-determined*, which, in fact, gives no idea at all, or rather implies an abſurdity; viz. that a *determination*, which is an *effect*, takes place without any *cauſe* at all. For, excluſive of every thing that comes under the denomination of *motive*, there is really nothing at all left that can produce the determination. Let a man uſe what *words* he pleaſes, he can have no more *conception* how we can ſometimes be determined by motives, and ſometimes without any motive, than he can have of a ſcale being ſometimes weighed down by weights, and ſometimes by a kind of ſubſtance that has no weight at all, which, whatever it be in itſelf, muſt, with reſpect to the ſcale, be *nothing*.

Another argument for the neceſſary determination of the will, may be drawn from the analogy that it bears to the *judgment*. It is univerſally acknowledged, that the judgment is neceſſarily determined by the perceived agreement or diſagreement of ideas. Now the *will* is but a kind of judgment, depend-

depending upon the perceived *preferableneſs* of things propoſed to the mind; which apparent preferableneſs reſults as neceſſarily from the perception of the ideas themſelves, as that of their agreement, or diſagreement. In fact, all the difference between judgment and will is, that, in the former caſe, the determination relates to *opinions*, and in the latter to *actions*. The faculties of the mind, as the ancients have well obſerved, are only different modes in which the ſame principle acts; the judgment being the *mind judging*, and the will the *mind willing*; and it would be very extraordinary, indeed, if the ſame mind ſhould not be determined in a *ſimilar manner* in theſe two very ſimilar caſes, and that, if there be *a ſelf-determining will*, there ſhould not be *a ſelf-determining judgment* alſo. In reality, the latter is not more abſurd, and contrary to all appearances, than the former.

All that is advanced above goes upon the common ſuppoſition, of the will being a *diſtinct faculty* of the mind, and not of its being, according to Dr. Hartley's theory, together

together with all the other faculties, a particular caſe of the general property of the *aſſociation of ideas*, which is neceſſarily of a mechanical nature, or of its being included in the idea of *deſire*, which Dr. Price conſiders as only a motive with reſpect to the will.

But what is *deſire*, beſides a *wiſh* to obtain ſome apprehended good? and is not every wiſh a *volition*? Now, is it poſſible, that an apprehended good ſhould not be the object of deſire, whether controlled by ſome other deſire, &c. or not? For the ſame reaſon that a preſent good gives preſent pleaſure, an abſent good excites *deſire*, which, like any other of the paſſions, is univerſally allowed to be a perfectly mechanical thing. Since, therefore, deſire neceſſarily implies volition, we have here a clear caſe of the will being neceſſarily determined by the circumſtances which the mind is in; and if in *one caſe*, why not in *all others*? eſpecially as, in fact, every volition is nothing more than a deſire, viz. a deſire to accompliſh ſome

end,

end, which end may be conſidered as the *object* of the paſſion or affection?

That the determinations of what we call the will are, in fact, nothing more than a particular caſe of the general doctrine of aſſociation of ideas, and, therefore, a perfectly mechanical thing, I endeavoured to ſhew in the *Eſſay prefixed to my Examination of the Scotch Writers*. I ſhall in this place go over the argument again, more minutely.

Till the mind has been affected with a ſenſe of pleaſure or pain, all objects are alike indifferent to it; but ſome, in conſequence of being always accompanied with a perception of pleaſure, become pleaſing to us, while others, in conſequence of being accompanied with a ſenſe of pain, become diſpleaſing; and to effect this, nothing can be requſite but the aſſociation of agreeable ſenſations and ideas with the one, and of diſagreeable ones with the other. Admitting, therefore, the doctrine of aſſociation,

or

or that two ideas often occurring together, will afterwards introduce one another, we have all that is requiſite to the formation of all our *paſſions*, or *affections*; or of ſome things being the objects of love, and others of hatred to us.

The manner in which actions, adapted to ſecure a favourite object, become aſſociated with the idea of it, has been explained at large by Dr. Hartley; and it being univerſally admitted, that the view of a favourite object (of an apple to a child, for inſtance) is immediately followed by an attempt to ſeize it, I ſhall here take it for granted, that there is ſuch a neceſſary connexion of theſe ideas and motions; and that, in the ſame manner, whenever the idea of any favourite object is preſented to us, we endeavour to get it into our power.

If the favourite object be within our *immediate reach*, it will, upon theſe principles, be immediately ſeized; ſo that there will be no *interval* between the proſpect and the enjoyment, except what was neceſſarily taken

taken up in the bodily motions, &c. But this interruption, being nothing more than what muſt always have been experienced, will occaſion no pain or uneaſineſs; for all the parts of the whole proceſs being intimately connected in the mind, the enjoyment will, in fact, commence the moment that the object comes in view. Thus we ſee that perſons exceedingly hungry, are perfectly eaſy and happy all the time of a neceſſary and expeditious preparation for dinner, and are never impatient, or uneaſy, till the delay begins to be more than they had expected. An attentive obſerver of this proceſs, may call this ſtate of mind that of *certain expectation*, which is always pleaſurable, from the perfect aſſociation of all the ſtages of it with the final iſſue.

Let us now ſuppoſe this connected train of ideas to be interrupted. Let an apple, for inſtance, be ſhewn to a child, and immediately withdrawn, and thrown quite away; ſigns of uneaſineſs will be immediately perceived, the evident conſequence of the interruption of a train of aſſociated ideas,

ideas, which had begun to take place in the mind; and the ſtronger the aſſociation had been, in conſequence of its having been frequently repeated, and ſeldom interrupted before, the greater pain will be felt by the interruption. This painful ſtate of mind may be termed *diſappointment* and *deſpair*.

Let us, in the next place, ſuppoſe the object to be known to be capable *in itſelf* of giving a perſon great pleaſure, but to be intirely out of our reach, as the poſſeſſion of a great eſtate to a poor man, or of a kingdom to a private gentleman. Having never had any *enjoyment*, or *hope* of it, this connected train of ideas, leading from the object to the enjoyment (the interruption of which would have given him pain) never took place, and conſequently it is regarded with perfect *indifference*.

If we be in circumſtances in which the favourite object has been known to be ſometimes obtained, and ſometimes not, the mind will be held in a kind of *middle ſtate* between certain expectation and deſpair,

which will be called *hope*, if we apprehend the chances to be in favour of our obtaining it, and *fear* if it be more probable that we ſhall not obtain it. To this ſtate of mind, viz. within the extreme limits of hope and fear, we apply the term *deſire*; and it is in this ſtate, which is of ſome continuance, that we diſtinctly perceive that affection of the mind to which we give the name of *wiſhing*, or *willing*.

But what is more properly called a *volition*, is moſt diſtinctly perceived when the object does not appear, at firſt ſight, to be deſirable or not, but requires that ſeveral circumſtances be conſidered and compared. When a child ſees an apple, and immediately catches at it, it is a ſimple caſe of the aſſociation of ideas, and if no other caſes had been known, the term *volition*, or *will*, would hardly have been thought of. But when the mind is kept in ſuſpence, between deſiring and not deſiring an object, the final *preponderancy of deſire* is called a *will*, or *wiſh to obtain it*, and the *prevalence of averſion*, is called a will, or *wiſh to decline it*.

it. This caſe, however, of a proper *volition* ſucceeding a deliberation, though more complex, is not leſs mechanical, and dependent upon preceding ideas, and on the ſtate of mind, than the others. It is ſtill nothing more than aſſociation of ideas, though the final, and prevailing aſſociation, has been for ſome time prevented from taking place, by a variety of inferior aſſociations.

The term *will* is as little applicable to determinations and actions *ſecondarily automatic*, as to thoſe that are *originally* ſo; of which I ſhall give an explanation, together with a caſe.

The firſt motions of the fingers, or legs of a child, are called *automatic*, being the immediate and mechanical effect of an external impreſſion, and not ariſing from any *idea* in the mind. To theſe motions the term *volition*, or *will*, is certainly not at all applicable.

Afterwards the ſame motions become aſſociated with ideas, at which time they be-

gin to be called *voluntary*, as when a child reaches out his hand to take an apple. But the motion is called *more perfectly voluntary*, in proportion as the ideas with which it is connected are more numerous and complex, and when other ideas, preſent to the mind at the ſame time, have a connection with oppoſite motions, ſo that it ſhall be ſome time before the prevailing aſſociation takes place.

But when the motion ſhall be as perfectly aſſociated with this *complex ſet of ideas*, or *ſtate of mind*, as it was with a *ſingle idea*, ſo that the one ſhall immediately follow the other, it is called *ſecondarily automatic*; and this being as inſtantaneous as an originally automatic motion, the term *volition* ceaſes to be applied to it. This is the caſe when a perſon walks without attending to the motion of his legs, or plays on a muſical inſtrument without thinking of the particular poſition of his fingers; each of which motions and poſitions, having been dependent upon ideas, was before performed with deliberation, and an expreſs volition.

As

As it is evident, from the obſervation of the fact, that automatic motions paſs into voluntary ones, and theſe again into thoſe that are ſecondarily automatic, it is evident, that they are all equally mechanical; the laſt proceſs, in particular, being nothing but the ſecond *ſhortened*, or, which is the ſame thing, the ſecond, or the perfectly voluntary motion, being the laſt, or the ſecondarily automatic, *extended*. As, therefore, the laſt is evidently mechanical, no attention of mind being employed in it, the ſecond muſt be ſo too, though an expreſs attention be given to it.

In every view of the ſubject, therefore, whether the will be conſidered in a popular, or a philoſophical ſenſe, it appears that its determinations muſt be directed by certain invariable laws, depending upon the previous ſtate of mind, and the ideas preſent to it, at the moment of forming any reſolution; ſo that, in no caſe whatever, could they have been otherwiſe than they actually were.

SECTION V.

Of the ſuppoſed CONSCIOUSNESS OF LIBERTY, *and the uſe of the term* AGENT.

THE greateſt difficulties in the conſideration of the ſubject of liberty and neceſſity have ariſen from *ambiguities in the uſe of terms*. To contribute, therefore, all that may be in my power to clear this important ſubject of the obſcurity in which it has been involved, I ſhall conſider the meaning of ſuch terms as appear to me to have had the greateſt ſhare in perplexing it; and, in doing this, I ſhall take an opportunity of replying to what that excellent man, and very able metaphyſician, Dr. Price, has advanced upon this ſubject, in his *Review of the Principles of Morals*, becauſe, it appears to me, that he has been miſled by the uſe of ſuch words.

"We

"We have, in truth," ſays he*, "the "ſame conſtant and neceſſary conſciouſneſs "of liberty that we have that we *think*, "*chooſe*, *will*, or even *exiſt*; and whatever "to the contrary men may ſay, it is impoſ- "ſible for them, in earneſt, to think they "have no *active ſelf-moving powers*, and are "not cauſes of their own volitions, or not "to aſcribe to *themſelves* what they muſt be "conſcious they *think* and *do*.

"A man chooſing to follow his judgment "and deſires, or his actually doing what he "is inclined to do, is what we mean when "we ſay *motives determine him*. At the ſame "time, it is very plain, that motives can "have no concern in effecting his determi- "nation, or that there is no *phyſical connec-* "*tion* between his judgment and views, and "the actions conſequent upon them. What "muſt be more abſurd than to ſay, that "*our inclinations act upon us, and compel* us, "that our *deſires and fears put us in motion*, "or *produce our volitions*, i. e. are *agents*; "and yet what is more conceivable, than

* P. 302.

" that they may be the *occaſions* of our put-
" ting ourſelves into motion? What ſenſe
" would there be in ſaying, that the ſitua-
" tion of a body, which may properly be
" the *occaſion*, or the *account*, of its being
" ſtruck by another body, is the *efficient* of
" its motion, or its *impeller*?"

I do not think that this objection to the doctrine of neceſſity can be expreſſed in a ſtronger or better manner, and I have purpoſely made this quotation, in order to meet the difficulty in its greateſt force; being confident, that, when the ideas are attended to, it will appear that the writer is, in fact, a neceſſarian; and, though unperceived by himſelf, is, *in words only*, an advocate for the doctrine of metaphyſical liberty. In order to avoid all ambiguity myſelf, I ſhall deſcribe the *fact*, with reſpect to human nature, in ſuch a manner as, I think, it ſhall hardly be poſſible to be miſled by words.

Man is a being of ſuch a make, that when certain things, two kinds of fruit, for inſtance, are propoſed to him, they become the

the objects of deſire, in different degrees, according to his experience of their different qualities, their wholeſomeneſs, the pleaſure they give to his taſte, and various other conſiderations. As the *deſireableneſs*, in this caſe, is complex, and the impreſſion that each circumſtance belonging to it makes upon the mind is alſo various, depending upon the momentary ſtate of it, the preſence or abſence of other ideas, &c. it is poſſible that the comparative deſirableneſs of the two fruits may vary much in a ſhort ſpace of time, ſometimes the one, and ſometimes the other, having the aſcendant. But, provided the man were obliged to make a choice at any one moment of time, it will not be denied, that he would certainly chooſe that which appeared to him, for that moment, the more deſirable. If he were under no reſtraint whatever, it is poſſible, that, on ſome accounts, he might chooſe to make no choice at all, and he might neglect both the kinds of fruit. But ſtill it would be becauſe that conduct appeared *more deſireable* than the other, i. e. *preferable* to it.

This,

This, I will venture to ſay, is all that a man can poſſibly be *conſcious of*, viz. that nothing hinders his chooſing, or taking, whichſoever of the fruits appears to him more deſirable, or his not making any choice at all, according as the one or the other ſhall appear to him preferable upon the whole. But there is always ſome *reaſon* for any object, or any conduct, appearing deſirable or preferable; a reaſon exiſting either in a man's own previous *diſpoſition of mind*, or in his *idea of the things* propoſed to him. In things of ſmall conſequence, or in a very quick ſucceſſion of ideas, the reaſon may be forgotten, or even not be explicitly attended to; but it did exiſt, and actually contributed to make the thing, or the conduct, appear deſirable at the time.

As this is all that any man can be conſcious of with reſpect to himſelf, ſo it is all that he can obſerve with reſpect to others. Agreeably to this, whenever we either reflect upon our own conduct, or ſpeculate concerning that of others, we never fail to conſider,

conſider, or aſk, what could be the *motive* of ſuch or ſuch a choice; always taking for granted, that there muſt have been ſome motive or other for it; and we never ſuppoſe, in ſuch caſes, that any choice could be made without ſome motive, ſome *apparent reaſon* or other.

When it is ſaid, that a man acts from *mere will* (though this is not common language) the word is never uſed in a ſtrict metaphyſical ſenſe, or for will under the influence of no motive; but the meaning is, that, in ſuch a caſe, a man acts from *wilfulneſs*, or *obſtinacy*, i. e. to reſiſt the control of others; the motive being to *ſhew his liberty, and independence*, which is far from being a caſe in which a man is ſuppoſed to act without any motive at all.

The *conſciouſneſs of freedom*, therefore, is an ambiguous expreſſion, and cannot prove any thing in favour of philoſophical or metaphyſical liberty; but, when rightly underſtood, appears to decide in favour of the doctrine of neceſſity, or the neceſ-

ſary

ſary influence of motives to determine the choice.

If what has been ſtated be the fact, and the whole fact (and for the truth of the repreſentation I appeal to every man's own feeling and perſuaſion) it muſt be quite arbitrary, and can have no ſort of conſequence, except what is merely verbal, whether I ſay, that the *cauſe* of the choice was the *motive* for it (which Dr. Price very properly defines to be the *judgment*, or the *deſire*) or the *mind*, in which that choice takes place, that is, *myſelf*, or ſome other perſon; and to this cauſe it is that we aſcribe the *agency*, or *determining power*. In the former caſe it is the power, or force, of the motive, and in the latter that of the perſon. In either caſe there is a certain *effect*, and the concurrence of two circumſtances, viz. a *motive*, and a *mind*, to which that motive is preſented, or in which it exiſts, for the *cauſe* of the effect.

If, according to the deſcription given above, any perſon will maintain, that, notwithſtanding

withſtanding there be a real effect, and a ſufficient cauſe, there is no proper *agency* at all, merely becauſe the will is neceſſarily determined by motives, nothing follows but that, out of complaiſance, I may ſubſtitute ſome other word in its place. For if it be aſſerted, that we have a conſciouſneſs of any other kind of agency than has been deſcribed, the fact is denied, and I challenge any perſon to do more than merely aſſert it. Without any other kind of agency than I have deſcribed, the whole buſineſs of human life, conſiſting of a ſucceſſion of volitions, and correſponding actions, goes on, juſt as we obſerve it to do, and every juſt rule of life, reſpecting the regulation of the will, and the conduct, has a perfect propriety and uſe; but no propriety, or uſe at all, on any other hypotheſis.

However, I have no objection to meet Dr. Price upon his own ground in this inſtance, viz. appealing to the eſtabliſhed *uſe of words*, with reſpect to the proper *cauſe* of volitions and actions. He ſays, "What would be "more abſurd than to ſay, that our *inclina-*

"*tions*

"*tions act upon us*, and *compel us*, that our "*desires and fears put us into motion*, or *pro-* "*duce our volitions*." Absurd as this language appears to Dr. Price, it is, in fact, the common style in which the conduct of men is described, and certainly proves, that, if men have any ideas really corresponding to their words, they do consider the motives of mens actions to be, in a proper sense, the *causes* of them, more properly than the mind, which is *determined by the motives*. This also is common popular language, and therefore must have a foundation in the common apprehension of mankind.

Dr. Price says, "If our inclinations com- "pel us to act, if our desires and fears put "us into motion, they are the *agents*; where- "as they are, properly, only the occasion "of our putting ourselves into motion." But what can this be, besides a mere verbal distinction? If it be universally true, that the action certainly follows the motive, i. e. the inclination of the mind, and the views of things presented to it, it is all that a necessarian can wish for; all his *conclusions* follow,

follow, and he leaves it to others to ring changes upon words, and vary their expreſſions at pleaſure.

Dr. Price, however, is particularly unhappy in what he advances in ſupport of this arbitrary and verbal diſtinction. "What ſenſe," ſays he, "can there be in ſaying "that the ſituation of a body, which may "properly be the *occaſion*, or the *account* of "its being ſtruck by another body, is the "*efficient* of its motion, or its *impeller*?" Whereas, according to his own definition of *motive*, it includes both the inclination, or *diſpoſition of the mind*, and the *views of things preſented to it*, and this manifeſtly takes in both the *impelling body*, and *the ſituation* in which the body impelled by it is found; which, according to his own deſcription, includes the *whole cauſe* of the impulſe, or every thing that contributes to its being impelled. And of theſe two circumſtances, viz. the inclination of the mind, and the view of an object, it is the *latter* that is generally, and in a more eſpecial ſenſe, called the *motive*, and compared to the *impeller* (to uſe

uſe Dr. Price's language) while the inclination, or diſpoſition, of the mind, is only conſidered as a *circumſtance* which gives the motive an opportunity of acting upon it, or impelling it, and producing its proper effect. In this I appeal, as before, to the common ſenſe of mankind.

But, without regard to popular ideas, which Dr. Price may ſay are often founded on prejudice, and falſe views of things, I would conſider this matter with him as a *mathematician*, and a *philoſopher*; and I think I can ſhew him that, according to the mode of reaſoning univerſally received by the moſt *ſpeculative*, as well as the *vulgar*, we ought to conſider *motives* as the proper *cauſes* of human actions, though it is the *man* that is called the *agent*.

Suppoſe a philoſopher to be entirely ignorant of the conſtitution of the human mind, but to ſee, as Dr. Price acknowledges, that men do, in fact, act according to their *affections* and *deſires*, i. e. in one word, according to *motives*, would he not,

as

as in a case of the doctrine of chances, immediately infer that there must be a *fixed cause* for this coincidence of motives and actions? Would he not say that, though he could not see into the man, the connexion was *natural*, and *necessary*, because *constant*? And since the motives, in all cases, *precede* the actions, would he not naturally, i. e. according to the custom of philosophers in similar cases, say that the motive was the *cause* of the action? And would he not be led by the obvious analogy, to compare the mind to a balance, which was inclined this way or that, according to the motives presented to it.

It makes no difference to say, that the motive does not *immediately* produce the action. It is enough if it necessarily produce the immediate cause of the action, or the cause of the immediate cause, &c. for example, if the motive excite the *desire*, the desire determine the *will*, and the will produce the *action*. For contrive as many mediums of this kind as you please, it will still follow, that the action is *ultimately* according to the motive, *flows from it*, or *depends upon it*; and,

therefore, in proper philoſophical language, the motive ought to be called the *proper cauſe* of the action. It is as much ſo as any thing in nature is the cauſe of any thing elſe.

Since the common language of men correſponds to this view of the ſubject, it is a proof that, in fact, men do ſee it in this light. And if they do not purſue this doctrine to its diſtant and neceſſary conſequences, it is for want of ſufficient reflection, or ſtrength of mind. Indeed, this one ſimple truth, reſpecting the neceſſary influence of motives on the human mind, leads us much beyond the apprehenſions of the *vulgar*; but not to any thing that ought to alarm the *philoſopher*, or the *chriſtian*. The foundation is a truth grounded on univerſal experience and obſervation, and we have no need to fear any fair conſequences from it.

SECTION

SECTION VI.

Whether Liberty be eſſential to PRACTICAL VIRTUE; *and of* MORAL *and* PHYSICAL NECESSITY.

IT is on a mere verbal diſtinction, alſo, on which every thing that Dr. Price has advanced, in proof of *liberty being eſſential to practical virtue*, turns. "Practical virtue," he ſays *; "ſuppoſes liberty. A being who "cannot *act* at all, moſt certainly cannot "act virtuouſly or viciouſly. Now, as far "as it is true of a being, that he acts, ſo far "he muſt *himſelf* be the cauſe of the ac- "tion, and therefore *not neceſſarily deter- "mined* to act—Determination requires an "*efficient cauſe*. If this cauſe be the being "himſelf, I plead for no more. If not, "then it is no longer *his* determination, "i. e. he is no longer the *determiner*, but "the motive, or whatever elſe any one will "maintain to be the cauſe of the determi-

* Review of the Principles of Morals, p. 302.

" nation—In ſhort, who muſt not feel the " abſurdity of ſaying, *my volitions are pro-* " *duced by a foreign cauſe*, i. e. are *not mine*. " I *determine voluntarily, and yet neceſſarily*."

Here we have the ſame arbitrary account of *agency*, that has been conſidered before. For this is the very ſame, whether the object of choice be of a *moral* nature or not, whether it relates to two different kinds of fruit, or to virtuous or vicious actions. In fact, if a virtuous reſolution be formed, the perſon by whom it is formed, is the object of my complacence and reward, and if a vicious choice be made, the perſon is the object of my abhorrence; and there is the greateſt propriety and uſe in puniſhing him. And I appeal to the common ſenſe of mankind, if it would make any difference in the caſe, whether it be ſaid that the proper cauſe of the action was the *motive*, or the *being himſelf* actuated by the motive, ſince both were neceſſary to the action; and, as will be ſhewn in a following ſection, a perſon ſuppoſed to act without the influence of any motive, would not be conſidered as the object of

praiſe

praiſe or blame, reward or puniſhment at all.

Dr. Price is as unfortunate in his appeal to the common uſe of words in this caſe, as on the two former occaſions. "Who," ſays he, "muſt not feel the abſurdity of "ſaying, *my volition was produced by a ſo-* "*reign cauſe?*" meaning a *motive*. Now this is actually the common language of all the world, and nobody feels any abſurdity in it: becauſe the conſequences he draws from it, by no means follow, viz. that then the volition is not *my own*. It is *my volition*, whatever was the motive that produced it, if it was a volition that took place in *my mind*.

The diſtinction which this writer makes between a *moral* and a *phyſical neceſſity*, is equally uſeleſs as that concerning the proper ſeat of agency, or cauſation. If a man's mind be ſo formed, whether it be by *nature*, or *art*, that he ſhall, in all caſes, accede to every virtuous propoſal, and decline every thing vicious; if the choice be really

his own, and not that of any other for him, we love and approve his character, and ſee the greateſt propriety in rewarding him. And the caſe is not at all altered, by ſaying, that the neceſſity, by which he acts, is a *phyſical* or *moral* one. Theſe are but words. If the choice be certain, and truly neceſſary, it is a proof that, with that diſpoſition of mind, no other choice could be made; and, whatever conſequences are drawn from the conſideration of the impoſſibility of any other choice being made, applies to this caſe, if to any. And yet, in the following extract, Dr. Price conſiders actions as *truly neceſſary*, and yet, in the higheſt degree *virtuous*; and not directly treating of *agency* in this place, and therefore being, perhaps, a little off his guard, it is remarkable, that he expreſſes himſelf in a manner by no means ſuited to his ſyſtem, but as if the proper cauſe of the actions was the motives that led to them; though a little before he had repreſented it as the greateſt abſurdity, to ſay, that a man can determine *voluntarily*, and yet, *neceſſarily*.

" By

" By the neceſſity which is ſaid to dimi-
" niſh the virtue of good actions muſt be
" meant, not a *natural* (which would take
" away the whole idea of *action* and *will*)
" but a *moral neceſſity*, or ſuch as ariſes
" from the *influence of motives*, and *affections*
" *of the mind*, or that *certainty* of deter-
" mining one way, which may take place
" upon the ſuppoſition of certain views,
" circumſtances, and principles of an agent.
" Now it is undeniable, that the very great-
" eſt *neceſſity* of this ſort is conſiſtent with,
" nay, is implied in, the idea of the moſt
" *perfect and meritorious virtue*; and, con-
" ſequently, can by no means be what, of
" itſelf, ever leſſens it. The more confi-
" dently we may depend upon a being's do-
" ing an action, when convinced of its pro-
" priety, whatever obſtacles may lie in his
" way, or, morally ſpeaking, the *more effi-*
" *cacious and unconquerable the influence of*
" *conſcience* is within him, the more amia-
" ble we muſt think him.

" In like manner, the moſt abandoned
" and deteſtable ſtate of wickedneſs, im-

" plies the greateſt *neceſſity of ſinning*, and " the greateſt degree of moral impotence. " He is the moſt vicious man who is ſo " enſlaved by vicious habits, or in whom " appetite has ſo far gained the aſcendant, " and a regard to virtue and duty is ſo far " weakened, that we can, at any time, *with* " *certainty*, foretel, that he will do evil, " when tempted to it. Let me, therefore, " by the way, remark, that every idea of " liberty muſt be very erroneous, which " makes it inconſiſtent with the moſt abſo- " lute and complete certainty, or *neceſſity*, " of the kind that I have now taken notice " of, or which ſuppoſes it to overthrow all " ſteadineſs of character, or conduct. The " greateſt influence of motives that can ra- " tionally be conceived, or which it is poſ- " ſible for any one to maintain, without " running into the palpable and intolerable " abſurdity of making them *phyſical effi-* " *cients*, or *agents*, can no way affect li- " berty. And it is ſurely very ſurprizing, " that our moſt *willing determinations* ſhould " be imagined to have moſt of the appear- " ance of not proceeding from ourſelves,

" and

"and that what a man does with the fulleſt "conſent of his will, with the leaſt reluc- "tance, and the greateſt deſire and reſolu- "tion, he ſhould, for that very reaſon, be "ſuſpected not to do *freely*, i. e. *not to do* "*at all*."

As a profeſſed neceſſarian, I would not wiſh to uſe any other language than this. But it does not appear to me to be the proper language of an advocate for metaphyſical liberty, and of that kind of liberty being eſſential to virtue, to talk of virtue *ariſing from the influence of motives*, and *affections of mind*, or of the *efficacious and unconquerable influence of conſcience*. What evidence is there in all this of a *ſelf-determining power*, acting *independently of all motives*, of all *judgment*, or *deſire*, and of the importance of this power to virtue? Here we have the moſt *perfect virtue* eſtabliſhed on principles, on which it muſt be allowed, that it could never be *proved*, or *made to appear*, that any ſuch ſelf-determining power exiſted.

Dr.

Dr. Price allows, that were all men perfectly virtuous, or perfectly vicious, all their actions would be *neceſſary*, and might, with certainty, be foretold; their inward diſpoſition, and ſituation, being together ſufficient to account for all their conduct. It is plain, therefore, that when he does not uſe the language of a *ſyſtem*, a *full conſent of the will*, though produced by the *efficacious and unconquerable influence of conſcience*, that is, of *motives*, is ſufficient to conſtitute virtue. Here, therefore, we ſee the moſt perfect virtue ariſing from the moſt abſolute neceſſity, that is, if there be any meaning in words, virtue, without a poſſibility of a man's acting otherwiſe than he does, i. e. without his having a power, *diſpoſed as he was*, to act otherwiſe. If this be not a juſt inference, I do not know what is. But how this agrees with what he obſerves in another place *, I do not ſee. He ſays, "It has al-"ways been the general, and it has evi-"dently been the natural, ſenſe of man-"kind, that they cannot be accountable for

* P. 303.

what

"what they have no power to avoid. No-
"thing can be more glaringly abſurd, than
"applauding, or reproaching, ourſelves, for
"what we were no more the cauſe of, than
"of our own being, and what it was no
"more poſſible for us to prevent, than the
"return of the ſeaſons, or the revolutions
"of the planets."

This is ſo expreſſed, as if the *diſpoſition of mind*, which is one neceſſary cauſe of mens reſolutions and actions, was not at all concerned; but, taking in this circumſtance, to which Dr. Price himſelf allows a *certain and neceſſary operation*, that which he here calls a *glaring abſurdity* is preciſely his own principle, unleſs he will ſay, that a man is not accountable for the moſt *abandoned and deteſtable wickedneſs*, which, he expreſſly ſays, implies the greateſt *neceſſity of ſinning*. In fact, it is only where the neceſſity of ſinning ariſes from ſome *other cauſe* than a *man's own diſpoſition of mind*, that we ever ſay, there is any impropriety in puniſhing a man for his conduct. If the impoſſibility of acting well, has ariſen from a *bad diſpoſition*,

tion, or *habit*, its having been impoſſible, *with that diſpoſition*, or *habit*, to act virtuouſly, is never any reaſon for our forbearing puniſhment: becauſe we know, that puniſhment is proper to correct that diſpoſition, and that habit; and that we thereby both reform the ſinner, and warn others, which are all the juſt ends of puniſhment; every thing elſe deſerving no other name than *vengeance*, and being manifeſtly abſurd, becauſe anſwering no good purpoſe. At the ſame time, puniſhment, uſed with this view, will be adminiſtered with the utmoſt tenderneſs and compaſſion.

I would farther take the liberty to obſerve, that Dr. Price's opinion of *liberty being eſſential to virtue*, has led him to adopt an idea of it, that is inconſiſtent with what he himſelf has acknowledged, concerning the moſt perfect virtue ariſing from the *influence of motives*, and *affections of mind*. "Inſtinctive benevolence," he ſays *, "is no "principle of virtue, nor are any actions, "flowing merely from it, virtuous. As

* P. 318.

"far

"far as this influences, ſo far ſomething "elſe than *reaſon* and *goodneſs* influences, "and ſo much, I think, is to be ſubtracted "from the moral worth of any action or "character. This is very agreeable to the "common ſentiments and determinations "of mankind." And again *, "The con-"cluſion I would eſtabliſh is, that the virtue "of an agent is always leſs in proportion "to the degree in which *natural temper*, and "*propenſities* fall in with his actions, *inſtinc-"tive principles* operate, and *rational re-"flection on what is right* to be done is "wanting."

Now what is the difference between *affections of mind*, from which, he ſays, ariſes the moſt perfect and meritorious virtue, and *inſtinctive benevolence*, *natural temper*, and *propenſity?* For my own part, I ſee no difference, but that the former comprehends the latter. For what is *inſtinctive benevolence*, or *natural temper*, and *propenſity*, but *particular affections of mind?* Alſo the language of the former paragraph, and not of this,

* P. 394.

which

which is the very reverſe of it, is, I am confident, agreeable to the common ſentiments and determinations of mankind.

Mankind, in general, do not refine ſo much as Dr. Price. Whatever it is *within a man* that leads him to virtue, and that will certainly and neceſſarily incline him to act right, or to do what they approve, they deem to be a *virtuous principle*, to be the *foundation of merit*, and to *intitle to reward*. If they allow a man more merit for having *acquired* this diſpoſition or propenſity, than upon the ſuppoſition of his having been *born* with it, it is becauſe they ſuppoſe ſome *prior diſpoſition* to acquire it, and ſo ſtrong as to have overcome conſiderable obſtacles to the acquiring of it. But this is only carrying the principle of virtue, the foundation of merit, and of a title to reward a little higher. The *nature* of it is ſtill the very ſame. Men are charmed with a virtuous conduct, with the principle that was the cauſe of it, with the principle that was the cauſe of that principle, and ſo on, as far as you pleaſe to go.

The

The only reaſon why we are leſs ſtruck with a virtuous action, proceeding from what is called *natural temper*, is becauſe we conſider it as a *fickle principle*, on which we can have no ſufficient dependence for the future. But let that principle be ſuppoſed to be really *fixed* and *ſtable*, and wherein does it differ from that diſpoſition of mind which is the reſult of the greateſt labour and attention?

If two men be in all reſpects *the ſame inwardly*, if they *feel*, and *act* preciſely in the ſame manner, upon all occaſions; how, in the ſight of God or man, can there be more virtue in the *preſent conduct* of the one than in that of the other, whatever difference there may *have been* with reſpect to the *acquiſition* of that temper? Every thing that is ſo confirmed as to become *habitual*, operates exactly like what is called *inſtinct* (for my own part, I believe them to be, in all caſes, the very ſame thing) but does a courſe of virtue become leſs virtuous, in conſequence of being *perſiſted in*, and, conſequently, being a more *eaſy* and *mechanical thing*?

Yet

Yet this is the natural concluſion from Dr. Price's principles. Velleius Paterculus, as is obſerved by Mr. Hobbes *, praiſes Cato becauſe he was good *by nature, et quia aliter eſſe non potuit.*

Theſe maxims take away all virtue, goodneſs, and merit, from the *greateſt and beſt of all beings*, and likewiſe make it abſurd to *pray for virtue*; ſince nothing that is *communicated* can be entitled to that appellation. And ſurely the common ideas and practices of mankind, at leaſt of chriſtians, reprobate the notion. In fact, it is mere *Heathen Stoiciſm*, which allows men to pray for *external things*, but admoniſhes them that, as for *virtue*, it is our own, and muſt ariſe from *within ourſelves*, if we have it at all. And yet Dr. Price, I know, prays, like other chriſtians, and with the *humility* of a neceſſarian, who conſiders every thing belonging to him, *temper*, *will*, and *conduct*, as the gift of God, and himſelf as nothing more than the *inſtrument* (though at the ſame time the *object*) of his gracious deſigns.

* Works, p. 476.

And

And as I am not alarmed at the *moral influence* of *his* opinions, I hope he will not be alarmed at that of *mine*.

I wiſh Dr. Price would conſider for a few minutes (and a very few, I ſhould think, would ſuffice) what this *ſelf-determining power*, of which he makes ſo great a boaſt, can be. By his own confeſſion, it is not *judgment*, it is not *conſcience*, it is not *affection*, it is not *deſire*, it is not *hope* or *fear*, nor conſequently any of the *paſſions*. It muſt, therefore, be *mere will*, under no direction or guidance, becauſe, under no *influence* whatever; and of what *value*, or *uſe*, can ſuch a principle be? Suppoſing the thing poſſible (as I deem it to be abſolutely impoſſible, that the will ſhould act without judgment, conſcience, affection, or any other motive) the determination, though dignified with the appellation of *ſelf*, cannot be any thing but a mere *random deciſion*, which may be good or bad, favourable or unfavourable to us, like the chance of a die, and cannot poſſibly be of a nature to be entitled to praiſe or blame, merit or

demerit, reward or puniſhment. I cannot, therefore, perſuade myſelf, that a wiſe and benevolent author would have given man a power ſo intirely *inſignificant to every valuable purpoſe*, and of ſuch a nature too, that *himſelf*, that *wiſdom* and *power in the abſtract*, could not control it.

I alſo wiſh Dr. Price would conſider in what ſenſe a determination of his mind can be ſaid to be more *his own*, on account of its not having been produced by previous *motives*, but in a manner independent of all motives, or reaſons, for choice. For my part, I own that, ſuppoſing the thing to be *poſſible*, as I conceive it to be naturally impoſſible, I cannot ſee either any thing to *boaſt* of in ſuch a determination, or any foundation for *property* in it. If nothing in the preceding ſtate of his mind (which would come under the deſcription of *motive*) contributed to it, how did *he* contribute to it? and, therefore, in what ſenſe can he call it *his*? If he reject a determination produced by motives, becauſe motives are *no part of himſelf*, he muſt likewiſe give up

all

all claim to a determination produced without motives, becauſe that alſo would be produced without the help of any thing belonging to himſelf. If the former have a *foreign cauſe*, and therefore he cannot claim it, the latter has *no cauſe at all*, and is, therefore, what neither himſelf, nor any other perſon, can claim.

But the thing itſelf is abſolutely chimerical; a power of determining *without motive*, or a proper *ſelf-determining* power, without any regard to judgment, conſcience, or affection, is impoſſible. It is to ſuppoſe an *effect* without a *cauſe*. The ſuppoſition is contrary to all experience and obſervation: and if we only admit this one undeniable *fact*, viz. that the will cannot properly determine *itſelf*, but is always determined by *motives*, that is, by the preſent diſpoſition of the mind, and the views of things preſented to it, it cannot be any other than a *neceſſary* determination, ſubject to laws, as ſtrict and invariable as thoſe of mechanics. There cannot poſſibly be any medium in the caſe. If we always chooſe that

object, or that action, which, *on whatever account*, appears *preferable* at the moment of making the choice, it will always be determined by ſome *invariable rule*, depending upon the *ſtate of the mind*, and the *ideas preſent to it*; and it will never be equally in our power to chooſe two things, when all the previous circumſtances are the very ſame.

SECTION VII.

Of the Propriety of REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, *and the Foundation of Praiſe and Blame, on the Scheme of Neceſſity.*

THE objection to the doctrine of neceſſity that has weighed the moſt with thoſe who have conſidered the ſubject, is that, if mens' determinations and actions flow neceſſarily from the previous ſtate of their minds, and the motives, or influences, to which they are expoſed, the idea of *reſponſibility*, or *accountableneſs* vaniſhes, and there can be no propriety or uſe of *rewards* or *puniſhments*.

Now,

Now, I hope to make it appear, that, when the caſe is rightly underſtood, there can be no uſe or propriety of rewards or puniſhments on any other ſcheme, but the greateſt poſſible upon this.

In order to make this clearly apprehended, let us ſuppoſe two minds conſtructed, as I may ſay, upon the principles of the two oppoſite ſchemes of *liberty* and *neceſſity*; all the determinations of the one being invariably directed by its previous diſpoſitions, and the motives preſented to it, while the other ſhall have a power of determining, in all caſes, in a manner independent of any ſuch previous diſpoſition or motives; which is preciſely the difference between the ſyſtems of neceſſity and liberty, philoſophically and ſtrictly defined. To avoid circumlocution, let us call the former A, and the latter B. I will farther ſuppoſe myſelf to be a father, and theſe two my children; and, knowing their inward make and conſtitution, let us conſider how I ſhould treat them.

My object is to make them virtuous and happy. All my precepts, and the whole of my diſcipline, are directed to that end. For the uſe of diſcipline is by the hope of ſomething, which the ſubjects of it know to be good, or the fear of ſomething, which they know to be evil, to engage them to act in ſuch a manner, as the perſon who has the conduct of that diſcipline well knows to be for their good *ultimately*, though they cannot ſee it. In other words, I muſt make uſe of *preſent good*, and *preſent evil*, in order to ſecure their *future* and *greateſt good*; the former being within the apprehenſion of my children, and the latter lying beyond it, and being known to myſelf only. This I take to be preciſely the nature of *diſcipline*; the perſon who conducts it being ſuppoſed to have more knowledge, experience, and judgment, than thoſe who are ſubject to it.

Now, ſince motives have a certain and neceſſary influence on the mind of A, I know that the proſpect of good will certainly

tainly incline him to do what I recommend to him, and the fear of evil will deter him from any thing that I wiſh to diſſuade him from; and therefore I bring him under the courſe of diſcipline above deſcribed, with the greateſt hope of ſucceſs. Other influences, indeed, to which he may be expoſed, and that I am not aware of, may counteract my views, and thereby my object *may* be fruſtrated; but, notwithſtanding this, my diſcipline will, likewiſe, have its *certain* and *neceſſary effect*; counteracting in part, at leaſt, all foreign and unfavourable influence, and therefore cannot be wholly loſt upon him. Every promiſe and every threatening, every reward and every puniſhment, judiciouſly adminiſtered, works to my end. If this diſcipline be ſufficient to overcome any foreign influence, I engage my ſon in a *train of proper actions*, which, by means of the *mechanical ſtructure of his mind*, will, at length, form a ſtable *habit*, which inſures my ſucceſs.

But in my ſon B, I have to do with a creature of quite another make; motives

have no neceſſary or certain influence upon his determinations, and in all caſes, where the principle of *freedom from the certain influence of motives* takes place, it is exactly an equal chance, whether my promiſes or threatenings, my rewards or puniſhments, determine his actions or not. The *ſelf-determining power* is not at all of the nature of any mechanical influence, that may be counteracted by influences equally mechanical, but is a thing with reſpect to which I can make no ſort of calculation, and againſt which I can make no proviſion. Even the longeſt continued ſeries of proper actions, will form no *habit* that can be depended upon; and therefore, after all my labour and anxiety, my object is quite precarious and uncertain.

If we ſuppoſe that B is *in ſome degree* determined by motives, in that very degree, and no other, is he a proper ſubject of diſcipline; and he can never become *wholly ſo*, till his ſelf-determining power be entirely diſcharged, and he comes to be the ſame kind of being with A, on whom motives of all

all kinds have a certain and neceſſary influence. Had I the making of my own children, they ſhould certainly be all conſtituted like A, and none of them like B.

Beſides, the diſcipline of A will have a ſuitable influence on all that are conſtituted like him, ſo that *for their ſakes*, as well as on the account of A himſelf, I ought to bring him under this ſalutary treatment. And thus all the ends of diſcipline are anſwered, and rewards and puniſhments have the greateſt *propriety*; becauſe they have the fulleſt *effect* upon the doctrine of neceſſity; whereas, it is evident, they are abſolutely loſt, having no effect whatever, upon the oppoſite ſcheme.

This appears to me to be the faireſt and the moſt unexceptionable view of the ſubject; by which it appears, that the Divine Being, the father of us all, in order to make us the proper ſubjects of diſcipline, and thereby ſecure our greateſt happineſs (which is all that, philoſophically ſpeaking, is really meant

meant by making us *accountable creatures*) muſt conſtitute us in ſuch a manner, as that motives ſhall have a certain and neceſſary influence upon our minds, and muſt not leave us at liberty to be influenced by them or not, at our arbitrary pleaſure.

I do not think it is properly *neceſſary* to add any thing more on this ſubject; but, becauſe this queſtion has (perhaps more than any other in the whole compaſs of philoſophical diſcuſſion) been rendered obſcure by an unfair and improper manner of ſtating, I ſhall give another view of it; by which, I hope, it will appear, that there is all the foundation that we can wiſh for a proper *accountableneſs*, and for *praiſe* and *blame*, upon the doctrine of neceſſity, and not ſo much as a ſhadow of any real foundation for them upon any other ſuppoſition; the boaſted advantage of the doctrine of *liberty* belonging, in fact, to the doctrine of *neceſſity* only; and I am confident that my ideas on this ſubject are, at the ſame time, thoſe of the *vulgar*, and agreeable to *ſound philoſophy*,

philoſophy, while thoſe of the metaphyſicians, who have adopted a contrary opinion, are founded on a mere *fallacy*:

When I, or the world at large, *praiſe* my ſon A, we tell him we admire his *excellent diſpoſition*, in conſequence of which all good motives have a certain and never-failing influence upon his mind, always determining his choice to what is virtuous and honourable, and that his conduct is not directed either by mere *will*, or the *authority of any other perſon*, but proceeds from his own virtuous diſpoſition only; and that his good habits are ſo confirmed, that neither promiſes nor threatenings are able to draw him aſide from his duty.

In this repreſentation I am confident that I keep back nothing that is eſſential. The ideas of mankind, in general, never go beyond this, when they praiſe any perſon, nor philoſophically ſpeaking, *ought* they to do it. Praiſe that is founded on any other principles is really *abſurd*, and, if it was underſtood by the vulgar, would be reprobated

bated by them, as intirely repugnant to their conceptions of it. This will clearly appear by conſidering the caſe of my ſon B.

We have ſuppoſed that A has done a virtuous action, and has been *commended*, becauſe it proceeded from the *bent of his mind to virtue*, ſo that whenever proper circumſtances occurred, he *neceſſarily* did what we wiſhed him to have done. Let us now ſuppoſe that B does the very ſame thing; but let it be fully underſtood, that the *cauſe* of his right determination was not any bias or *diſpoſition of mind* in favour of virtue, or becauſe a good *motive* influenced him to do it; but that his determination was produced by ſomething within him (call it by what name you pleaſe) of a quite *different nature*, with reſpect to which motives of any kind have no ſort of influence or effect, a mere *arbitrary pleaſure*, without any reaſon whatever (for a *reaſon* is a *motive*) and I apprehend he would no more be thought a proper ſubject of praiſe, notwithſtanding he ſhould do what was *right in itſelf*, than the dice, which, by a fortunate throw, ſhould give a man

man an eſtate. It is true the action was right, but there was not the *proper principle* and *motive*, which are the only juſt foundations of praiſe.

In ſhort, where the proper *influence of motives* ceaſes, the proper foundation of praiſe and blame diſappears with it; and a *ſelf-determining power*, ſuppoſed to act in a manner independent of motive, and even contrary to every thing that comes under that deſcription, is a thing quite foreign to every idea that bears the leaſt relation to praiſe or blame. A good action produced in this manner, is no indication of a *good diſpoſition of mind*, inclined to yield to the influence of good impreſſions, and, therefore, is nothing on which I can depend for the future. Even a ſeries of good actions, produced in this manner, gives no ſecurity for a proper conduct in future inſtances; becauſe ſuch actions can form no *habit*, i. e. *no neceſſary tendency to a particular conduct*; but every thing is liable to be reverſed by this ſelf-determining principle, which can turn a deaf ear to all motives, and all reaſons.

So

So difficult is it to get out of the road of common ſenſe, that even philoſophical perſons will farther deceive themſelves, by ſaying, that the ſelf-determining power is influenced by motives, and does not determine *abſolutely at random*. But if this be a *proper influence*, there can be no proper ſelf-determining power, except by ſelf-determination be underſtood what the world in general always does underſtand by it, viz. a power of determination not ſubject to the controul of *others*, but produced by cauſes operating within a man's ſelf only. If, when the *ſtate of mind*, and every *idea* preſent to it, are preciſely the ſame, there be a power of forming either of two contrary reſolutions (which is the caſe, if *neceſſary determination* be excluded) it is plain, that the proper *cauſe* of the reſolution, that which actually *decided* in the caſe, could not be any thing either in the *ſtate of the mind* itſelf, or any *idea* preſent to it (becauſe, notwithſtanding theſe circumſtances, there is a power of determining either agreeable, or contrary to their natural influence) and, therefore, could not be any thing to which mankind have

have ever attributed either praiſe or blame. It is never the *action*, but the *diſpoſition of mind*, and the *motive* that makes any thing *meritorious*; and here the determination was not cauſed either by the ſtate of mind, or any motive whatever.

I will venture to ſay that, let this caſe be ſtated with ever ſo much addreſs and refinement, it will ſtill be found that there cannot be any juſt foundation for praiſe, but upon a ſcheme which ſuppoſes the mind to be ſo diſpoſed, as that juſt views of things will neceſſarily determine the will to right action. The two ſchemes of liberty and neceſſity admit of no medium between them. But if any kind of medium be ſuppoſed, in which ſomething ſhall be allowed to the influence of *motive*, and ſomething to the *ſelf-determining power*, acting independently of motive, ſtill all the *virtue* and *merit*, all the foundation for *praiſe*, takes place juſt ſo far as neceſſity takes place, and fails juſt ſo far as this imaginary *liberty of choice*, acting independently of motives, interferes to obſtruct it.

It

It has been ſeen that *puniſhment* would have no propriety, or uſe, upon the doctrine of philoſophical liberty; *blame* alſo, upon the ſame ſcheme, would be equally abſurd and ill founded. If my child A acts wrong, I tell him that I am exceedingly diſpleaſed, becauſe he has ſhown a *diſpoſition of mind*, on which motives to virtue have no ſufficient influence; that he appears to have ſuch a *propenſity to vicious indulgences*, that I am afraid he is irreclaimable, and that his utter ruin will be the conſequence of it. This is the proper language of blame; and, upon a mind conſtituted like that of A, may have a good effect, as well as the diſcipline of puniſhment.

But if the conſtitution of the mind of B be attended to, it will be ſeen that blame is equally abſurd, as puniſhment is unavailing. If he has acted the ſame part that A has done, the language which I addreſſed to A will not apply to him. It is true, that he has done what is wrong, and it muſt have bad conſequences; but it was not from any *bad diſpoſition of mind*, that made him ſub-

ject

ject to be influenced by bad impreſſions. No, his determination had a cauſe of quite *another nature*. It was a choice directed by *no bad motive whatever*; but a mere *will*, acting independently of any motive; and which, though it has been on the ſide of vice to-day, may be on the ſide of virtue to-morrow. My blame or reproaches, therefore, being ill founded, and incapable of having any effect, it is my wiſdom to withhold them, and wait the uncertain iſſue with patience.

If this be not a juſt, impartial, and philoſophical ſtate of this caſe, I do not know what is ſo; and by this means it appears, that the doctrine of the *neceſſary influence of motives* upon the mind of man, makes him the proper ſubject of diſcipline, reward and puniſhment, praiſe and blame, both in the common and philoſophical uſe of the words; and the doctrine of *ſelf-determination*, independent of the influence of motives, intirely diſqualifies a man from being the proper ſubject of them.

It is ſaid, that the nature of *remorſe* implies a ſelf-determining power. I anſwer, that this is no other than the ſame deception that I have explained before. For blaming *ourſelves*, or blaming *another*, are things of the very ſame nature, and depend upon the ſame principles. The ſenſe of *ſelf-reproach*, and *ſhame*, is excited by our finding that we have a diſpoſition of mind leading to vice, and on which motives to virtue, in particular caſes, have had no influence.

If I blame myſelf for any thing elſe, viz. for not exerting a *ſelf-determining power*, by which I may ſuppoſe that I might have acted otherwiſe, independently of the previous diſpoſition of mind, and the motives then preſent to it, the idea is not at all adapted to excite any proper remorſe. For it has been ſhewn to afford no foundation for blame whatever, and, in the nature of things, cannot poſſibly do it. For on this ſuppoſition there is nothing *vicious*, or blameworthy, that is the proper *cauſe* of the action,

tion, but ſomething that bears *no ſort of relation to morality*. Morals depend upon *inward diſpoſitions of mind*, and *good or bad habits*; but this *ſelf-determination* is a thing capable of counteracting all diſpoſitions, and all habits, and not by means of *contrary diſpoſitions* and *contrary habits*, but by a *power of quite another nature*, to which the properties of diſpoſitions and habits, ſuch as approbation, or diſapprobation, in a moral ſenſe, or praiſe or blame, cannot poſſibly belong.

A man, indeed, when he reproaches himſelf for any *particular action* in his paſt conduct, may fancy that, if he was in the ſame ſituation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere *deception*; and, if he examines himſelf *ſtrictly*, and takes in all circumſtances, he may be ſatisfied that, with the *ſame inward diſpoſition of mind*, and with preciſely *the ſame views of things* that he had then, and excluſive of all others that he has acquired by reflection *ſince*, he could not have acted otherwiſe than he did.

But will this conviction at all leſſen his ſenſe of *grief*, or *ſhame?* On the contrary, it will only more fully ſatisfy him, that his diſpoſitions and habit of mind, *at that time* were ſo bad, that the vicious action was *unavoidable*. And the ſenſe he now has of this deplorable ſtate of his mind, and the alarming tendency of it, will operate ſo as to make him act better, and become better diſpoſed for the future; ſo that, upon another ſimilar occaſion, he would not do what he did before. And is not this all the benefit that a man can poſſibly derive from a ſenſe of ſhame, and ſelf-reproach, commonly called remorſe of conſcience?

Thus, I hope, I have made good what I advanced on this ſubject, in my *Examination of the Writings of Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Oſwald* *. "As to the hackneyed ob-"jection to the doctrine of neceſſity, from "its being inconſiſtent with the idea of "virtue and vice, praiſe and blame, it may "be fully retorted upon its opponents.

* P. 178.

"For,

"For, as to their boaſted *ſelf-determining* "*power* (were the thing poſſible in itſelf, "and did not imply an abſurdity) by which "they pretend to have a power of acting "independently of every thing that comes "under the deſcription of *motive*, I ſcruple "not to ſay, that it is as foreign to every "idea of virtue and vice, praiſe or blame, "as the groſſeſt kind of mechaniſm, that "the moſt blundering writer, in defence of "liberty, ever aſcribed to the advocates for "moral neceſſity."

As different repreſentations of the ſame thing, and different views of it, affect the mind differently, and a view that does not at all ſtrike one perſon, may ſtrike another, I ſhall conclude this ſection with ſome juſt obſervations of Mr. Hume, and others of Mr. Search, and Lord Kaims, relating to the ſubject of it.

"Actions", ſays Mr. Hume*, "are, by "their very nature, temporary and periſh-"ing; and where they proceed not from

* Philoſophical Eſſays, p. 155.

" ſome cauſe, in the *character* and *diſpoſition* " of the perſon who performed them, they " can neither redound to his honour, if " good, nor infamy, if evil. The *actions* " themſelves may be blameable, they may " be contrary to the rules of morality and " religion, but the perſon is not reſponſible " for them. And as they proceeded from " nothing in him that is *durable*, and *con-* " *ſtant*, and leave nothing of that nature " behind them, it is impoſſible he can, on " that account, become the object of pu- " niſhment, or vengeance. According to " the principle, therefore, which denies " *neceſſity*, and conſequently *cauſes*, a man " is as pure and untainted after having com- " mitted the moſt horrid crime, as at the " firſt moment of his birth; nor is his *cha-* " *racter* any way concerned in his *actions*, " ſince they are not derived from it, and the " wickedneſs of the one can never be uſed as " a proof of the depravity of the other."

" Men are not blamed," he ſays *, " for " ſuch actions as they perform *ignorantly*,

* P. 156.

" and

" and *caſually*, whatever may be the conſe-
" quences. Why? but becauſe the prin-
" ciples of theſe actions are only *momentary*,
" and terminate in them only. Men are
" leſs blamed for ſuch evil actions as they
" perform *haſtily*, and *unpremeditatedly*, than
" for ſuch as proceed from *thought* and *de-*
" *liberation*. For what reaſon? but becauſe
" a haſty temper, though a conſtant cauſe,
" is a principle of the mind that operates
" only by *intervals*, and infects not the
" *whole character*."

" Freedom of action," ſays Mr. Search *,
" and ſo much underſtanding as to make
" the party ſenſible for what the puniſhment
" was inflicted, are always deemed neceſ-
" ſary requiſites to render him obnoxious
" thereto; becauſe puniſhment operating
" upon the *imagination*, and through that
" upon the *will*, where either of theſe two
" characters are wanting, becomes uſeleſs,
" and conſequently unjuſt. Therefore, ſly
" revenges, which may be miſtaken for ac-
" cidents, and nobody can know they were

* Light of Nature, vol. v. p. 233.

" the effect of reſentment, though ſome-
" times practiſed by ſpiteful perſons, have
" never been holden warrantable by the ju-
" dicious. Nor will a righteous man puniſh
" where the tranſgreſſor had not liberty of
" choice, nor where the reaſon of his pu-
" niſhing cannot be underſtood.

" In none of the works of providence," ſays Lord Kaims, " ſo far as we can pene-
" trate, is there diſplayed a deeper reach of
" art and wiſdom, than in the laws of action
" peculiar to man, as a thinking and rational
" being. Were he left looſe, to act in con-
" tradiction to motives, there would be no
" place for prudence, foreſight, nor for ad-
" juſting means to an end. It could not
" be foreſeen by others what a man would
" do the next hour, nay, it could not be fore-
" ſeen even by himſelf. Man would not
" be capable of rewards and puniſhments,
" he would not be fitted either for divine
" or for human government, he would be
" a creature that has no reſemblance to the
" human race. But man is not left looſe:
" for though he is at liberty to act accord-
" ing

" ing to his own will, yet his will is regu-
" lated by deſire, and deſire by what pleaſes
" or diſpleaſes. This connexion preſerves
" uniformity of conduct, and confines hu-
" man actions within the great chain of
" cauſes and effects. By this admirable
" ſyſtem, liberty and neceſſity, ſeemingly
" incompatible, are made perfectly concor-
" dant, fitting us for ſociety, and for go-
" vernment, both human and divine *.

" How hard is the lot of the human ſpe-
" cies to be thus tied down and fixed to
" motives, ſubjected by a neceſſary law to
" the choice of evil, if evil happen to be
" the prevailing motive, or if it miſleads
" us, under the form of our greateſt intereſt
" or good! How happy to have had a free
" independent power of acting contrary to
" motives, when the prevailing motive has
" a bad tendency! By this power we might
" have puſhed our way to virtue and happi-
" neſs, whatever motives were ſuggeſted by
" vice and folly to draw us back, or we
" might by arbitrary will have refrained

* Sketches on Man, vol. ii. p. 300.

" from

" from acting the bad part, though all the " power of motives concurred to urge us on.

" So far well; but let us ſee whither this " will carry us. This arbitrary power " being once ſuppoſed, may it not be exert- " ed againſt good motives as well as bad " ones? If it does us good by accident, in " reſtraining us from vice, may it not do us " ill by accident, in reſtraining us from " virtue, and ſo ſhall we not be thrown " looſe altogether? At this rate no man " could be depended upon. Promiſes, " oaths, vows, would be in vain: for no- " thing can ever bind or fix a man who is " influenced by no motive. The diſtinction " of characters would be at an end: for a " perſon cannot have a character, who has " no fixed or uniform principle of action. " Nay, moral virtue itſelf, and all the force " of law, rule, and obligation, would, upon " this hypotheſis, be nothing. For no crea- " ture can be the ſubject of rational or moral " government, whoſe actions, by the conſti- " tution of its nature, are independent of " motives, and whoſe will is capricious and " arbitrary.

" arbitrary. To exhort, to inſtruct, to
" promiſe, or to threaten, would be to no
" purpoſe. In ſhort, ſuch a creature, if
" ſuch could exiſt, would be a moſt bizarre
" and unaccountable being, a mere abſur-
" dity in nature, whoſe exiſtence could ſerve
" no end.

" Were we ſo conſtituted as always to
" be determined by the moral ſenſe, even
" againſt the ſtrongeſt counter-motives, this
" would be conſiſtent with human nature;
" becauſe it would preſerve intire the con-
" nexion that, by an unalterable law, is
" eſtabliſhed betwixt the will and the pre-
" vailing motive. But to break this con-
" nexion altogether, to introduce an un-
" bounded arbitrary liberty, in oppoſition
" to which motives ſhould not have influ-
" ence, would be, inſtead of amending, to
" deform and unhinge the whole conſtitu-
" tion. No reaſon have we, therefore, to
" regret that we find the will neceſſarily
" ſubjected to motives. The truth of this
" general poſition muſt coincide with our
" wiſh, unleſs we would rather have man

" to

" to be a whimſical and ridiculous, than a " rational and moral being *."

SECTION VIII.

How far Mens' GENERAL CONDUCT *will be influenced by the Belief of the Doctrine of Neceſſity.*

IT is imagined by ſome, that the apprehenſion of all the actions of men depending upon motives which neceſſarily influence their determinations, ſo that no action or event could poſſibly be otherwiſe than it *has been, is,* or *is to be,* would make men indifferent with reſpect to their conduct, or to what befals them in life. I anſwer, ſo it would, if their *own actions,* and *determinations* were not neceſſary links in this chain of cauſes and events, and if their good or bad ſucceſs did not, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word, *depend upon themſelves.*

* Eſſays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, p. 177.

But,

But, this being the caſe, the apprehenſion that their endeavours to promote their own happineſs will have a certain and neceſſary effect, and that no well-judged effort of theirs will be loſt, inſtead of diſpoſing them to remit their labour, will encourage them to exert themſelves with redoubled vigour; and the *deſire of happineſs* cannot but be allowed to have the ſame influence upon all ſyſtems.

With reſpect to the temper and diſpoſition of mind, conſidered in a *moral reſpect*, a man has, certainly, more encouragement to take pains to improve it, when he is ſenſible that, according to the ſettled conſtitution, and eſtabliſhed laws of nature, it depends *intirely upon himſelf*, whether it be improved or not; that his negligence will be followed by neceſſary and certain ruin, whereas his circumſpection, reſolution, and perſeverance, will be attended with as certain and neceſſary ſucceſs; things *foreign to himſelf* not interfering here, as they ſometimes do in the conduct of *civil affairs*, to diſappoint the beſt concerted ſchemes.

All

All this may, perhaps, be made more intelligible by an example. I ſhall therefore endeavour to give one. No man entertains a doubt, but that every thing relating to *vegetation* is ſubject to the *eſtabliſhed laws of nature*; and ſuppoſing this to be the caſe, with reſpect to the human mind, and its operations, a being of perfect intelligence and foreſight, will know how we ſhall be provided for the next, or any future year; ſo that, in fact, our proviſion for the next year, and all the events of it, are abſolutely fixed, and nothing can interfere to make it otherwiſe than it is to be. But will any farmer, believing this ever ſo firmly, neglect, on this account, to ſow his fields, and content himſelf with ſaying, "God "knows how I ſhall be provided for the "next year? I cannot change his decree, "and let his will be done." We ſee, in fact, that ſuch a perſuaſion never operates in this manner; becauſe, though the chain of events is neceſſary, our *own determinations*, and *actions*, are neceſſary links of that chain. This gives the farmer the fulleſt aſſurance, that, if it be decreed for him to ſtarve,

ſtarve, it is likewiſe decreed for him to neglect to ſow his fields; but if he *do* ſow his fields, which depends intirely upon himſelf, that then, ſince the laws of nature are invariable, it will be evident, that no ſuch unfavourable decree had gone forth.

In fact, the ſyſtem of neceſſity makes every man the *maker of his own fortune*, in a ſtricter ſenſe than any other ſyſtem whatever; and the belief of this gives a man greater confidence of ſucceſs in all his labours, ſince none of them can be in vain. On the contrary, wherever this chain of the neceſſary connexion of cauſes and effects is broken, there *uncertainty* enters, and the idea of this is always accompanied with *indifference*, or *deſpair*.

As our perſuaſion concerning the doctrine of neceſſity cannot make any change in our conduct with reſpect to *men*, whom we know we muſt gain to our intereſt by proper conduct and addreſs, ſo neither can it affect our behaviour with reſpect to God; the

the mode and object of our addreſs to both being exactly ſimilar.

Indeed, it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe there can be any difficulty attending the ſubject of *prayer*, or any branch of it, upon the ſuppoſition of the doctrine of neceſſity, that does not equally affect it, on the general ſuppoſition of God's knowing all our wants, and being diſpoſed to ſupply them, as far as it is proper that he ſhould do it. And, with reſpect to this, it is ſufficient to ſay, that the whole of our intercourſe with the Deity, is founded upon the idea of his condeſcending, for our good, to be conſidered by us in the familiar light of a *parent*, or *governor*. And having, for our good, aſſumed theſe characters, he will certainly *realize* them, by requiring of us ſuch behaviour as wiſe parents require of their children, and wiſe governors of their ſubjects. Now, wiſe parents often juſtly refuſe to ſupply the wants of their children, till they ſolicit for it, with a proper temper of mind. But this ſubject I have conſidered more

more largely, in my *Inſtitutes of Natural and Revealed Religion* *. I ſhall, therefore, in this place, only preſent my reader with a different view that Mr. Hobbes has given of it, on the ſuppoſition of prayer not being the *cauſe*, or the proper *means*, of procuring any favour from God; his conduct towards us being determined on other accounts.

"Thankſgiving," ſays he †, "is no cauſe "of the bleſſing paſt, and that which is "paſt is *ſure* and *neceſſary*; yet even among "men, thanks is in uſe, as an acknowledg- "ment of benefits paſt, though we ſhould "expect no new benefit for our gratitude; "and prayer to God Almighty, is but "thankſgiving for God's bleſſings in gene- "ral; and, though it precedes the parti- "cular thing we aſk, yet it is not a *cauſe*, "or *means* of it, but a ſignification that we "expect nothing from God, but in ſuch "manner as he, not we, will."

* Vol. i. p. 147. † Works, p. 477.

Upon the whole, I am ſatisfied, that it can only be in conſequence of ſome groſs *miſ-ſtating of the caſe*, if the belief of the doctrine of neceſſity appear to have, in any reſpect, an unfavourable influence upon the mind; and, in a variety of reſpects, it cannot but be apparent, that it muſt have the happieſt and nobleſt effects imaginable. But I purpoſely confine myſelf to what has been thought moſt *unpromiſing* in the ſyſtem that I have adopted, and what is generally eſteemed to be the *dark* and *dangerous ſide* of the principle. And, if even this view of it, when it is conſidered fairly and impartially, be really favourable to it, what may we not expect from other views of this doctrine, which all the world muſt allow to be highly advantageous?

SECTION

SECTION IX.

Of the moral Influence of the Doctrine of Neceſſity.

IT has been ſaid, that the principles on which the doctrine of neceſſity is founded, are equally thoſe of the vulgar, and of true philoſophy. Mankind, in general, have no idea of volition, but as preceded and directed by motives; and if they were told of any determination of the mind, not produced by motives, good or bad, they would never be brought to think there could be any thing *moral*, any thing *virtuous or vicious* in it, any thing that could be the proper object of *praiſe* or *blame*, *reward* or *puniſhment*.

All the idea that the generality of mankind have of liberty, is perfectly conſiſtent with, and, in fact, flows from, the principles of moral neceſſity; for they mean no more by it, than a freedom from the con-

trol of others, and that their volitions are determined only by their own views of things, and influenced, or guided, by motives operating within themſelves. Beyond this their ideas do not go, nor does the buſineſs of human life require that they ſhould. They have, therefore, no apprehenſion of the real and unavoidable conſequences of the principles they every day act upon. They would even be alarmed, and ſtaggered, if thoſe conſequences were pointed out to them; and, perhaps, from their unwillingneſs to admit the conſequences, would be tempted to diſguiſe their daily feelings and experience, imagining them to be different from what they really are. This, I doubt not, is the real ſource of all the objections that have been made to the doctrine of neceſſity.

Mankind, in general, have alſo no difficulty in admitting other principles, that are not deduced from their own experience, which yet are equally incompatible with the doctrine of metaphyſical liberty. They would not heſitate, for example, to admit, that

that future events, depending upon human reſolutions, may be fore-known, and fore-told, by a being of competent knowledge, and that there can be no effect, without a cauſe. But when they are told that, in conſequence of theſe conceſſions, they muſt admit, that nothing *could have been* otherwiſe than *it has been*, that every thing comes to paſs in conſequence of an eſtabliſhed conſtitution of things, a conſtitution eſtabliſhed by the author of nature, and, therefore, that God is to be conſidered as the proper and ſole cauſe of all things, good and evil, natural and moral, they are ſtaggered, and withhold their aſſent.

From this place, therefore, the philoſopher muſt be content to proceed by himſelf. But we ſhall ſee that his more comprehenſive views of the ſyſtem of nature are not leſs, but much more favourable to his improvement in virtue and happineſs, than the more limited views of the bulk of mankind. They look no farther for the cauſes of mens' actions than to *men*; whereas, the

philoſopher conſiders them, as neceſſary inſtruments in the hands of the firſt cauſe. Let us now fairly trace the conſequences of this more enlarged and juſter view of things.

But, previous to this, I would obſerve, that the practical uſe of theſe philoſophical views is confined to a man's *cooler moments*, when the mind is not under the influence of any violent emotion or paſſion. For, ſince the mind of a philoſopher is formed, and the aſſociations by which it is influenced, are fixed, exactly like thoſe of other men, he will not be able, in the general tumult and hurry of life, to feel, think, or act, in a manner different from other men. A provocation will fix his reſentment upon the perſon from whom it immediately proceeds, and a grateful or kind action will, in like manner, direct his love and gratitude to the perſon from whom it immediately comes. His own actions, alſo, will be conſidered with the ſame mechanical feelings of *ſelf-applauſe*, or *remorſe*, as if he had not been a philoſopher.

What

What we are now to conſider, therefore, are the feelings of the philoſopher *retired from the world*, under the influence of no violent emotion, and therefore contemplating nothing very recent. Or, allowing that his philoſophical views ſhould gradually modify his feelings (as undoubtedly they will do, in proportion as they are attended to, and have an opportunity of impreſſing the mind) let us conſider what alteration in a man's ſentiments and conduct they will tend to produce; whether the change will be favourable or unfavourable, whether his philoſophy will make him the better or the worſe man, the better or the worſe citizen.

Now, in my opinion, his philoſophical views will give an elevation and force to his piety, and to virtue in all its branches, that could not have been acquired in any other way. And this may be perceived in thoſe perſons whoſe general views of things have approached the neareſt to thoſe that are truly philoſophical, by which I mean thoſe who, from a *principle of religion*, have aſ-

cribed more to God, and leſs to man, than other perſons; which appears to me to have been the caſe very remarkably with the ſacred writers, and with other perſons who have imbibed their devotional ſpirit from an intimate acquaintance with the ſcriptures.

That the ſpirit of *devotion* in general muſt be greatly promoted by the perſuaſion, that God is the proper and ſole cauſe of all things, needs no arguing. Upon this ſcheme we ſee God in every thing, and may be ſaid to ſee every thing in God; becauſe we continually view every thing as in connexion with him, the author of it. By this means the idea of God will become aſſociated with every other idea, heightening all our pleaſures, and diminiſhing, nay, abſorbing and annihilating, all our pains. Alſo the influence of this conſtant and lively ſenſe of the Divine preſence and energy, attending to, diſpoſing, and overruling all things, cannot but, in a variety of other reſpects, be moſt favourable and happy. It muſt produce the deepeſt *humility*,

mility, the moſt intire *reſignation* to the will of God, and the moſt unreſerved *confidence* in his goodneſs and providential care.

With this diſpoſition of mind towards God, it will not be poſſible to bear ill-will to any of our brethren, his offspring, or to indulge any paſſion, or habit, that is forbidden by God. In ſhort, this one leading principle of devotion cannot fail to regulate the whole temper and conduct. It neceſſarily implies, or begets, every thing in a man's temper that is truly amiable and valuable.

Alſo, the full perſuaſion that nothing can come to paſs without the knowledge and expreſs appointment of the greateſt and beſt of beings, muſt tend to diffuſe a joyful *ſerenity* over the mind, producing a conviction, that, notwithſtanding all preſent unfavourable appearances, *whatever is, is right*; that even all *evils*, reſpecting individuals or ſocieties, any part, or the whole of the human race, will terminate in *good*; and that the greateſt ſum of good could not, in the nature

ture of things, be attained by any other means.

No other than a neceſſarian can poſſibly attain to the full perſuaſion of this great and invaluable truth, the only ſure *anchor of the ſoul* in time of adverſity and diſtreſs, and a never-failing ſource of conſolation under the moſt gloomy proſpects. Upon any other hypotheſis, it will be believed, that many things in which the independent uncontrolled determinations of fallible men take place, are continually *going wrong*, and that much actual evil, unconnected with, and unproductive of, good, does exiſt. Whereas, in the eye of a neceſſarian, the idea of *real abſolute evil* wholly diſappears: ſince, in the contemplation of a mind poſſeſſed of a ſufficient degree of comprehenſion, capable of conſidering as *one thing*, *one whole*, whatever is neceſſarily connected, all partial evils are infinitely overbalanced by, and are therefore really and truly *annihilated*, in the idea of the greater good to which they are ſubſervient, and which, when properly diſpoſed (as by infinite wiſ-

dom

dom they undoubtedly are) they really heighten. To a perſon well acquainted with the doctrine of the aſſociation of ideas, this will be no paradox, but a moſt important and neceſſary truth.

The connexion that all perſons, and all things neceſſarily have, as parts of an immenſe, glorious, and happy *ſyſtem* (and of which we ourſelves are a part, however ſmall and inconſiderable) with the great author of this ſyſtem, makes us regard every perſon, and every thing, in a friendly and pleaſing light. The whole is but *one family*. We have all *one God and Father*, whoſe affection for us is intenſe, impartial, and everlaſting. He *deſpiſes nothing that he has made*, and by ways unknown to us, and often by methods the moſt unpromiſing, he provides for our greateſt good. We are all training up in the ſame ſchool of moral diſcipline, and are likewiſe *joint heirs of eternal life*, revealed to us in the goſpel.

With ſuch ſublime views of the ſyſtem, and of the author of it, as theſe, vice is abſo-

abſolutely incompatible; and more eſpecially *hatred*, *envy*, and *malice*, are wholly excluded. I cannot, as a neceſſarian, hate any man; becauſe I conſider him as *being*, in all reſpects, juſt what God has made him to be, and alſo as *doing*, with reſpect to me, nothing but what he was expreſſly deſigned, and appointed to do; God being the only cauſe, and men nothing more than the inſtruments in his hands, to execute all his pleaſure. And by the extinction of all hatred and malice, room is made for the growth and diſplay of every ſocial virtue. If I no longer love men as the proper ultimate cauſes of the good they do me, I love and reſpect them as the inſtruments of it. I alſo love the amiable diſpoſition from which it flows, both on account of its beneficial influence, and its reſemblance to the diſpoſition of the Parent of all good.

If, as a neceſſarian, I ceaſe to *blame* men for their vices in the ultimate ſenſe of the word, though, in the common and proper ſenſe of it, I continue to do ſo as much as other perſons (for how neceſſarily ſoever they act,

act, they are influenced by a baſe and miſchievous diſpoſition of mind, againſt which I muſt guard myſelf and others, in proportion as I love myſelf and others) I, on my ſyſtem, cannot help viewing them with a *tenderneſs* and *compaſſion*, that will have an infinitely finer and happier effect; as it muſt make me more earneſt and unwearied in my endeavours to reclaim them, without ſuffering myſelf to be offended, and deſiſt from my labour, through provocation, diſguſt, or deſpair.

The natures of the moſt vicious of mankind being the ſame with my own, they are as improveable as mine, and, whatever their diſpoſition be at preſent, it is capable of being changed for the better, by means naturally adapted to that end; and under the diſcipline of the univerſal Parent, they will, no doubt, be reclaimed, ſooner or later. Looking, therefore, beyond the preſent temporary ſcene, to a future period, and their final deſtination, we may conſider them as *brethren*, even in virtue and happineſs. Their ſufferings, however, in the mean

mean time, will be in proportion to their depravity, and, for this reaſon, I cannot but feel myſelf moſt earneſtly concerned to leſſen it.

What I am deſcribing can only take place, in proportion to our *comprehenſion of mind*, which, however, is extended by frequent contemplations of this kind, but muſt remain very narrow and limited, after all the attention we can give to the ſubject; and, therefore, the Divine Being, whoſe comprehenſion is infinite, is alone *perfectly good*, and *perfectly happy*. To him nothing is ſeen as an *evil*, but as a neceſſary and uſeful part of a perfect whole.

As far as theſe great and juſt views of things can be entertained and indulged, they have the happieſt effect upon the mind; and where they fail, the neceſſarian is but like the reſt of mankind, who ſtop at *ſecond cauſes*, and thereby comes under the influence of ſuch motives to virtue as are common to the reſt of mankind.

SECTION

SECTION X.

In what Senſe GOD *may be conſidered as* THE AUTHOR OF SIN, *and of the Objection to the Doctrine of Neceſſity, on that Account.*

WHEN it is conſidered, that the diſtinction between things *natural* and *moral* intirely ceaſes on the ſcheme of neceſſity, the vices of men come under the claſs of common evils, producing miſery for a time; but, like all other evils, in the ſame great ſyſtem, are ultimately ſubſervient to greater good. In this light, therefore, every thing, without diſtinction, may be ſafely aſcribed to God. Whatever terminates in good, philoſophically ſpeaking, is good. But this is a view of moral evil, which, though innocent, and even uſeful in ſpeculation, no wiſe man can, or would chooſe to act upon himſelf, becauſe our underſtandings are too limited for the application of ſuch a means of good; though a being

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being of infinite knowledge may introduce it with the greateſt advantage.

Vice is productive not of good, but of evil to us, both here and hereafter, and probably during the whole of our exiſtence; though good may reſult from it to the whole ſyſtem. While our natures, therefore, are what they are, and what aſſociation has neceſſarily made them, and ſo long as we ſee every thing in its true light, we muſt ſhun vice as any other evil, and indeed the greateſt of all evils, and chooſe virtue as the greateſt good. Nay, we ſhall cultivate good diſpoſitions with more care and attention, ſince, according to the fixed laws of nature, our preſent and future happineſs neceſſarily depends upon it. And as to the *good of the whole univerſe*, or of *all mankind*, it can be no object, except to a mind capable of comprehending it. Whether we be virtuous or vicious, and conſequently happy or miſerable, it will be equally a neceſſary part of the whole; ſo that this conſideration, were we ſo abſurd as to pretend to govern

vern our conduct by it, ſhould not bias us one way more than another.

Our ſupppoſing that God is the *author of ſin* (as, upon the ſcheme of neceſſity, he muſt, in fact, be the author of all things) by no means implies, that he is a *ſinful being*; for it is the *diſpoſition of mind*, and the *deſign*, that conſtitutes the ſinfulneſs of an action. If, therefore, his diſpoſition and deſign be good, what he does is morally good. It was wicked in Joſeph's brethren to ſell him into Egypt, becauſe they acted from envy, hatred, and covetouſneſs; but it was not wicked in God, to ordain it to be ſo; becauſe, in appointing it, he was not actuated by any ſuch principle. In him it was gracious and good, becauſe he did it, as we read, to *preſerve life*, and to anſwer other great and excellent purpoſes in the extenſive plan of his providence.

If it was proper upon the whole (and of that propriety God himſelf is certainly the only judge) that ſo important an event

ſhould be brought about by the low paſſions, and intereſted views of men, it was right and wiſe in him, to appoint that it ſhould be brought about in that very manner, rather than any other; and if it be right and wiſe that thoſe vices, when they have anſwered the great and good purpoſes of him who appoints and over-rules all things for good, ſhould be reſtrained, the ſufferings which he inflicts for that purpoſe, are right and *juſt puniſhments*. That God might have made all men ſinleſs, and happy, might, for any thing that we know, have been as impoſſible, as his making them not finite, but *infinite beings*, in all reſpects equal to himſelf.

Mr. Hume, who, in general, diſcuſſes the queſtion concerning liberty and neceſſity with great clearneſs, intirely abandons the doctrine of neceſſity to the moſt immoral and ſhocking conſequences; a conduct which muſt have tended to create a prejudice againſt it: but how ill founded has, I hope, been ſufficiently ſhewn.

He

He ſays *, that "upon the ſcheme of "neceſſity, human actions can either have "no turpitude at all, as proceeding from ſo "good a cauſe (the Deity) or if they can "have any moral turpitude, they muſt in- "volve our Creator in the ſame guilt, while "he is acknowledged to be their ultimate "cauſe and author." "It is not poſſible," ſays he again †, "to explain diſtinctly how "the Deity can be the mediate cauſe of all "the actions of men, without being the "author of ſin, and moral turpitude." But did not this writer know, what is known to all the world, that the *motive*, or *intention* with which a thing is done, is the circumſtance that principally conſtitutes its *morality*? Men who act from a bad intention, are certainly vicious; but, though God may be the ultimate cauſe of that bad diſpoſition, yet, ſince he produces it from a *good motive*, in order to bring good out of it, he is certainly not vicious, but good, and holy in that reſpect.

* Philoſophical Eſſays, p. 157. † P. 262.

Mr. Hobbes, alſo, fails in his ſolution of this difficulty, juſtifying the divine conduct, not upon the principle of the *goodneſs of his ultimate deſigns* in every thing that he appoints, but on account of his *power* only. "Power irreſiſtible," ſays he *, "juſtifies all actions, really and properly, in whomſoever it be found. Leſs "power does not, and becauſe ſuch power "is in God only, he muſt needs be "juſt in all actions; and we, that not "comprehending his councils, call him "to the bar, commit injuſtice in it." It is poſſible, however, that Mr. Hobbes might not mean power ſimply; for when he blames men for cenſuring the conduct of God, when they do not comprehend his councils, he ſeems to intimate, that, could we ſee the *deſigns* of God, in appointing and over-ruling the vices of men, we might ſee reaſon to approve and admire them, on account of the wiſdom and goodneſs on which they are founded.

* Works, p. 477.

I would

I would obſerve farther, with reſpect to this queſtion, that the proper *foundation*, or rather the *ultimate object*, of virtue, is *general utility*, ſince it conſiſts of ſuch conduct, as tends to make intelligent creatures the moſt truly happy, in the whole of their exiſtence; though, with reſpect to the *agent*, no action is denominated virtuous, that is not *voluntary*, and that does not proceed from ſome *good motive*, as a regard to the will of God, the good of others, or the dictates of conſcience. If, therefore, the Divine Being be influenced by a diſintereſted regard to the happineſs of his creatures, and adopt ſuch meaſures as are beſt calculated to ſecure that great and glorious end, this end will certainly ſanctify the means that are really neceſſary to accompliſh it, with reſpect to him, who chooſes thoſe means only with a view to that end, and who cannot be miſtaken in his application of them. The reaſon why it is wrong in man, a finite creature, to *do any evil that good may come of it*, is, that our underſtandings being limited, the good that we project may not come of it, and, therefore, it

is beſt that we, and all finite creatures, ſhould govern our conduct by certain *inviolable rules*, whatever advantage may ſeem to us to be derived from occaſional deviations from them.

Upon the whole, *natural good* is to be conſidered as the object and end, and virtue as being, at the ſame time, a *means* to that end, and likewiſe a *part* of it. It is, therefore, well obſerved by a writer who calls himſelf *Search* *, "moral evil were no evil, "if there was no natural evil. Becauſe, "how could I do wrong, if no hurt or da- "mage could enſue thereform to any body? "And it is no greater than the miſchief "whereof it may be productive. There- "fore, it is natural evil that creates the "difficulty, and the quality of this evil is "the ſame from whatever cauſes ariſing."

Though Mr. Edwards has many valuable remarks on this ſubject, and, upon the whole, has ſatisfactorily anſwered the objection to the doctrine of neceſſity, which

* See his Light of Nature, vol. v. p. 238.

ariſes

ariſes from the conſideration of *God being the author of ſin*, yet, in treating of it, he has made one obſervation which, I think, is not well founded, and which ſeems to ſhew that he was not willing to encounter the difficulty in its greateſt ſtrength.

He ſays *, "There is a great difference "between God's being the ordainer of the "certain exiſtence of ſin, by *not hindering* "it under certain circumſtances, and his "being the *proper actor*, or *author of it*, by "a *poſitive agency* or efficiency. Sin," ſays he, again "is not the fruit of any poſitive "agency, or influence of the Moſt High, "but, on the contrary, ariſes from his "withholding his action and energy." He alſo ſays, that, "though the abſence of "the ſun is the cauſe of darkneſs, it would "be improper to call the ſun the *ſource of* "*darkneſs*, as it is of *light*."

But if there be any foundation for the doctrine of neceſſity, *i. e.* if all events ariſe from preceding ſituations, and the *original*

* Inquiry, p. 363.

ſituations of all things, together with the *laws* by which all changes of ſituation take place, were fixed by the Divine Being, there can be no difference whatever with reſpect to his *cauſation* of one thing more than another. And even whatever takes place in conſequence of his withholding his ſpecial and extraordinary influence, is as much agreeable to his *will*, as what comes to paſs in conſequence of the general laws of nature.

It may, however, juſtly be ſaid, and this is the proper anſwer to the difficulty, that the Divine Being may adopt ſome things which he would not have choſen *on their own account*, but for the ſake of other things with which they were neceſſarily connected. And if he prefers that ſcheme in which there is the greateſt prevalence of virtue and happineſs, we have all the evidence that can be given of his being infinitely holy and benevolent, notwithſtanding the mixture of vice and miſery there may be in it. For ſuppoſing ſuch a neceſſary connexion of things, good and evil, the moſt wiſe, holy, and good being, would not have made any other

other choice; nor do I ſee that it is poſſible to vindicate the *moral attributes*, or the *benevolence* of God, of which they are only *modifications*, upon any other ſuppoſition than that of the neceſſary connexion, in the nature of things, between good and evil, both natural and moral. And this neceſſary connexion is very manifeſt in a variety of inſtances.

According to the moſt fundamental laws of nature, and indeed the very *nature of things*, great virtues in ſome could not be generated, or exiſt, but in conjunction with great vices in others; for it is this oppoſition that not only exhibits them to advantage, but even, properly ſpeaking, *creates* them. Where could there be clemency, fortitude, elevation of ſoul, and deep reſignation to the will of God, which form the moſt glorious and excellent of characters, but in ſtruggling with difficulties that ariſe from injuſtice, ingratitude, and *vice*, of all other kinds, as well as from *outward adverſity* and diſtreſs; ſo that even the ſuppoſition of there being no *general laws of nature* (which would,

would, probably, be the greateſt of all evils) but of God doing every thing *ſingly*, and in a manner independent of every thing elſe, would not be of any advantage in this caſe.

If any perſon, notwithſtanding this repreſentation, ſhould be alarmed at the idea of God's being the proper cauſe of all evil, natural and moral, he ſhould conſider that, upon any ſcheme that admits of the divine *preſcience*, the ſame conſequences follow. For ſtill God is ſuppoſed to foreſee, and *permit*, what it was in his power to have prevented, which is the very ſame thing as *willing* and directly *cauſing* it. If I certainly know that my child, if left to his liberty, will fall into a river, and be drowned, and I do not reſtrain him, I certainly *mean* that he ſhould be drowned; and my conduct cannot admit of any other conſtruction. Upon all ſchemes, therefore, that admit of the divine preſcience, and conſequently the *permiſſion* of evil, natural and moral, the ſuppoſition of God's virtually *willing* and *cauſing* it is unavoidable, ſo that upon any ſcheme, the origin and exiſtence of evil can only

only be accounted for on the ſuppoſition of its being ultimately *ſubſervient to good*, which is a more immediate conſequence of the ſyſtem of neceſſity, than of any other.

The doctrine of neceſſity certainly inforces the belief of the greateſt poſſible good with reſpect to the whole ſyſtem, admitting the goodneſs of God in general, and cannot well be reconciled with the everlaſting miſery of any. We are, therefore, naturally led, by the principles of it, to conſider all future evils in the ſame light as the preſent, i. e. as corrective and ſalutary, terminating in good, which is alſo ſufficiently agreeable to the language of the ſcriptures, with reſpect to all puniſhment, preſent or future. The neceſſarian, therefore, though he *may* admit the annihilation of the wicked, yet ſince they are to have the benefit of the *general reſurrection*, together with the righteous, and we have no account of any death afterwards, but are aſſured, on the contrary, that all will be equally immortal, he will lean ſtrongly to the belief of the everlaſting ultimate happineſs of all; and this is an idea

idea moſt ſublime and glorious, and which cannot but have the happieſt effect upon the mind at preſent.

On this ſubject I ſhall not enlarge, but content myſelf with quoting the firſt paragraph of the concluſion of Dr. Hartley's *Obſervations on Man*, in which will be ſeen what an impreſſion this idea made upon his mind. If it be peruſed with attention, and without prejudice, it muſt, I think, prepoſſeſs the reader in favour both of the *ſyſtem*, and of the *man*.

" I have now gone through with my Ob-
" ſervations on the frame, duty, and expec-
" tations of man, finiſhing them with the
" doctrine of ultimate, unlimited, *happi-*
" *neſs to all.* This doctrine, if it be true,
" ought at once to diſpel all gloomineſs,
" anxiety, and ſorrow, from our hearts, and
" raiſe them to the higheſt pitch of love,
" adoration, and gratitude, towards God,
" our moſt bountiful creator, and merci-
" ful father, and the inexhauſtible ſource
" of all happineſs and perfection. Here
" ſelf-

" ſelf-intereſt, benevolence, and piety, all
" concur to move and exalt our affections.
" How happy in himſelf, how benevolent
" to others, and how thankful to God,
" ought that man to be, who believes both
" himſelf and others born to an infinite ex-
" pectation. Since God has bid us rejoice,
" what can make us ſorrowful? Since he
" has created us for happineſs, what mi-
" ſery can we fear? If we be really intend-
" ed for ultimate unlimited happineſs, it
" is no matter to a truly-reſigned perſon,
" *when*, or *where*, or *how*. Nay, could
" any of us fully conceive, and be duly in-
" fluenced by this glorious expectation,
" this infinite balance in our favour, it
" would be ſufficient to deprive all pre-
" ſent evils of their ſting and bitterneſs.
" It would be a ſufficient anſwer to the
" τοδεν το κακον, to all our difficulties and
" anxieties, from the folly, vice, and mi-
" ſery, which we experience in ourſelves,
" and ſee in others, that they will all end
" in unbounded knowledge, virtue and
" happineſs; and that the progreſs of every
" individual in his paſſage through an

" eternal

" eternal life, is from imperfect to perfect, " particular to general, leſs to greater, " finite to infinite, and from the creature " to the Creator."

SECTION XI.

Of the Nature of REMORSE OF CONSCIENCE, *and of* PRAYING FOR THE PARDON OF SIN, *on the Doctrine of Neceſſity.*

SEVERAL perſons, firmly perſuaded of the truth of the doctrine of neceſſity, yet ſay, that it is not poſſible to *act upon it*; and to put, what they think, a peculiarly difficult caſe, they aſk, how it is poſſible for a neceſſarian to pray for the pardon of ſin.

I anſwer, in general, that Dr. Hartley appears to me to have advanced what is quite ſufficient to obviate any difficulty that can ariſe from this view of the ſubject, when he admoniſhes us carefully to diſtinguiſh between the *popular* and *philoſophical language*, as correſponding to two very different

rent views of human actions; according to one of which, the bulk of mankind refer their actions to themselves only, without having any distinct idea of the divine agency being, directly or indirectly, the cause of them: whereas, according to the other, we look beyond all second causes, and consider the agency of the first and proper cause, exclusive of every thing subordinate to it.

These very different views of things must be attended with very different *feelings*; and, when separated from each other, they will, in several respects, lead to a different *conduct*, as well as require a different *language*. Now, such are the influences to which all mankind, without distinction, are exposed, that they necessarily refer actions (I mean, refer them ultimately) first of all to themselves and others; and it is a long time before they begin to consider themselves, and others, as *instruments* in the hand of a superior agent. Consequently, the associations which refer actions to themselves get so confirmed, that they are never intirely obliterated; and, therefore, the common language,

language, and the common feelings of mankind, will be adapted to the firſt, the limited and imperfect, or rather erroneous view of things.

The Divine Being could not be unapprized of this circumſtance, or unattentive to it; and he has wiſely adapted the ſyſtem of religion that he has preſcribed to us, the modes of our religious worſhip, and every thing belonging to it, to this imperfect view of things. It is a ſyſtem calculated for the *bulk of mankind*, and of philoſophers as partaking of the feelings of the bulk of mankind; and, therefore, would, we may ſuppoſe, have been different, if the bulk of mankind had been ſpeculatively and practically philoſophers; in ſome ſuch manner as the modes of worſhip varied in the Jewiſh and chriſtian churches.

But it is of prime conſequence in this buſineſs, that, in whatever *ſenſe*, or *degree*, any particular ſentiment, or feeling, is felt as improper by a neceſſarian, in the ſame ſenſe and degree his principles will make that

that ſentiment, or feeling, to be of no uſe to him. Thus, to apply this to the caſe in hand: if the ſentiments of ſelf-applauſe on the one hand, and of ſelf-reproach on the other, be, in any ſenſe or degree, impoſſible to be felt by a neceſſarian, in the ſame ſenſe or degree (while he feels and acts like a neceſſarian) he will have no occaſion for thoſe ſentiments; his mind being poſſeſſed by a ſentiment of a much higher nature, that will intirely ſuperſede them, and anſwer their end in a much more effectual manner. And whenever his ſtrength of mind fails him, whenever he ceaſes to look to the firſt cauſe only, and reſts in ſecond cauſes, he will then neceſſarily feel the ſentiments of ſelf-applauſe and ſelf-reproach, which were originally ſuggeſted by that imperfect view of things into which he is relapſed.

Every man's feelings will neceſſarily be uniform. To be a neceſſarian in *ſpeculation*, and not in *practice*, is impoſſible, except in that ſenſe in which it is poſſible for a man

to be a chriſtian in ſpeculation, and a libertine in practice. In one ſenſe, a ſpeculative chriſtian, or neceſſarian, may feel and act in a manner inconſiſtent with his principles; but, if his faith be what Dr. Hartley calls a *practical* one, either in the doctrine of neceſſity, or the principles of chriſtianity, that is, if he really *feels* the principles, and if his affections and conduct be really directed by them, ſo that they have their natural influence on his mind, it will be impoſſible for him to be a bad man. What I mean, therefore, is, that *a truly practical neceſſarian* will ſtand in no need of the ſentiments either of ſelf-applauſe, or ſelf-reproach. He will be under the influence of a much ſuperior principle, *loving God and his fellow-creatures* (which is the ſum and object of all religion, and leading to every thing excellent in conduct) from motives altogether independent of any conſideration relating to himſelf. On this I need not enlarge in this place, if what I have advanced on the *moral influence of the doctrine of neceſſity*, be conſidered.

It

It is acknowledged that a neceſſarian, who, as ſuch, believes that, ſtrictly ſpeaking, *nothing goes wrong*, but that every thing is under the beſt direction poſſible, himſelf, and his conduct, as part of an immenſe and *perfect whole*, included, cannot accuſe himſelf of having done wrong, in the ultimate ſenſe of the words. He has, therefore, in this ſtrict ſenſe, nothing to do with repentance, confeſſion, or pardon, which are all adapted to a different, imperfect, and fallacious view of things. But then, if he be really capable of ſteadily viewing the great ſyſtem, and his own conduct as a part of it, in this true light, his ſupreme regard to God, as the great, wiſe, and benevolent author of all things, his intimate communion with him, and devotedneſs to him, will neceſſarily be ſuch, that he can have no will but God's. In the ſublime, but accurate language of the apoſtle John, he will *dwell in love*, he will *dwell in God*, and *God in him*; ſo that, *not committing any ſin*, he will have nothing to repent of. He will be *perfect, as his heavenly father is perfect*.

But as no man is capable of this degree of perfection in the preſent ſtate, becauſe the influences to which we are all expoſed will prevent this conſtant referring of every thing to its primary cauſe, the ſpeculative neceſſarian, will, in a general way, refer actions to himſelf and others; and conſequently he will neceſſarily, let him uſe what efforts he will, feel the ſentiments of ſhame, remorſe, and repentance, which ariſe mechanically from his referring actions to himſelf. And, oppreſſed with a ſenſe of *guilt*, he will have recourſe to that *mercy* of which he will ſtand in need. Theſe things muſt neceſſarily accompany one another, and there is no reaſon to be ſolicitous about their ſeparation.

It is, alas! only in occaſional ſeaſons of retirement from the world, in the happy hours of devout contemplation, that, I believe, the moſt perfect of our race can fully indulge the enlarged views, and lay himſelf open to the genuine feelings, of the neceſſarian principles; that is, that he can *ſee every*

every thing in God, or in its relation to him. Habitually, and conſtantly, to realize theſe views, would be always to *live in the houſe of God*, and within the *gate of heaven*; ſeeing the plain finger of God in all events, and as if the angels of God were conſtantly deſcending to earth, and aſcending to heaven, before our eyes. Such enlarged and exalted ſentiments are ſometimes apparent in the ſacred writers, and alſo in the hiſtories of chriſtian and proteſtant martyrs; but the beſt of men, in the general courſe of their lives, fall far ſhort of this ſtandard of perfection.

We are too apt to loſe ſight of God, and of his univerſal uncontrolled agency; and then, falling from a ſituation in which we were equally ſtrangers to *vice* and *ſolicitude*, from a ſtate truly *paradiſaical*, in which we were incapable of *knowing* or *feeling* any evil, as ſuch, converſing daily with God, enjoying his preſence, and contemplating his works, as all infinitely good and perfect, we look no higher than ourſelves, or beings on a level with ourſelves; and of courſe

find ourſelves involved in a thouſand perplexities, follies, and vices; and we now want, and ought to fly to, the proper remedy in our caſe, viz. ſelf-abaſement, contrition, and ſupplication.

Moreover, well knowing what we generally are, how imperfect our *views*, and conſequently how imperfect our *conduct*, it is our wiſdom, and our intereſt, freely to indulge theſe feelings, till they have produced their proper effect; till the ſenſe of guilt has been diſcharged by the feelings of contrition, and a humble truſt in the Divine mercy. Thus, *gradually* attaining to purer intentions, and a more upright conduct, we ſhall find leſs obſtruction in enlarging our views to comprehend the true plan of providence; when, having leſs to reflect upon ourſelves for, the ſentiment of reproach ſhall eaſily and naturally vaniſh; and we ſhall then fully conceive, and rejoice in, the belief that in all things we *are*, and *have been*, *workers together with God*; and that *he works all his works in us, by us, and for us*.

The

The improvement of our natures, and conſequently the advancement of our happineſs, by enlarging the comprehenſion of our minds (chiefly by means of a more diſtinct view of the hand of God in all things, and all events) is, in its own nature, a gradual thing, and our attempts to accelerate this natural progreſs may poſſibly be attended with ſome inconvenience; though, I own, I apprehend but little danger from this quarter.

What we have moſt to dread, is the almoſt irrecoverable debaſement of our minds by *looking off from God, living without him*, without a due regard to his preſence, and providence, and *idolizing ourſelves and the world*; conſidering other things as *proper agents* and *cauſes*; whereas, ſtrictly ſpeaking, there is but *one cauſe*, but *one ſole agent* in univerſal nature. Thus (but I feel myſelf in danger of going beyond the bounds of the queſtion I am now diſcuſſing) all vice is reducible to *idolatry*; and we can only be completely virtuous and happy in the worſhip of the one only living and true God;

the idea uſually annexed to the word *worſhip* but faintly ſhadowing out what the intelligent reader will perceive I *now* mean by it.

In all this it muſt be remembered, that I am addreſſing myſelf to *profeſſed neceſſarians*; and I muſt inform them, that if they cannot accompany me in this ſpeculation, or find much difficulty in doing it, they are no more than *nominal* neceſſarians, and have no more feeling of the real *energy of their principles*, than the merely nominal chriſtian has of thoſe of chriſtianity. It requires much reflection, meditation, and ſtrength of mind, to convert *ſpeculative* principles into *practical* ones; and till any principle be properly *felt*, it is not eaſy to judge of its real *tendency* and *power*. It is common with unbelievers to declaim on the ſubject of the miſchief that chriſtianity has done in the world, as it is with the opponents of the doctrine of neceſſity to dwell upon the dangerous tendency of it; but the real neceſſarian, and true chriſtian, know, and *feel*, that their principles tend to make them better men in all reſpects; and

and that it can only be ſomething that is very improperly called either *chriſtianity*, or *the doctrine of neceſſity*, that can tend to make them worſe.

I think, however, that a mere ſpeculatiſt may be ſatisfied, that the feeling of remorſe, and the practice of ſupplication for pardon, have ſtill leſs foundation on the doctrine of philoſophical liberty, than on that of neceſſity, as I preſume has been demonſtrated already. Indeed, what can a man have to blame himſelf for, when he acted *without motive*, and from *no fixed principle*, good or bad; and what occaſion has he for pardon who never meant to give offence; and, as I have ſhewn at large, unleſs the mental determinations take place without regard to motive, there is no evidence whatever of the mind being free from its neceſſary influence. But it ſeems to be taken for granted, that whatever a neceſſarian cannot feel, or do, his opponent can; whereas, in fact, the doctrine of repentance, as defined by the advocates of liberty themſelves,

ſelves, has much leſs place on their principles than on ours.

The whole doctrine of *ſecond cauſes* being *primary* ones, is certainly a miſtake, though a miſtake that all imperfect beings *muſt* be ſubject to. Whatever, therefore, is built upon that miſtake can have no place in a truly philoſophical ſyſtem. But I will farther advance, that while men continue in this miſtake, and, conſequently, while their reflections on their own conduct, as well as on that of others, ſhall be modified by it, they will derive conſiderable advantage even from an imperfect view of the true philoſophical doctrine, viz. that of neceſſity, whereas a man, in the ſame circumſtances, muſt receive ſome injury from the oppoſite ſentiment of philoſophical liberty; ſo much may it be depended upon, that a knowledge of this truth can do no harm, but muſt do ſome good.

Remorſe for paſt miſconduct implies a deep ſenſe of depravity of heart, or a wrong bias

bias of mind, by which temptations to ſin will have much more influence with us than they ought to have. This is the ſentiment that will be fully felt by what I now call the *imperfect neceſſarian*; a character which, as I obſerved before, applies to all mankind. As a neceſſarian he conſiders his bad conduct as neceſſarily ariſing from his bad diſpoſition. It is *bad fruit* growing from a *bad tree*. And, as he knows that, unleſs the tree be made good, it will be impoſſible to make the fruit good; ſo he is ſenſible that unleſs he can, by the uſe of proper diſcipline, bring his mind into a better ſtate, he can never depend upon himſelf for acting more properly on future occaſions. He, therefore, from that principle by which we univerſally ſeek our own happineſs and improvement, labours to correct his vicious diſpoſition; and, expecting no miraculous aſſiſtance, he applies to the proper remedies indicated by the conſideration of his caſe.

At the ſame time, his regard to God, as the author of all good, and who has appointed

pointed *meditation* and *prayer* as a means of attaining it, will make him conſtantly look up to him for his favour and bleſſing. And if, as he becomes more philoſophical, his devotions have in them leſs of *ſupplication*, and rather take the form of *praiſe*, *thankſgiving*, and a joyful firm *confidence* in the divine care and providence, reſpecting equally the things of time and eternity, it will not contribute the leſs to his moral improvement and happineſs. But the beſt of men will not, in fact, get beyond that ſtate of mind, in which direct and fervent *prayer*, properly ſo called, will be as *unavoidable* as it will be *uſeful* to them. What I now ſay will not be well underſtood by all perſons, but I ſpeak to thoſe who have ſome experience in matters of religion, and who are accuſtomed to reflection on their natural feelings.

Let us now conſider what the doctrine of philoſophical liberty can do for a man in the circumſtances above-mentioned. He, like the neceſſarian, finds himſelf involved in guilt, and he alſo begins to ſpeculate con-

concerning the cauſes of it; but, overlooking the ſecret mechaniſm of his mind, he aſcribes the whole to the mere *obſtinacy of his will*, which, *of itſelf*, and not neceſſarily influenced by any motives, has turned a deaf ear to every thing that better principles could ſuggeſt. But, in what manner can ſuch mens *uncontrollable will* be rectified? As far as we have recourſe to *motives*, and *principles*, we depend upon the doctrine of *mechaniſm*; and without that we have nothing to do but ſit with folded hands, waiting the arbitrary deciſions of this ſame *ſovereign will*.

If he ſpeculates farther, and conſiders how little his real temper and character are concerned in ſuch unaccountable motions of his ſelf-determined will, I ſhould think him in ſome danger of making himſelf very eaſy about his vices. And this would be the caſe, if men were not neceſſarily influenced by ſounder principles than they always diſtinctly perceive. Now, it appears to me, that if a man's ſpeculations take

take this turn, it would have been much better for him never to have ſpeculated at all, and that they only tend to bewilder, and hurt him.

Again, ſuppoſing a man to have attained to ſome degree of a virtuous character and conduct, his farther progreſs will be accelerated by the belief of the doctrine of neceſſity, and retarded by that of philoſophical liberty.

The conviction that God is the author of all *good*, will always much more readily take firm hold of the mind than the idea of his being, likewiſe, the author of all *evil*, though all evil ultimately terminates in good; becauſe it requires more ſtrength of mind to ſee and believe this. A long time, therefore, before we ſuſpect that our evil diſpoſitions come from God, as well as our good ones, and that all things that exiſt, ultimately conſidered, equally promote the divine purpoſes, we ſhall aſcribe all evil to ourſelves, and all good to God;

and

and this perſuaſion will be ſo rivetted, in a long courſe of time, that after we are convinced that God is really and truly the author of *all things*, without diſtinction, we ſhall aſcribe evil to him only in an unſteady and confuſed manner; while the perſuaſion that he is the ſole author of all good will have received a great acceſſion of ſtrength, from our new philoſophical principles coinciding with, and confirming, our former general notions.

Now no ſentiment whatever is ſo favourable to every thing amiable, good, and great, in the heart of man, as a ſpirit of *deep humility*, grounded on diſclaiming all our excellencies, and referring them to their proper ſource, that feeling which Dr. Hartley very expreſſively calls *ſelf-annihilation*, joined with that which naturally and neceſſarily accompanies it, *joy and confidence in God*, as *working all our good works in us and for us*. This is the diſpoſition that inſpires all the writers of the books of ſcripture, and is obſervable in all truly ſerious and

and devout perſons to this day, whether their ſpeculative opinions be favourable to it or not. Nay, it has given ſuch a turn to the *eſtabliſhed language of devotion* in all countries, and all ages, that the contrary ſentiment, or that of claiming the merit of our good works to ourſelves, would have the appearance of ſomething abſolutely impious and blaſphemous. Now, it muſt be acknowledged, that this diſpoſition of mind, viz. that of aſcribing every thing that is good in us to God, is greatly favoured and promoted by the belief of the doctrine of neceſſity. It may even operate this way to the greateſt advantage, at the ſame time that, through our imperfect comprehenſion of things, we continue to aſcribe evil to ourſelves, and are affected with the deepeſt ſentiments of remorſe and contrition.

On the contrary, as far as the doctrine of philoſophical liberty operates, it tends to check humility, and rather flatters the pride of man, by leading him to conſider himſelf as being, independently of his maker,

maker, the primary author of his own good diſpoſitions and good works. This opinion, which, without being able to perceive *why*, every truly pious perſon dreads, and cannot bring himſelf expreſſly to avow, is apprehended to be juſt *, according to the doctrine of philoſophical liberty, which repreſents man as endued with the faculty of free-will, acting independently of any control from without himſelf, even that of the Divine Being; and that juſt ſo far as any ſuperior being, directly or

* I ſay *apprehended* to be juſt, which is all that my argument requires, though, ſtrictly ſpeaking, as I have ſhewn at large, the claim of *merit*, or *demerit*, is equally ill-founded on the doctrine of philoſophical liberty. The ſentiments of merit and demerit are certainly *natural*, and found in all mankind; but they have not, therefore, any connection with the doctrine of philoſophical liberty. On the contrary, I maintain, that the *common opinion* is the doctrine of neceſſity, though not come to its proper extent. No man, for inſtance, has any idea, but that *the will is always determined by ſome motive*, which is the great hinge on which the doctrine of neceſſity turns; nor has any man in common life any idea of *virtue*, but as ſomething belonging to *character* and *fixed principle*, conſtantly *influencing the will*.

indirectly, influences his will, he can pretend to no ſuch thing as real virtue, or goodneſs; though the virtue that anſwers to this deſcription is certainly not that which animated the prophets of the Old Teſtament, or our Saviour and the apoſtles in the New, but is mere heathen *Stoiciſm*.

When this temper is much indulged, it is even poſſible, contradictory as it ſeems, to aſcribe all moral good to a man's ſelf, and all moral evil to the inſtigation of the devil, or ſome other wicked ſpirit that has acceſs to our minds: whereas, without the intervention of this doctrine of the *independency of the will*, and eſpecially with a little aid from the doctrine of *mechaniſm*, we ſhould rather, as was ſhewn before, though inconſiſtently ſtill, aſcribe all good to God, and all evil to ourſelves.

Conſtantly to aſcribe *all* to God, is an attainment too great for humanity. To be able to do it *at intervals*, in the ſeaſons of

of retirement and meditation, but ſo as conſiderably to influence our general feelings, and conduct in life, is a happy and glorious advantage. Sweet, indeed, are the moments in which theſe great and juſt views of the ſyſtem, to which we belong, can be fully indulged. If, however, we cannot habitually aſcribe *all* to God, but a part only, let it be (and ſo indeed it naturally will be) that which is *good*; and if we muſt aſcribe any thing to ourſelves, let it be that which is *evil*.

Thus have I given a frank and ingenuous account of my own ideas and impreſſions on this ſubject. How far they will give ſatisfaction to others, I cannot tell.

SECTION XII.

How far the Scriptures are favourable to the Doctrine of Neceſſity.

SUCH is the connexion between the principle of *devotion* and the doctrine of *neceſſity*, that with which ſoever of them a man begins, he is unavoidably led, in ſome degree, towards the other, whether he be diſtinctly aware of it or not.

The man who believes that the government of the world is in the hands of God, and that this God has great and gracious deſigns in every thing that he does, cannot believe that any thing happens unknown to him, or unforeſeen by him, or that he will permit any thing to come to paſs that will not, *in fact*, and *ultimately*, promote his own deſigns, and even more effectually than any thing elſe. This is ſo near to the doctrine of abſolute *decrees*, and the expreſs *appointment* of every thing that comes to paſs,

paſs, even with reſpect to the vices of men, that they are not eaſily diſtinguiſhed. Conſequently, a perſon who ſees in a ſtrong light the doctrine of divine providence, cannot avoid ſpeaking like a neceſſarian on the ſubject, and conſidering God himſelf as having *done* what he *permits*, and *avails himſelf* of, in the good that reſults from it. And ſuch, in fact, as no man can deny, is the language of the ſacred writers.

In the ſcriptures we not only meet with ſuch language as this, *The wrath of man ſhall praiſe thee, and the remainder of wrath ſhalt thou reſtrain* * (which is ſtrongly expreſſive of the ſubſerviency of the moſt malignant paſſions of the human heart to the divine purpoſes, and implies, that nothing more of vice will be permitted than is of uſe to that end) but many particular events, which were wholly brought about by the vices of men, are ſaid to be expreſſly *appointed* by God; and even the very temper and diſpoſition by which the agents were

* Pſ. lxxvi. v. 10.

actuated, are ſaid to be inſpired by God, for that very purpoſe. At the ſame time, however, it appears, from the circumſtances of the hiſtory, that there was no proper *interpoſition* of the Divine Being in the caſe, no real *miracle*, but every thing took place according to the common eſtabliſhed courſe of nature; ſince what thoſe wicked perſons did may eaſily be accounted for on principles by which men are actuated every day; and they did nothing but what ſuch men would naturally do again, in the ſame circumſtances.

In like manner, the good deſigns and actions of men are, in the ſcriptures, frequently aſcribed to God, though there be no reaſon, from the circumſtances of the facts, to ſuppoſe that there was any ſupernatural influence upon their minds, but that they acted as well-diſpoſed perſons would naturally do in their ſituations.

Alſo, the common operations of nature are deſcribed in ſuch language, both in the Old and New Teſtament, as evidently ſhews, that

that the writers conſidered all the laws of the ſyſtem, as if they were executed immediately by the author of them, and, conſequently, that all events whatever are properly his own agency, juſt as if no ſecond cauſes had intervened. A mind habitually pious looks beyond all ſecond cauſes, to the firſt and proper cauſe of all things, and reſts only there.

Good men, in the ſcriptures, frequently aſcribe their own good works to God, as the proper author of them, *the giver of every good and every perfect gift*, and are the fartheſt in the world from having the leaſt idea of their having any *merit*, or claim upon God, in conſequence of it; which, upon the doctrine of philoſophical free-will, they ſuppoſe themſelves to have. But their language is utterly irreconcileable with this doctrine.

Laſtly, both the preſent and the future deſtination of men is generally ſpoken of as fixed and ordained by God, as if he from the

firſt intended, that whatever *is to be, ſhould be*, with reſpect to happineſs or miſery, here or hereafter.

Not that I think the ſacred writers were, ſtrictly ſpeaking, *neceſſarians*, for they were not *philoſophers*, not even our Saviour himſelf, as far as appears; but their habitual devotion naturally led them to refer all things to God, without reflecting on the rigorous meaning of their language; and very probably had they been interrogated on the ſubject, they would have appeared not to be apprized of the proper extent of the neceſſarian ſcheme, and would have anſwered in a manner unfavourable to it.

For the greater ſatisfaction of my reader, I ſhall produce a few examples of each of the particulars I have mentioned, though in a different order; and I beg that he would give a deliberate attention to them, and then I cannot help thinking he will be diſpoſed to view them in the light in which I have repreſented them.

That

That God was conſidered by the ſacred writers as the author of the good diſpoſitions, and good works of men, is evident from the following paſſages.

And the Lord thy God will circumciſe thy heart, and the heart of thy ſeed, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy ſoul, that thou mayeſt live *.

And I will give them a heart to know me, that I am the Lord; and they ſhall be my people, and I will be their God, and they ſhall turn unto me with their whole heart †. *And I will give them one heart, and one way, that they may fear me for ever, for the good of them, and of their children after them. I will put my fear in their hearts, and they ſhall not depart from me* ‡.

And I will give them one heart, and I will put a new ſpirit within you, and I will take the ſtony heart out of your fleſh, and I will give you a heart of fleſh §. *And I will put*

* Deut. xxx. 6. † Jer. xxiv. 7.
‡ xxxii. 39. § Ezek. xi. 19.

my

my ſpirit within you, and cauſe you to walk in my ſtatutes, and ye ſhall keep my judgments, and do them *.

It is ſaid of Lydia †, *whoſe heart the Lord opened, that ſhe attended unto the things that were ſpoken of Paul.*

With reſpect to the *reception of the goſpel*, our Saviour ſays ‡, *All that the Father giveth me ſhall come to me. No man can come to me, except the Father, who has ſent me, draw him*; and again, *No man can come unto me except it be given to him of my Father.*

To the ſame purpoſe the apoſtle Paul ſays §, *I have planted and Apollos watered, but God gave the increaſe; ſo that neither is he that planted any thing, neither he that watered, but God that gave the increaſe.* He alſo ſays, *Being confident of this one thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you will perform it unto the day of Jeſus Chriſt* ‖.— *Work out your own ſalvation with fear and*

* Ezek. xxxvi. 27. † Acts xvi. 14. ‡ John vi. 37, &c.
§ 1 Cor iii. 6, &c. ‖ Phil. i. 6.

trembling,

trembling, for it is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his own good pleaſure *.

We find the ſame ſentiment in Jude †, *Now unto him that is able to keep you from falling, and to preſent you faultleſs before the coming of his glory with exceeding joy, to the only wiſe God, and our Saviour, be glory and majeſty*, &c.

All prayers for good diſpoſitions go upon the ſame principles, and theſe are frequent in the ſcriptures. Thus Solomon, at the ſolemn dedication of the temple, prays in the following manner ‡, *O Lord God of Abraham, Iſaac and Jacob, keep this for ever in the imagination of the thoughts of the hearts of thy people, and prepare their hearts unto thee.*

David ſays §, *Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right ſpirit within me.*

* Phil. ii. 12, 13. † V. 24 ‡ 1 Chron. xxix. 18.
§ Pſ. li. x.

The

The apoſtle Paul prays to the ſame purpoſe, *Now the God of hope fill you with all hope and joy in believing, that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Ghoſt**. *That he may grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be ſtrengthened with might, by his ſpirit, in the inner man; that Chriſt may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love,* &c.† *And the very God of peace ſanctify you wholly*‡. *Now the God of all peace make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well pleaſing in his ſight, through Jeſus Chriſt* §.

In the ſame manner prays the apoſtle Peter ‖, *But the God of all grace—make you perfect, eſtabliſh, ſtrengthen and ſettle you.*

Such, alſo, is the uſual ſtyle of prayer to this day, as the following expreſſions from the book of Common Prayer, "O God,

* Rom. xv. 13.
† Epheſ. iii. 16.
‡ 1 Theſſ. v. 23.
§ Heb. xiii. 20,
‖ 1 Peter v. 10.

from

" from whom all holy deſires, all good " counſels, and all juſt works do proceed." And again, " Almighty and ever-living " God, who makeſt us both to will and to " do thoſe things that be acceptable to thy " divine majeſty."

That the evil actions of men, alſo, which neceſſarily imply bad diſpoſitions, do, in the language of ſcripture, take place in conſequence of the particular appointment of God, and eſpecially ſuch actions as terminate in great good, or juſt puniſhment, which is the ſame thing, the following paſſages abundantly prove. The ſelling of Joſeph into Egypt was certainly a moſt baſe action of his brethren; but obſerve how this pious man ſpeaks of it, addreſſing himſelf to his brethren afterwards *, *Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with yourſelves, that ye ſold me hither; for God did ſend me before you, to preſerve life:* And again †, *It was not you that ſent me hither, but God.*

* Gen. xlv. 5. † V. 8.

The

The manner in which God is ſaid to have hardened the heart of Pharaoh, for which, however, he was juſtly puniſhed, is very expreſs *, *I will harden his heart that he ſhall not let the people go*; and the expreſſion is frequently repeated in the courſe of the hiſtory.

It is alſo ſaid of the Canaanites †, *It was of the Lord to harden their hearts, that they ſhould come againſt Iſrael in battle, that he might deſtroy them utterly.*

When the men of Sechem, who had unjuſtly taken the part of Abimelech, afterwards quarrelled with him, it is ſaid ‡, *And God ſent an evil ſpirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem, and the men of Shechem dealt treacherouſly with Abimelech.*

It is ſaid of the ſons of Eli §, that *they hearkened not unto the voice of their father, becauſe the Lord would ſlay them.*

* Exod. iv. 21. † Joſ. ix. 20.
‡ Judges ix. 23. § 1 Sam. ii. 25.

When

When Ahab for his wickedneſs and obſtinacy was juſtly devoted to deſtruction, it is ſaid *, that *God ſent a lying ſpirit into the mouths of his prophets, in order to deceive him.*

Our Saviour ſeems to have conſidered both the rejection of the goſpel by thoſe who boaſted of their wiſdom, and the reception of it by the more deſpiſed part of mankind, as being the conſequence of the expreſs appointment of God †. *At that time Jeſus anſwered, and ſaid, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou haſt hid theſe things from the wiſe and prudent, and haſt revealed them unto babes; even ſo, Father, for it ſeemed good in thy ſight.*

Speaking, upon another occaſion, concerning the unbelief of the Jews, he ſays ‡, *Therefore they could not believe, becauſe that Eſaias hath ſaid again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they ſhould not ſee with their eyes, nor underſtand with their heart, and I ſhould heal them.*

* 2 Chron. xviii. † Matt. xi. 25.
‡ John xii. 39.

Moſes,

Moſes, alſo, ſpeaking of the obſtinacy of the Jews, ſays *, *Yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to ſee, and ears to hear, unto this day.* Iſaiah, alſo, in his addreſs to God, ſays †, *O Lord, why haſt thou made us to err from thy ways, and hardened our heart from thy fear?*

With reſpect to the apoſtacy of the latter times, the apoſtle Paul ſays ‡, *And for this cauſe God ſhall ſend them ſtrong deluſions, that they ſhould believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleaſure in unrighteouſneſs.*

We know of no act of more atrocious wickedneſs, or one for which a more juſt and ſevere puniſhment was inflicted, than the death of Chriſt, and yet it is always ſpoken of as moſt expreſſly *decreed*, and *appointed by God*; and, as was obſerved before, it entered, in a moſt remarkable manner, into the plan of divine providence. It is thus ſpoken of in the book of Acts §, *Him,*

* Deut. xxix. 4. † Iſ. lxiii. 17.
‡ 2 Theſſ. ii. 11. § Ch. ii. 23.

being

being delivered by the determined counſel and fore-knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and ſlain; and again *, *Of a truth, againſt thy holy child Jeſus, whom thou haſt anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Iſrael, were gathered together; for to do whatſoever thy hand, and thy counſel, determined before to be done.*

That God is conſidered as the ſovereign diſpenſer both of goſpel privileges here, and future happineſs hereafter, appears in ſuch paſſages as theſe †, *God hath from the beginning choſen you to ſalvation, through ſanctification of the ſpirit, and belief of the truth.*

The language of St. Paul in the ninth chapter of the epiſtle to the Romans, relates, at the ſame time, to external privileges, moral virtue, and future happineſs, as having a very near connexion with one another ‡. *He ſaith to Moſes, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compaſſion on whom I will have compaſſion. So then it is not of him that*

* Acts iv. 27. † 2 Theſſ. ii. 13. ‡ Ver. 15, &c.

willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that ſheweth mercy. For the ſcripture ſaith unto Pharaoh, Even for this ſame purpoſe have I raiſed thee up, that I might ſhew my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt ſay then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath reſiſted his will? Nay, but, O man, who art thou that replieſt againſt God? Shall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it, Why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the ſame lump, to make one veſſel unto honour, and another unto diſhonour? What if God, willing to ſhew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-ſuffering the veſſels of wrath fitted to deſtruction: and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the veſſels of mercy, which he afore prepared unto glory? Even us, whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but alſo of the Gentiles.

In the following paſſage, alſo, the ſame apoſtle ſpeaks of the whole proceſs, from being

being firſt called to the knowledge of God, to a ſtate of future glory, as equally the work of God *. *For whom he did foreknow, he alſo did predeſtinate to be conformed to the image of his ſon, that he might be the firſt-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predeſtinate, them he alſo called: and whom he called, them he alſo juſtified; and whom he juſtified, them he alſo glorified. What ſhall we then ſay to theſe things? If God be for us, who can be againſt us?*

That ſuch things as come to paſs in the common courſe of providence, were conſidered by the pious writers of the ſcriptures as more immediately adminiſtered by himſelf, overlooking ſecond cauſes, and regarding only the firſt and proper cauſe of all things, the following paſſages, among many others, abundantly teſtify.

With reſpect to the general *conſtitution of nature*, the Pſalmiſt ſays †, *Thou viſiteſt the*

* Rom. viii. 29. † Pſ. lxv. 9.

earth, and watereſt it: thou greatly enricheſt it with the river of God, which is full of water: thou prepareſt them corn, when thou haſt ſo provided for it: thou watereſt the ridges thereof abundantly: thou ſettleſt the furrows thereof: thou makeſt it ſoft with ſhowers: thou bleſſeſt the ſpringing thereof.——Theſe all wait upon thee, that thou mayeſt give them their meat in due ſeaſon. That thou giveſt them, they gather: thou openeſt thine hand, they are filled with good: thou hideſt thy face, they are troubled: thou takeſt away their breath, they die, and return to their duſt: thou ſendeſt forth thy ſpirit, they are created: and thou reneweſt the face of the earth *.

What we call the *common events*, and *accidents* of life, are all, in the language of ſcripture, the expreſs appointment of God. *If a man lie not in wait, but God deliver him into his hand* †. *The lot is caſt into the lap, but the whole diſpoſing thereof is of the Lord* ‡.

* Pſ. civ. 27. † Exod. xxi. 13. ‡ Prov. xvi. 33.

Are

Are not two ſparrows ſold for a farthing, and one of them ſhall not fall to the ground without your heavenly father.*

The Lord killeth, and maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up: he raiſeth up the poor out of the duſt, and lifteth up the beggar from the dunghill †.

He changes times and ſeaſons: he removeth kings and ſetteth up kings: he giveth wiſdom to the wiſe, and knowledge to them that know underſtanding ‡.

I cauſed it to rain upon one city, and cauſed it not to rain upon another city. I have ſmitten you with blaſting, and mildew. I have ſent among you the peſtilence. Your young men have I ſlain with the ſword §.

The *thoughts*, and *diſpoſitions of men*, are alſo repreſented as being under the ſecret direction of God ||, *The king's heart is in the*

* Matt. x. 29. † 1 Sam. ii. 6, 7. ‡ Dan. ii. 21, § Amos iv. 7, &c. || Prov. xxi. 1.

hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water. He turneth it whitherſoever he will.

Ambitious and wicked men are often ſpoken of as the inſtruments of divine providence*, *Ariſe, O Lord, deliver my ſoul from the wicked, which is thy ſword.*

The ſubſerviency of the proud king of Aſſyria to the deſigns of divine providence, is deſcribed by the prophet Iſaiah in a manner that is peculiarly emphatical and ſublime†, *O Aſſyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the ſtaff in their hand is my indignation. I will ſend him againſt an hypocritical nation, and againſt the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to take the ſpoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the ſtreets. Howbeit he meaneth not ſo, neither doth his heart think ſo, but it is in his heart to deſtroy, and to cut off nations not a few. For he ſaith, By the ſtrength of my hand I have done it, and by my wiſdom, for I am prudent: and I have removed the bounds of the people, and have robbed their treaſures, and I*

* Pſ. xvii. 13. † Iſa. x, 5, &c.

have

have put down the inhabitants like a valiant man. Shall the axe boaſt itſelf againſt him that heweth therewith, or ſhall the ſaw magnify itſelf againſt him that ſhaketh it? as if the rod ſhould ſhake itſelf againſt him that lift it up, or as if the ſtaff ſhould lift up itſelf, as if it were no wood, &c.

Of another conqueror, alſo, God ſays *, *Thou art my battle axe, and weapons of war: for with thee will I break in pieces the nations, and with thee will I deſtroy kingdoms. And with thee will I break in pieces the horſe and his rider,* &c.

From the whole of this ſubject, and theſe paſſages compared with others, I do not, as I obſerved before, infer, that the ſacred writers were, philoſophically ſpeaking, *neceſſarians*. But they were ſuch good and pious men, ſet God ſo much before them, and had ſuch high and juſt ideas of his uncontrollable power and providence, that they overlooked all ſecond cauſes, and had reſpect to God only, as the proper and ultimate cauſe of all.

* Jer. li. 20.

SECTION XIII.

The Calviniſtic doctrine of PREDESTINATION *compared with the Philoſophical doctrine of* NECESSITY.

THE philoſophical doctrine of *Neceſſity* ſo much reſembles the Calviniſtic doctrine of *Predeſtination*, in ſome views of it, that it may be worth while to point out diſtinctly in what they agree, and in what they differ. I ſhall, therefore, do it, and with as much fairneſs as I poſſibly can.

The ſcheme of philoſophical neceſſity has been ſhewn to imply a chain of *cauſes and effects*, eſtabliſhed by infinite wiſdom, and terminating in the greateſt good of the whole univerſe: evils of all kinds, natural and moral, being admitted, as far as they contribute to that end, or may be, in the nature of things, inſeparable from it. No neceſſarian, however, ſuppoſes that any of the human race will ſuffer eternally; but that

that future puniſhments will anſwer the ſame purpoſe as temporal ones are found to do, all of which tend to good, and are evidently admitted for that purpoſe; ſo that God, the author of all, is as much to be adored and loved for what we *ſuffer*, as for what we *enjoy*; his *intention* being equally kind in both, ſince both are equally parts, and equally neceſſary parts, of the ſame plan. Upon the doctrine of neceſſity, alſo, the moſt indifferent actions of men are equally neceſſary with the moſt important; ſince every volition, like any other *effect*, muſt have an adequate *cauſe*, depending upon the previous ſtate of the mind, and the influence to which it is expoſed.

On the other hand, the conſiſtent, the moderate, or ſublapſarian Calviniſt, ſuppoſes that God created the firſt man abſolutely free to ſin, or not to ſin, capable of ſinleſs obedience to all the commands of God; but that, without being predeſtinated to it, he fell from this ſtate of innocence, by eating the forbidden fruit; and from that time became, and all his poſterity with him

him (he being their federal head) liable to the eternal wrath of God, and that their whole natures were at the ſame time ſo vitiated, that they are naturally incapable of thinking a good thought, or doing a good action.

The whole race of mankind being thus liable to everlaſting damnation, God was pleaſed, for *his own glory*, and ſovereign good will, and without any reaſon of *preference*, to reſerve a ſmall number, in compariſon with the reſt of mankind, and predeſtinate them to everlaſting happineſs, on condition that his ſon, the ſecond perſon in the trinity, in power, glory, and all other reſpects, equal to himſelf, ſhould become man, ſubmit in their ſtead to death, and bear that infinite puniſhment of divine wrath, which every ſin againſt an infinite Being had deſerved, and which infinite juſtice could not remit; while all the reſt of the corrupted maſs of mankind, not being redeemed by the death of Chriſt, remained neceſſarily doomed to ſin here, and to miſery for ever hereafter.

The

The elect being, like other perſons, born in *original ſin*, have their natures equally depraved, and of courſe are as incapable of all good thoughts, or good works, as the reprobate, till God, by a *miraculous interpoſition*, produces a change in their diſpoſition, and, by his immediate agency on their minds, enables them to think and act ſo as to pleaſe him. But after this miraculous change, or *new birth*, though an elected perſon may ſin, and always will do ſo when he is *left to himſelf*, he will not finally fall away and periſh; but God will, ſome time before his death, renew him again by repentance, and he ſhall certainly be happy for ever. Whereas the reprobate (the grace of repentance, and of the new birth, not being vouchſafed to them) are under a neceſſity of ſinning, and of ſinning only. Though their actions ſhould, to all appearance, be ever ſo praiſe-worthy in the ſight of men, they are, in fact, *of the nature of ſin*, and only ſerve to aggravate their certain and final condemnation. Moreover, though many of them die in infancy, before they were capable of committing *actual*

tual ſin, they are nevertheleſs liable to the eternal wrath of God, on account of the ſin of their forefather, and federal head.

Now, in comparing theſe two ſchemes, I can ſee no ſort of reſemblance, except that the future happineſs, or miſery, of all men is certainly fore-known, and appointed by God. In all other reſpects they are moſt eſſentially different; and even where they agree in the *end*, the difference in the *manner* by which that end is accompliſhed is ſo very great, that the *influence* of the two ſyſtems on the minds of thoſe that adopt and act upon them, is the reverſe of one another, exceedingly favourable to virtue in the neceſſarian, and as unfavourable to it in the Calviniſt.

For the eſſential difference between the two ſchemes is this: the neceſſarian believes that his own diſpoſitions and actions are the neceſſary and ſole means of his preſent and future happineſs; ſo that, in the moſt proper ſenſe of the words, it depends intirely upon *himſelf* whether he be virtuous

or

or vicious, happy or miſerable, juſt as much as it depends upon the farmer himſelf ſowing his fields and weeding them, whether he will have a good crop; except that, in favour of the doctrine of neceſſity, where *morals* are concerned, his endeavours in the former caſe are much more certain in their effect than in the latter; which view of things cannot but operate to make him exert himſelf to the utmoſt, in proportion to his regard for his own happineſs; his ſucceſs being certain, in proportion to his exertion of himſelf. With this exertion he cannot miſcarry, but without it he muſt, unleſs the laws of nature ſhould change, be inevitably miſerable. As far as any ſyſtem of faith can induce men to cultivate virtuous principles and habits, this doctrine of neceſſity muſt do it.

On the other hand, I do not ſee what motive a Calviniſt can have to give any attention to his moral conduct. So long as he is unregenerate, all his thoughts, words, and actions, are neceſſarily ſinful, and in the act of *regeneration* he is altogether paſſive.

On

On this account the moſt conſiſtent Calviniſts never addreſs any exhortations to ſinners, conſidering them as *dead in treſpaſſes and ſins*, and, therefore, that there would be as much ſenſe and propriety in ſpeaking to the dead as to them. On the other hand, if a man be in the happy number of the *elect*, he is ſure that God will, ſome time or other, and at the moſt proper time (for which the laſt moment of his life is not too late) work upon him his miraculous work of *ſaving and ſanctifying grace*. Though he ſhould be ever ſo wicked immediately before this divine and *effectual calling*, it makes nothing againſt him. Nay, ſome think that, this being a more ſignal diſplay of the wonders of divine grace, it is rather the more probable that God will take this opportunity to diſplay it. If any ſyſtem of ſpeculative principles can operate as an axe at the root of all virtue and goodneſs, it is this.

The neceſſarian, alſo, believes nothing of the poſterity of Adam ſinning in him, and of their being liable to the wrath of God on

on that account, or of the neceſſity of an infinite being making atonement for them, by ſuffering in their ſtead, and thus making the Deity propitious to them. He believes nothing of all the actions of any men being neceſſarily ſinful; but, on the contrary, thinks that the very worſt of men are capable of benevolent and worthy intentions in many things that they do; and likewiſe, that very good men are capable of falling from virtue, and conſequently of ſinking into final perdition. The opinions of the Calviniſt on theſe heads he conſiders as equally abſurd and dangerous. Upon the principles of the neceſſarian alſo, all *late repentance*, and eſpecially after long and confirmed habits of vice, is altogether and neceſſarily ineffectual; there not being ſufficient time left to produce a *change of diſpoſition* and character, which can only be done by a change of conduct, and of proportionably long continuance.

Beſides, before Mr. Edwards, no Calviniſt, I think I may venture to ſay, conſidered every particular volition and action of men as

as determined by preceding motives. The Calviniſts, together with the reſt of mankind, who ſpeculated at all upon the ſubject, maintained what was called the doctrine of *indifference* with reſpect to particular actions; and though they conſidered all who were unregenerate as incapable of thinking a good thought, and as under a neceſſity of continually committing ſin, they would not ſay that every particular ſinful action was neceſſary, excluſive of every other ſinful action. Alſo, except the ſupralapſarians, no Calvaniſts ever conſidered Adam *before his fall* as being under any neceſſity of ſinning; ſo that the doctrine of the proper *mechaniſm of the human mind*, from which no volition is exempt, was certainly unknown to them. Alſo, their belief of a divine interpoſition both in the work of regeneration, and upon almoſt every occaſion with reſpect to the elect afterwards, is ſuch, that, according to them, the proper laws of nature are perpetually violated; ſo that the moſt perfect knowledge of them could be of little uſe for regulating our expectations, with regard to any event in which the affections

fections of the human mind are concerned. In this the creed of the neceſſarian is the very reverſe of that of the Calviniſt.

Farther, the Calviniſtic ſyſtem intirely excludes the *popular notion* of free-will, viz. the liberty, or power, of doing what we pleaſe, virtuous or vicious, as belonging to every perſon, in every ſituation; which is perfectly conſiſtent with the doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity, and indeed reſults from it. And in this reſpect it is that the language of ſcripture cannot be reconciled with the tenets of Calviniſm. In the ſcriptures all ſinners are moſt earneſtly exhorted to forſake their ſins, and return to their duty; and all, without exception, have the fulleſt aſſurances given to them of pardon and favour upon their return. *Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, why will ye die, O houſe of Iſrael* ?* is the uniform tenor of the ſcripture calls to repentance; and the Divine Being is repreſented as declaring, in the moſt ſolemn manner, that *he hath no pleaſure in the death of a*

* Ezek. xxxiii. 11.

ſinner, but had rather that he would turn from his way and live *.

Such expoſtulations as theſe have the greateſt propriety upon the ſcheme of neceſſity, which ſuppoſes a neceſſary and mechanical influence of motives upon the human mind; but can have no propriety at all with reſpect to men who are ſo far *dead in ſin*, as to be incapable of being excited to virtue by any motive whatever. And it is only tantalizing men to propoſe to them motives that cannot poſſibly influence them, and when nothing but a divine power, operating miraculouſly, and conſequently in a manner *independent of all natural means*, is able to effect that very change, which they are exhorted to make in themſelves.

That I do not miſrepreſent the proper Calviniſtic principles I am very confident. They are held, indeed, with conſiderable variation, but what I have deſcribed is what is moſt generally meant by Calviniſm, and is

* Ezek. v. 11.

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the moſt conſiſtent, and at the ſame the moſt favourable ſcheme of the kind; and is that to which I was formerly as much attached myſelf, as any perſon can be now.

The doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity is, in reality, a modern thing, not older, I believe, than Mr. Hobbes. Of the Calviniſts, I believe Mr. Jonathan Edwards to be the firſt. Others have followed his ſteps, eſpecially Mr. Toplady. But the inconſiſtency of his ſcheme with what is properly Calviniſm, appears by his dropping ſeveral of the eſſential parts of that ſyſtem, and his ſilence with reſpect to others. And when the doctrine of neceſſity ſhall be thoroughly underſtood, and well conſidered by Calviniſts, it will be found to militate againſt almoſt all their peculiar tenets. Mr. Toplady believes that all children dying in infancy are happy *, and that much the greater part of mankind are elected †; that undoubtedly there are *elect Mahometans*, and *elect Pagans*, and he ſeems to think the torments of hell will not be eternal. But this

* See his Scheme of Neceſſity aſſerted, p. 121. † P. 120.

is departing very widely indeed from the proper doctrines of Calviniſm; and more attention to the principles of the neceſſarian ſcheme cannot fail to draw him, and all philoſophizing Calviniſts, farther and farther from that ſyſtem: nor will they be able to reſt any where, but in what I call the ſimple and unadulterated doctrine of revelation, and which they brand with the obnoxious name of *Socinianiſm*, in which, after being what they now are, I joyfully and thankfully acquieſce; reflecting with a kind of horror on what I was, and what I felt, when I endeavoured to think and act, as I moſt conſcientiouſly did, upon thoſe principles.

I cannot, however, conclude this ſection without acknowledging (and I do it with particular ſatisfaction) that though I conſider the proper Calviniſtic ſyſtem as a moſt *gloomy* one, and peculiarly unfavourable to virtue, it is only ſo when *conſiſtently purſued*, and when every part of it equally impreſſes the mind. But this is never, in fact, the caſe with any ſyſtem. If there be in our minds a *prevalence of good principles* and good

diſ-

diſpoſitions, we naturally turn our eyes from every thing in our reſpective ſyſtems that, even by a juſt conſtruction, is unfavourable to virtue and goodneſs, and we reflect with pleaſure, and act upon thoſe parts of them only that have a good tendency. Now the doctrine of a general and a moſt particular providence, is ſo leading a feature in every ſcheme of predeſtination, it brings God ſo much into every thing, and the ideas of juſtice and goodneſs are ſo inſeparable from the idea of the Divine Being, that, in ſpite of every thing elſe in the ſyſtem, an habitual and animated devotion will be the reſult, and from this principle no evil is to be dreaded.

But where a diſpoſition to vice has preoccupied the mind, I am very well ſatisfied, and but too many facts might be alledged in proof of it, that the doctrines of Calviniſm have been actually fatal to the *remains of virtue*, and have driven men into the moſt deſperate and abandoned courſe of wickedneſs; whereas the doctrine of neceſſity, properly underſtood, cannot poſſibly have any ſuch effect, but the contrary.

In fact, if, from a good education, or any other ſource, the general bias of the mind be in favour of virtue, a man may be ſafely truſted with any ſpeculative principles. But if the bias be in favour of vice, it is of great importance that the ſpeculative principles be right and ſound; that, when viewed in every juſt light, they may operate as a motive for reforming the life and manners. The connexion between virtue and happineſs, and between vice and miſery, is upon no principles whatever ſo certain and demonſtrable as on thoſe of philoſophical neceſſity.

Whether it be owing to my Calviniſtical education, or my conſidering the principles of Calviniſm as generally favourable to that leading virtue *devotion*, or to their being ſomething akin to the doctrine of neceſſity, I cannot but acknowledge that, notwithſtanding what I have occaſionally written againſt that ſyſtem, and which I am far from wiſhing to retract, I feel myſelf diſpoſed to look upon Calviniſts with a kind of *reſpect*, and could never join in the contempt and inſult with which I have often heard them treated

treated in converſation. From my long and intimate acquaintance with the very *ſtraiteſt of that ſect*, I have ſeen but too much reaſon to believe, that though there is often among them great malignity of heart, concealed under all the external forms of devotion, I have been, and am ſtill acquainted with many, whoſe hearts and lives, I believe, are, in all reſpects, truly chriſtian, and whoſe chriſtian tempers are really promoted by *their own views* of their ſyſtem.

It is true that the treatment I have met with from Calviniſts, *as ſuch*, muſt have had a tendency to exaſperate me againſt them; but every thing of this kind has been balanced by the kindneſs I have met with from others of them. And I ſhall ever reflect with gratitude, that the perſon to whom, in this world, I have been under the greateſt obligation, was at the ſame time a ſtrict Calviniſt, and in all reſpects as perfect a human character as I have yet been acquainted with. I had the faireſt opportunity of obſerving and ſtudying it, and I now frequently reflect upon it, with ſatisfaction and

improvement. All who knew me in the early part of life will know whom I mean, and all who knew *her* will know that I do not exaggerate.

Upon the whole, however, the acquaintance I have had with Calviniſts convinces me, that their principles, in the minds of calm, ſober-thinking perſons, will always leave ſome room for doubt and uncertainty with reſpect to the evidence of their converſion, and what is called the *work of grace in the heart*; in which much muſt neceſſarily be left to the imagination, and, therefore, that at times a gloom will be ſpread over the ſoul. Conſequently, unleſs this effect be counteracted by ſomething either in the natural temper, or opinions, of a more liberal caſt, their principles do not admit of that perfect *ſerenity* and *chearfulneſs*, with which it is to be wiſhed that a life of real piety and virtue might ever be attended.

LET-

LETTERS

TO

1. The AUTHOR of LETTERS on MATERIALISM,
2. DR. KENRICK,
3. MR. JOHN WHITEHEAD,

AND

4. DR. HORSELEY.

To the Author of the LETTERS ON MATERIALISM *and on* HARTLEY'S THEORY OF THE MIND.

SIR,

YOU have challenged me to the diſcuſſion of a variety of topics, ſome of which are the moſt difficult, ſublime, and important of any that lie within the reach of the human underſtanding; and where the greateſt men have expreſſed the greateſt diffidence, you have written with the greateſt poſſible confidence. Alſo, if your language be not ironical, you conſider your antagoniſt as the moſt formidable combatant you could have to contend with. You have, on various occaſions, expreſſed the higheſt opinion of my learning and abilities, and the ſtrongeſt ſenſe of my merit and ſervices in the cauſe of literature, and where knowledge of the moſt valuable kind was concerned. To paſs over what you ſay in general

neral of my "eminent abilities and inde-"fatigable labours in every learned and "valuable purſuit," and alſo with reſpect to natural philoſophy in particular, than which nothing finer can be ſaid of any man, you are more particularly laviſh of your encomiums upon me on the ſubject of my controverſy with the Scotch defenders of the doctrine of *Inſtinctive Principles of Truth*, in which I had occaſion to introduce ſeveral of the opinions which have given you ſo much offence, and which you call upon me to defend.

As a prudent man, you certainly would not have provoked a combat in the very high tone in which you have done this, without the greateſt certainty of ſucceſs. You have, no doubt, therefore, in your own mind, *counted the coſt* of the enterprize you have undertaken, and have already anticipated my confuſion, and your complete triumph.

Now it happens that ſo very great a philoſopher, and ſo acute a metaphyſician, as you

you repreſent me to be, and who has had the ſubjects on which you ſo boldly challenge me in contemplation from the time that I was capable of conſidering them at all, to the preſent time of my life, which is the memorable year *forty-five*, a period in which, at a medium, the human faculties may be deemed to have arrived at their very ακμη; a period in which we expect a due mixture of imagination and judgment, in which the ardour of youth is not extinguiſhed, but improved into a manly vigour: it happens, I ſay, that, in theſe very advantageous circumſtances, in which you and nature have placed me, after having had your Letters in my hands about twelve months, and having in that time exerciſed my faculties in a cloſe attention to metaphyſical ſubjects, as, I hope, my *Diſquiſitions on Matter and Spirit*, and the preceding treatiſe on *Philoſophical Neceſſity* will prove, I do now, with great ſerioufneſs, aver, that, in my opinion, hardly any of the works of the three Scotch writers, which you and I hold ſo cheap, is weaker in point of argument than yours. I barely except

that

that of Dr. Oſwald, who is certainly one of the moſt dogmatical, and abſurd of all writers.

Farther, though, judging by facts, there is but little reaſon to expect that any man who has given to the public his opinion on any ſubject of importance, will ever retract it, I think I perceive marks of ſo much candour and ingenuouſneſs in ſome parts of your Letters (though I own I perceive but few traces of thoſe qualities in other places) that I do not abſolutely deſpair of engaging you to *acknowledge*, that you have fallen into ſeveral very important miſtakes; at leaſt, that your virulent cenſures of myſelf, and my opinions, are abundantly too ſevere. For this purpoſe, I ſhall lay before you a few plain conſiderations, to which I beg, in the firſt place, a very deliberate attention, and then an explicit anſwer. As I have already diſcuſſed ſufficiently, as I think, at large, the principal points in debate between us, in the preceding treatiſes, I ſhall, in this letter, only briefly refer to them.

You

You will think it extraordinary that the firſt point I beg you would attend to, and be explicit upon, is, whether you do really hold any opinion different from mine, at leaſt whether you do not acknowledge principles which neceſſarily, and not remotely, but *immediately*, draw after them the belief of all that I have contended for? and yet I am pretty confident that I can make this out to the ſatisfaction of others, and even to your own, with reſpect to the two great articles on which you arraign me, viz. the doctrines of *neceſſity* and of *materialiſm*.

Of the Doctrine of NECESSITY.

You expreſſly allow, a *conſtant influence of motives to determine the will. The moral*, you ſay *, *is as certain as is the phyſical cauſe*; and you will not deny (for no man can do it) that the immediate conſequence of this poſition is, that the Divine Being, who eſtabliſhed this conſtant dependence of human volitions upon preceding motives,

* P. 171.

and

and the ſtate of mind, could not intend that any volition, or choice, ſhould have been otherwiſe than it has been, is, or is to be. You are, therefore, as much a neceſſarian as myſelf; and all your copious declamation upon this topic, concerning the great miſchief done to morals and ſociety, &c. &c. &c. affects yourſelf as much as it does me.

If the mind be, in fact, *conſtantly* determined by motives, I deſire you would ſay, candidly, why you object to the mere term *neceſſity*, by which nothing is ever meant but the *cauſe of conſtancy*. As I have obſerved before, it is only becauſe I ſee a ſtone fall to the ground *conſtantly*, that I infer it does ſo *neceſſarily*, or *according to ſome fixed law of nature*; and pleaſe to ſay whether you think it could happen, that the mind could be conſtantly determined by motives, if there be not a fixed law of nature, from which that conſtant determination reſults. Indeed, Sir, this is ſo very plain, that you muſt either avow yourſelf *a neceſſarian*, dreadfully as the term may ſound in your ears, or adopt ſome quite new ground of

defence,

defence, ſome new principles of human liberty, that is, ſome *other kind of liberty* than what you have yet contended for.

As far as the conſequences of the *doctrine of neceſſity* affect the Deity, you, who believe the divine preſcience, make no ſcruple to admit them. You ſay *, "Why "a benevolent Creator gave free will to "man, which he foreſaw would be to his "unhappineſs and ruin, you can aſſign no "other reaſon, than that ſuch a being en-"tered into his general plan of exiſtence."

You admit, therefore, that all the actual conſequences of free will, the unhappineſs and ruin of a great proportion of mankind, entered into the general plan of providence, which is as much as ſaying that the plan required them, and could not proceed ſo well without them. And, if ſo, what objection can you have to the Divine Being having abſolutely *decreed* them? If his plan abſolutely required theſe evils, it is plain, that, at any rate, he muſt introduce them.

* P. 188.

All the difference that there can poſſibly be between us is, that, according to you, the divine plan required *free will*, though neceſſarily attended with the evils you mention, and I ſay that his plan required *general* and *ultimate happineſs*, though neceſſarily attended with the ſame evils. According to us both, the evils were neceſſarily, either to free will, or to general happineſs.

Of MATERIALISM.

The next great argument between us is, the uniform compoſition, and materiality, of the whole man. But, though you expreſs the greateſt abhorrence of this ſentiment, I call upon you to ſhew that you yourſelf do not virtually admit it. You expreſſly declare * for the doctrine of a proper *phyſical influence* between the mind and the body, as *the only philoſophical notion*, and you maintain that the two ſubſtances *mutually act and re-act upon each other*. Now this you explain on principles that moſt evidently ſet aſide all diſtinction between

* P. 76.

matter

matter and ſpirit, and make them to be as much of the ſame compoſition as I do myſelf. For you ſay that, "in order to this "mutual action, ſpirit muſt be poſſeſſed of "ſuch inferior qualities, as are not unalli-"able with the more exalted ſpecies of mat-"ter." Now the moſt exalted ſpecies of matter poſſible muſt have length, breadth, and thickneſs, and in the common opinion, *ſolidity*, or it would not be matter at all. And I call upon you to ſay whether thoſe inferior qualities of ſpirit, by which it is capable of acting, and of being acted upon, by a ſubſtance that has no properties beſides extenſion and ſolidity, muſt not be comprized under thoſe of extenſion and ſolidity? I will venture to ſay that you cannot name any other quality that will anſwer your purpoſe. In fact, therefore, you maintain exactly what I do, viz. that a ſubſtance poſſeſſed of the properties of matter may have thoſe of perception and thought likewiſe. You may uſe a different language, but our ideas are the very ſame. I appeal to your own more mature reflections on the ſubject. I alſo deſire you to explain how ſpirit, as

you ſay * can *bear no relation to ſpace*, and yet be poſſeſſed of ſome properties in common with thoſe of matter.

Beſides aſcribing to ſpirit the properties of matter, to confound them more effectually, you farther aſcribe to matter the peculiar properties of ſpirit, for you give it an *active power*, which all other immaterialiſts, and indeed all conſiſtent immaterialiſts, ſay is incompatible with their idea of matter. I deſire you would tell me, therefore, why, if one ſpecies of active power (for you are not explicit enough to ſay *what kind* of active power you mean) may be imparted to matter, *another*, or *any other* ſpecies of it may not? And what has the power of *thought* always been defined to be, but a particular ſpecies of active power?

Theſe remarks, I will venture to ſay, are ſo very plain, that a much worſe underſtanding than yours muſt be convinced of the juſtneſs of them, and a ſmall degree of ingenuouſneſs will produce an avowal of that

* P. 76.

con-

conviction. Theſe remarks alſo comprize all the great ſubjects on which we differ. As leſſer matters not worth repeating here, I deſire you would ſay what you have to advance in defence of your notion of *ſpace*, on which I have remarked *, and what you mean by ſaying it is an "ideal phenomenon, ariſing from the external order of "co-exiſting bodies." To me the expreſſion is abſolute jargon. Tell me alſo what you have to reply to my anſwer to your argument on the ſubject of *attention* †.

I ſhall now advert to ſome others matters not diſcuſſed in either of the preceding treatiſes; and here, alſo, I have no doubt but that I ſhall make your miſtakes and miſrepreſentations palpable even to yourſelf.

Of INSTINCTIVE PRINCIPLES.

What you ſay in order to prove that my own principles, or rather thoſe of Dr. Hartley, are as unfriendly to the cauſe of truth

* P. 58. † P. 92.

as the doctrine of inſtinctive principles, is ſo exceedingly trifling, and foreign to the purpoſe, that had I not ſeen it in the ſame book, I could not have perſuaded myſelf that a perſon who joins me ſo very heartily as you do in my condemnation of that ſyſtem, could poſſibly have written it.

You were "highly pleaſed," you ſay *, "to ſee a doctrine ſo triumphantly thrown "down, from its uſurped empire, which "had, within a few years, gained an aſto-"niſhing aſcendancy over minds that ſhould "have been aware of its fallacy and erro-"neous principles;" and upon many other occaſions you expreſs the ſtrongeſt approbation of my ſervices to the cauſe of truth on this account.

After this I might well be ſurprized to find myſelf accuſed of maintaining principles equally, or more unfavourable to the doctrine concerning *truth*; but I own I was ſtill more ſurprized, when I perceived the foundation on which you advance this

* P. 8.

extra-

extraordinary charge, and that the only ſimilarity you pretend to find between the doctrine of inſtinctive principles of truth and that of Dr. Hartley, is, that the aſſent to propoſitions is in both equally *neceſſary* and *infallible* *. "In both ſyſtems," you ſay †, "belief, as well as every mental affection, "is a neceſſary and mechanical effect." The only difference, you ſay ‡, "there is "betwixt them ſeems to be, that Dr. "Hartley admits of no effect for which he "does not aſſign, as the proper cauſe, ſome "nervous vibration, whilſt the Doctors, "without any ſufficient reaſon, are labour-"ing to eſtabliſh others, which ſpring up "immechanically, but however from ſome "internal impulſe. As far therefore as "ſenſations, ſenſitive ideas, and their ne-"ceſſary Scotch adjuncts go, the diſſimi-"larity of opinion is but trifling: they are "all the effects of conſtitution, or pre-eſ-"tabliſhed laws."

You alſo ſay §, that, "whenever any phe-"nomenon of the human mind is explained

* P. 122. † P. 123. ‡ Ibid. § P. 132.

"by aſſociation, a cauſe is produced in its "nature as impulſive and neceſſary, as can "poſſibly be the moſt unerring inſtinct; "with this only difference, that your ſyſ- "tem muſt be productive of eternal diſ- "cordance, and variety in opinions and "feelings."

Now ſurely, Sir, if you have read Mr. Locke, or indeed any other writer on the ſubject of the human mind, you muſt have found that, according to him, and all of them, how free ſoever man is deſcribed as *willing*, his *judgment* is always ſuppoſed to be neceſſary, or mechanical. Indeed what is judgment, but the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ideas preſent to the mind? Now you expreſſly allow (indeed, with all the world) that the mind is paſſive in perception, that is, that all our perceptions muſt neceſſarily depend upon the objects preſent to us, and the ſtate of the organs through which the ideas of them are tranſmitted. If I open my eyes, labouring under no diſorder, and there be only a ſheep before me, I cannot poſſibly ſee a horſe;

horſe; and if there be a young lamb accompanying the ſheep, I neceſſarily *ſee*, and therefore *judge*, that the ſheep is the bigger of the two. Now every other act of proper and ſimple judgment is as neceſſary and unavoidable, or, in your own language, as much the *effect of conſtitution*, and *eſtabliſhed laws*, as this; and complex reaſoning is all reducible to acts of ſimple judgment, as every logician knows. It is therefore impoſſible but that we muſt judge of all things as they appear to us, and it is this difference in the appearance of things that is the cauſe of the differences in the judgments that different men form of the ſame things. Theſe are principles that you *muſt* admit, and, therefore, all your violent declamation on the ſubject falls upon yourſelf, as well as on my devoted head.

Your cenſure of me on this ſubject is the more extraordinary, as, upon another occaſion, you complain of my principles as not ſufficiently ſecuring the aſſent to truth, for you ſay *, "If every perception be facti-

* P. 156.

"tious,

" tious, then, in ſpite of all internal rea-
" ſons, and relations in the objects, our
" ſentiments muſt widely deviate from, and
" the conſequent actions be in direct oppo-
" ſition to, every thing that is right and
" virtuous. To obviate ſuch deleterious
" effects, it appears that an all-wiſe Being
" muſt have provided ſome principle, *in-*
" *nate to our very conſtitutions*, whereby the
" charms of truth and virtue might be felt,
" and their reſpective rights immoveably
" fixed, in oppoſition to error and vice."

Now really, Sir, notwithſtanding your profeſſed abhorrence of the principle of *inſtinctive belief*, I do not ſee of what other nature can be this principle of yours, which, you ſay, is *innate to our very conſtitutions*, and *by which the charms of truth and virtue may be felt, and their reſpective rights immoveably fixed, in oppoſition to error and vice*. I do not ſee how Meſſrs. Reid, Beattie, and Oſwald could have expreſſed their own meaning more properly, or that you can account for the actual prevalence of error and vice in the world, any better on your principles

ciples than they can on theirs. What then becomes of your vehement cenſures of me, as maintaining principles as ſubverſive of truth as thoſe of their reprobated ſyſtem?

When, in favour of *your* inſtinctive principles of truth, you object to mine of *aſſociation*, that they muſt be productive of *infinite diſcordancy, and variety of opinions and feelings* *, you mention a remarkable fact, which, as it appears to me, cannot be accounted for but upon the principle of the aſſociation of ideas. This will, indeed, fully account for the actual diſcordancy and variety of opinions and feelings in the world, and in the moſt natural manner; and theſe, I ſay, are inconſiſtent with any doctrine of inſtinctive principles of truth, whether maintained by the Scotch Doctors, or by yourſelf.

Groſs miſconſtruction of Dr. Hartley's meaning.

You ſneer at me as a *rapid writer*, but rapid as my writings have been, they appear,

* P. 133.

to

to my own review, to have been ſufficiently guarded. For, without excepting any thing *material*, or any thing more than the ſloweſt writers in general may wiſh to correct and improve in their works, I do not know of any thing that I now wiſh to have written otherwiſe than it is. You, on the contrary, I preſume, have written with great caution, and have given ſufficient time to your publication; and when, with all due precautions, and advice of friends, you ſent it abroad, I dare ſay you judged it to be ſuperior to any oppoſition that it could meet with. But, notwithſtanding this, I doubt not but, after the peruſal of theſe remarks, if not before, you will ſee reaſon to wiſh you had written many things otherwiſe than you have done; and I do not mean with reſpect to the *manner* only, but the *matter* too. Some of the inſtances I have already mentioned will, I am perſuaded, make you pauſe; but I ſhall proceed to mention a few more, for which no apology can be made, the blunders in point of reaſoning being too groſs for any palliation; and yet I do not profeſs myſelf to be maſter of any uncommon

common art of detecting ſophiſtry. What ought to make you bluſh the more, they relate to two very heavy charges, one againſt Dr. Hartley, and the other againſt myſelf.

Dr. Hartley, with great ingenuouſneſs and truth, had ſaid, "However the neceſſarian may, in theory, aſcribe all to God, "yet the aſſociations of life beget the idea "and opinion of *ſelf*, refer actions to this "ſelf, and connect a variety of applauſes "and complacencies with thoſe actions; "and therefore that, as the aſſerters of "philoſophical free-will are not neceſſarily "proud, ſo the aſſerters of the doctrine of "mechaniſm are not neceſſarily humble." Now what can be inferred from this conceſſion, but that, though the doctrine of neceſſity *tends* to cure pride and conceit, &c. the influences to which we are expoſed in life counteract this tendency, in a great meaſure? This, I will venture to ſay, is all the *fair* inference that can be drawn from it.

Now what is the inference that you have drawn from it? I think you will hardly believe

believe that you could have written any thing ſo very inconcluſive, and injurious. For you ſay*, that " in this the good Doc-
" tor, in a fit of holy zeal, was determined,
" by one daſh of his pen, totally to anni-
" hilate all the boaſted excellencies and ſu-
" perior advantages of mechaniſm. There-
" fore" you ſay " has the doctrine of me-
" chaniſm, *from the Doctor's own confeſſion*,
" a general tendency to cauſe and ſupport
" the vices of pride, vanity, ſelf-conceit,
" and contempt of our fellow-creatures.
" And I wiſh to God," you add, " theſe
" were the only evils which that doctrine is
" calculated to generate, and immoveably to
" rivet in the human breaſt—Conſequences
" ſo deleterious—*la tete me tourne.*"——

I do not, Sir, even in this, charge you, as you do me, with a *wilful perverſion* of the author's meaning. But it is certainly a very unfortunate overſight, and of a very *calumniating and injurious tendency*, for which you will certainly aſk the Doctor and the Public pardon. An exact parallel to this

* P. 193.

conduct

conduct of yours, would be that of a phyſician, whoſe preſcription did *not quite cure* a diſorder, by reaſon of the patient's way of life neceſſarily promoting it, being charged with *acknowledging*, that he adminiſtered medicines which tended to aggravate the diſeaſe. Dr. Hartley does not ſay that the *belief of the doctrine of mechaniſm*, but that the *aſſociations of life* did the miſchief, notwithſtanding the good tendency of that doctrine.

Indeed, Sir, with reſpect to the unjuſt imputation of bad deſigns in your antagoniſts, you are, whether knowingly or unknowingly, a very dangerous writer, and ſuch as the Public ought to be cautioned againſt; for you have gone far beyond the bounds, I do not ſay, of *decorum* only, but of *truth*, and even of probability. You hint * that Dr. Hartley "wrote, and wrote "ſo much about a thing, with a deſign of "puzzling his readers." Now that you ſhould have read Dr. Hartley's work, as you ſay, *four times over*, and retain any ſuch im-

* P. 110.

preſſion

preſſion as this, aſtoniſhes me, but fully convinces me that it muſt have been with a prejudice which would effectually prevent your underſtanding him at all. It is, in ſeveral reſpects, evident, that, as yet, you are very little acquainted with his *theory*; though you tell us * that you can ſay "with-"out vanity, you underſtand him thorough-"ly," and I am now ſatisfied that you have been as little able to diſtinguiſh, or to catch his *ſpirit*. Of one of my own paragraphs, you ſay, that it is *replete* with *falſhood and wilful miſrepreſentation*. I hope you will bluſh when you reflect a moment upon things ſo very groſs as theſe.

Groſs miſrepreſentation of what I have ſaid concerning a FUTURE LIFE, &c.

But I proceed to your account of one of my arguments, of which you ſeem to have underſtood as little as of the above-mentioned of Dr. Hartley. I had ſaid what I believe to be very true, that "the doctrine

* P. 10.

"of

"of the immateriality of the ſoul has no "countenance in the ſcriptures," and you ſay, that "if ſo, the future exiſtence of "man muſt be given up, even on the part "of revelation." But, upon the leaſt reflection, you muſt ſee that, as a materialiſt, and a chriſtian, I believe *the reſurrection of the body*, that is of *the man*; and that upon this foundation only, in oppoſition to the opinion which places it on the *natural immortality of the ſoul*, I reſt my belief of a future life.

The paragraph in which you make this ſtrange conſtruction of my meaning, is in ſeveral reſpects, ſo curious, that I ſhall quote the whole of it *, and it will ſerve to give my reader a pretty juſt ſpecimen of your manner of treating me, and the ſubjects of this controverſy.

"You declare that the doctrine of natu-"ral immortality has no countenance from "the ſcriptures. I am not in the leaſt diſ-"poſed to pervert your meaning. I am

* P. 221.

"ſenſible of the enormity of the crime: "but I ſhould be exceedingly glad to know "whether theſe words have any meaning "at all. For if you mean to ſay that the "doctrine of natural immortality is not it- "ſelf, as ſuch, contained in the ſcriptures, "you are, to be ſure, in the right, becauſe "that doctrine, as the pure reſult of rea- "ſon, moſt evidently is not a revealed truth. "But if, as the words themſelves expreſs it, "this doctrine has really no countenance "from the ſcriptures, then is the future ex- "iſtence of man not only falſe in philoſo- "phy, as you inſiſt, but likewiſe in its the- "ological acceptation. What then becomes "of that part of the ſcheme of revelation "on which you reſt all your hopes of im- "mortality? But ſuch ſlips of the pen "(as has already been urged in juſtification "of a ſimilar overſight) are perhaps venial, "and eaſily excuſeable in the rapidity of "compoſition, particularly of ſo haſty a "compoſer as Dr. Prieſtley."

Pray, Sir, who is it that has written *haſtily*, and needs an apology in this caſe?

I leave

I leave it to yourſelf to judge; and I hope you will be duly ſenſible, as you ſay you are, of the *enormity of the crime* of perverting my meaning. Whatever the enormity be, you are certainly guilty of it.

However, you have not done with this ſubject, on which you fancy you have ſo much the advantage of me, and, poor as is the handle it gives you for cavilling, you are willing to make a little more of it. You ſay *, that "granting the notion of the im-" mortality of the ſoul was imported into " chriſtianity from the heathen philoſophy, " how could it poſſibly have contributed to " deprave that religious ſyſtem? If the re-" vealed tenet itſelf of immortality does " not neceſſarily tend to corrupt the heart, " or the chriſtian inſtitution, can it by any " means happen, that the ſame belief, when " ſuppoſed to ſpring from a ſecond ſource, " ſhould produce ſuch pernicious effects? " I bluſh, Sir, to ſuppoſe you capable of ſuch " flimſy reaſoning. But the fact ſtands re-" corded againſt you, and your philoſophy

* P. 224.

" muſt bear you through as well as it may.
" It may perhaps be glorious to diſſent from
" the crowd; but it is not, I am ſure, ra-
" tional, when more plauſible reaſons for
" ſuch conduct cannot be adduced."

Here again, notwithſtanding your inſulting me in this manner, you appear to know ſo very little of the argument you have undertaken to diſcuſs, as to take it for granted, that there can be no foundation for the belief of any future life, but upon that of the *natural immortality of the human ſoul*, as if you had never heard of the ſcripture doctrine of *the reſurrection of the dead*.

I ſhall now recite the whole of the paragraph on which your moſt uncharitable cenſure of me above-mentioned is founded, with another ſet of your remarks upon it, no leſs extraordinary than thoſe quoted above.

" The opinion of the natural immorta-
" lity of the ſoul had its origin in the hea-
" then philoſophy; and having, with other
" pagan

" pagan notions, inſinuated itſelf into chriſ-
" tianity, which has been miſerably de-
" praved by this means, has been the great
" ſupport of the popiſh doctrines of *purga-*
" *tory*, and the *worſhip of the dead*."

This paragraph I maintain to be, in its utmoſt extent, *ſtrictly true*, and I have little doubt but that the truth of it will be ſufficiently evident from what I have advanced in the *Diſquiſitions on Matter and Spirit*, and eſpecially in the *Sequel* to them. But ſuppoſing it had not been ſtrictly true, it is not ſurely ſo *palpably untrue*, as that the miſrepreſentation muſt neceſſarily be wilful. You ſay, however, on this occaſion, " That a writer who plumes himſelf
" on the character of ſingular candour and
" ſincerity, could have written a paragraph
" ſo replete with falſehood and wilful miſ-
" repreſentation, is not, at leaſt, a common
" phenomenon in the hiſtory of the human
" mind."

To the latter part of the paragraph, viz. that " the notion of the natural immorta-

" lity of the ſoul has been the great ſup-
" port of the popiſh doctrines of *purgatory*,
" and the *worſhip of the dead*," you ſay *,
" Therefore, moſt certainly, it came from
" the devil, or what is worſe, was in-
" vented by one of the antichriſts of pa-
" pal Rome.

" By purgatory (for I alſo underſtand
" ſomething of the popiſh ſcheme of faith)
" is meant a place of expiatory puniſhment.
" It is grounded on the belief of the ſoul's
" immortality, joined to a notion that no-
" thing undefiled can enter into heaven.
" But why ſhould you fancy that this doc-
" trine reſts *ſolely* on the opinion of natu-
" ral immortality, when a more adequate
" baſis may be diſcovered, to wit, an ex-
" preſs revelation, which both you and the
" papiſts (what a monſtrous coalition!)
" maintain, is ludicrous enough? Beſides,
" what poſſible ſupport can that Romiſh
" tenet derive from the pagan ſentiment in
" queſtion? Juſt with equal propriety might
" you aſſert that the doctrines of hell and

* P. 225.

" heaven

" heaven (only that they are not exclu-
" ſively popiſh) are ſprung from, or at leaſt
" founded on, the ſame opinion.

" En paſſant, Doctor, give me leave to
" aſk what objection can you conſiſtently
" have to the doctrine of *purgatory*, you
" who, I ſuppoſe with Dr. Hartley and
" others, have adopted the notion of an
" univerſal reſtoration, to take place ſome
" time or other? That notion annihilates
" the belief of eternal puniſhment, and
" conſequently eſtabliſhes a purgatory upon
" a more extenſive and extraordinary plan,
" indeed, than is that of Rome; but ſtill a
" purgatory it moſt certainly is. And if
" you will inſiſt that the popiſh tenet reſts
" on the ſentiment of natural immortality,
" by what fineſſe of logic will you be able
" to prove that your own purgatory is not
" derived, or upheld, by the ſame opinion.

" What you would mean to ſay by the
" worſhip of the dead, another popiſh doc-
" trine you aſſert ſupported by the ſame
" opinion, is, to me, quite a myſtery. I

" have been a good deal connected with " Roman Catholics, both at home and " abroad, but I never underſtood that wor- " ſhipping the dead was a part of their re- " ligion.

" What opinion, think you, will your fo- " reign friends Father Beccaria, and others, " form of your candour and ſimplicity of " heart, when they ſhall read this curious " note? But I beg your pardon, Sir. Your " friends on the other ſide of the water are, " I ſuppoſe, moſtly of the infidel caſt. You " would not, I dare ſay, be connected with " *bigots* of any nation. Seriouſly, to meet " with ſuch ſtale and childiſh reflections, " in a work, as you tell us, addreſſed to " *philoſophers*, gives me a very poor opinion " of your ingenuouſneſs, and liberal turn " of mind. And with what face can you " continue to brand others with the odious " appellation of *bigots*, and of enemies to " free enquiry, whilſt you ſtill retain rank- " ling within your own breaſt thoſe ſame " ridiculous prejudices againſt the Roman, " and perhaps other churches, which you

" firſt

"first imbibed within the walls of your "nurſery?"

On theſe extraordinary paragraphs of yours I ſhall make a few remarks.

1. I have no where ſaid that the doctrine of purgatory reſts *ſolely* on that of the natural immortality of the ſoul, but only that the latter is the *great ſupport* of the former.

2. You ſay that, with equal propriety, I might ſay that the doctrine of *heaven* and *hell* is founded on the ſame opinion; forgetting that there is no *unembodied ſpirit* in my heaven or hell.

3. My own *purgatory*, as you are pleaſed to call it (and to which I have no objection) being the temporary puniſhment of the wicked, alſo affects the *body* which riſes from the tomb, and not the *ſeparate ſoul*; ſo that it cannot require much *fineſſe of logic*, to prove that it does not reſt on the ſame foundation with the popiſh doctrine of purgatory.

4. I

4. I call the popiſh cuſtom of praying to St. Peter, St. Paul, &c. a *worſhipping of the dead*, becauſe theſe ſaints are *in a ſtate of death*, as the papiſts themſelves will not deny; for if they be not dead, they *never did die at all*, there not having been, that we know of, any reſurrection of the dead ſince their deceaſe. Beſides it would juſtify me if I ſaw them worſhipping perſons whom *I believed* to be dead.

5. As the paragraph quoted above could hardly be written by any other than a papiſt, I will take this opportunity of informing you and others, that, if by my *friends*, you mean perſons connected with me by common purſuits and correſpondence, I have among them both infidels and bigots; but that I never trouble myſelf about any man's faith or purſuits in ſome reſpects, if he be a man to my liking in others. Nor do I know that any of my friends in one reſpect complain of me for troubling them with my creed, or my ſchemes, in others. At the ſame time my friendſhips, in ſome reſpects, have not biaſſed my judgment in others.

others. With an unbelieving philoſopher, I am a philoſopher, but not the leſs a chriſtian, if any circumſtances ſhould bring the ſubject of religion in view; though it is a thing that, zealous as I am in that reſpect, I never obtrude upon any man. And though you treat me as a *bigot*, I do not, like thoſe of your perſuaſion, confine the favour of God, here or hereafter, to my own ſect, or even to the claſs of chriſtians; and I conſider the immoral chriſtian, of every perſuaſion, and eſpecially of my own, as the moſt criminal of mankind. Many of my philoſophical acquaintance treat with a good natured ridicule my profeſſion of chriſtianity, and I am ready either to argue the caſe with them ſeriouſly, or to ſmile, in my turn, at their ridiculing me; knowing that, in general, it is not accompanied with that attention to the ſubject, and conſequently with that knowledge of it, which I, at leaſt, *pretend* to.

I am even not without friends among zealous catholics, little as you ſeem to ſuſpect it, and I know how to value individuals of

of that or any communion, at the ſame time that I ſeriouſly conſider the Pope as *the man of ſin*, and the *antichriſt*, foretold in the ſcripture; and the popiſh religion, as diſtinguiſhed from Proteſtantiſm, as a maſs of the moſt horrid corruptions of chriſtianity. And if you will wait for my *Hiſtory of the Corruptions of Chriſtianity*, you will ſee that charge, narrow and bigotted as you will think me, proved in its utmoſt extent; though I do not ſay that my reaſons will be ſuch as will make any change in your religious creed. The force of prejudice, imbibed as you ſay *in the nurſery*, even in virtuous and ingenuous minds, is often greater than that of any argument.

The article of religion, however, excepted, I really flatter myſelf, that I ſhall be able to make ſome impreſſion upon you; and the remarks and obſervations advanced in this letter I propoſe by way of an *experiment* of the kind; though I own I am ſometimes ready to deſpair of my undertaking, when I conſider how very fully you ſeem to be *perſuaded in your own mind*. The language

in

in which you have, upon ſome occaſions, expreſſed this fulneſs of perſuaſion is ſo peculiarly ſtrong, that I cannot help ſmiling when I conſider on how very weak a foundation this confidence ſtands, and how very ſoon I am willing to hope, it will fall to the ground.

You ſay *, "with reſpect to the preſent "debate I am bold to declare that if I am "not on the right ſide, I will never ſacrifice "one ſingle moment of my future life to "the diſcovery of truth."

Concerning one argument to prove, againſt Dr. Hartley, that the mechanical ſyſtem cannot pre-ſuppoſe free-will, in the popular and practical ſenſe, you ſay †, "If this "reaſoning be not deciſive againſt Dr. Hart-"ley, I am willing to give up all pretenſions "to the leaſt atom of common ſenſe, and "fairly ſubmit to be claſſed in the ſame rank "of being with the pen I write with."

This language, I would obſerve by the way, very much reſembles that of Mr. Venn,

* P. 4. † P. 184.

in

in the firſt controverſy in which I was ever engaged. He ſaid he would *burn his Bible* if his concluſions from it were not juſt. But, as I admoniſhed him, that his reſolution was a very raſh one, as he had much to learn from his Bible yet, ſo though you ſhould be convinced that you have hitherto been engaged in a fruitleſs purſuit of truth, I would not have you, out of deſpair, give up the ſearch. If you be not too old, you may recover the time you have loſt on the falſe ſcent, and by double diligence come up with the foremoſt, after you have got into the right track.

At preſent, however, which is curious enough, you expreſs the ſame perſuaſion concerning me that I do concerning you, For you ſay *, "I dare defy the moſt vi-
"rulent and ſubtle adverſary to produce one
"ſingle abſurdity, through the whole ſyſ-
"tem of *immaterialiſm*, which, with his
"hand on his breaſt, the Rev. Dr. Prieſtley
"will declare to be ſuch."

* P. 82.

Now,

Now, in my *Diſquiſitions*, I have ſhewn, as you will ſee, that the ſyſtem of immaterialiſm is *replete with abſurdity*, and I do aſſure you that I can very ſafely lay my hand on my breaſt, and declare that I really believe the whole charge to be well founded. In return, I challenge you to prove a ſingle abſurdity in the ſyſtem of *materialiſm*. I have diſtinctly replied to all the objections you have advanced againſt it, whether they be peculiar to yourſelf, or not. Do you ſhew the futility of theſe replies, if you can.

I ſhall now cloſe this letter, after informing you, that, though my animadverſions on your letters do not make more than about ten diſtinct articles, I could eaſily have extended them to three or four times that number. For the things I have dwelt upon afford but a ſample of the manner in which the whole book is written, with reſpect both to ſtrength of argument, and manner of writing.

I muſt not, however, quite ſhut up this letter till I have informed you, how very raſh

raſh you have been to conclude that, becauſe I did not publicly diſown a particular Eſſay publiſhed in the *London Review*, you are authorized, as you ſay*, to deem it mine, or, which *nearly amounts to the ſame*, that it *came forth under my tutilage*, and *kind protection*. You repeat the ſame on ſeveral other occaſions †. Now I do not yet know any thing more of the author of that piece than I ſuppoſe you do. Even the ſentiments of it are, in many reſpects, not mine, as you may find by my *Diſquiſitions*; nor do I conſider the writer of it as very much my friend. Be this as it will, you certainly had no right to conſider any thing as being *mine*, that does not *bear my name*. Beſides, can I be ſuppoſed either to read every anonymous publication, eſpecially in *periodical works*, of which this country affords ſo great a number, or know what things are aſcribed to me? I aſſure you I never heard of this in particular being by any body ſuppoſed to be mine, till I ſaw the charge in your printed letters.

* P. 7. † P. 40, &c.

Let

Let this one *unqueſtionably falſe charge* teach you more caution for the future, and let it likewiſe impreſs your mind with the idea of its being poſſible for you to have been as much miſtaken in other particulars as you have been in this.

I might have enlarged on your accounts of the advertiſement ſigned *J. Seton*, and of the defence I was compelled to make of myſelf in the pamphlet intitled *Philoſophical Empiriciſm*, both of which are groſs miſrepreſentations of the facts, and to appearance malevolent; but I am really weary of animadverting upon ſuch things. I leave them to the judgment of the Public, and wiſhing you both more diſcernment, and more candour.

I am, Sir,

your very humble ſervant,

CALNE,
July, 1777. J. PRIESTLEY.

To Dr. KENRICK.

SIR,

YOU and I differ ſo very little with reſpect to any thing of importance in my *Diſquiſitions*, &c. that notwithſtanding the obligation I have laid myſelf under, I ſhould hardly have thought it neceſſary to addreſs you on the ſubject; and I freely acknowledge, that it is rather your importunity, than any thing elſe, that has induced me to do it.

We equally maintain that matter is not that impenetrable ſtuff that it has been imagined to be, that man is an homogeneous being, the ſentient principle not reſiding in a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, but being the reſult of organization; and, as far as I can perceive, you likewiſe agree with me in holding the doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity.

Of what then is it that you complain? It ſeems to be, principally, that I do not acknowledge to have learned my doctrine in your ſchool, and that the manner in which I explain it is not perfectly conſiſtent, or juſt. You ſay*, "I cannot eaſily abſolve "you from the cenſure of unpardonable "neglect, in being ignorant of what has ſo "recently, and repeatedly been advanced on "the fundamental ſubject of your *Diſquiſi-* "*tions*. Twenty years are now nearly elapſed "ſince I firſt took up the ſubject, on oc- "caſion of the late Cadwallader Colden's "treatiſe of the *principle of action in mat-* "*ter*, a ſubject on which I have frequently "deſcanted, in various publications, as oc- "caſion offered." In the ſame page you ſay, "that this neglect of mine is not ſo "much *real* as *affected*."

Now, Sir, whatever be the degree of *blame* that I have juſtly brought upon myſelf, I do aſſure you that my ignorance of your having maintained what I contend for, is not affected, but *real*; and indeed my not

* Review for 1778, p. 48.

having

having learned *more* of you, and my not holding your doctrine with perfect conſiſtency, may be allowed to weigh ſomething in anſwer to a charge of *plagiariſm*. Beſides, whatever injury I have done you, I reap no advantage from it; becauſe I do not advance the doctrine as my own diſcovery, but profeſs to have learned the ſyſtem from F. Boſcovich, and Mr. Michell.

I am but an occaſional reader of *Reviews*, and I have not the leaſt recollection either of Mr. Colden's treatiſe, or of any thing that was ever ſaid about it; and yet I am far from thinking diſreſpectfully either of *anonymous*, or of *periodical* publications, of which, without the leaſt reaſon, you frequently charge me: but certainly there is leſs chance of an anonymous publication being generally known, and eſpecially of its being aſcribed to its right author.

You ſay *, that you find I do not think you much my *friend*, becauſe I ſaid ſo of the author of the *Eſſay* in your Review for

* P. 402.

September 1775; but I had not the moſt diſtant ſuſpicion of your being the writer of that Eſſay. It is there called *a Letter to the Reviewers*, and was announced by yourſelf, as a piece ſuppoſed to be written either by *myſelf*, or *ſome of my able friends*; and, in conſequence, probably, of that manner of announcing it, it has, with many perſons, paſſed for mine. You muſt not blame me for not knowing it to be yours, when yourſelf announced it as mine.

As you ſeem not to have any recollection of this circumſtance, which has led myſelf and others into a miſtake, I ſhall take the liberty to recite the whole paragraph, which is in a note of your Review for Auguſt 1775 *. "For the reaſons alledged in our "account of Dr. Prieſtley's Eſſays, we beg "leave to be excuſed for the preſent from "entering into this intereſting diſpute, and "that ſtill the more earneſtly, as we have "had ſent us a long and laboured defence "of the paſſage that appeared ſo exception-"able to Mr. Seton, intended to have been

* P. 175.

"printed

"printed in a pamphlet by itſelf, had not "the author (either the Dr. himſelf, or "ſome able friend) juſtly conceived ſo good "an opinion of our candour, as to think "we ſhould afford a place for it in our Re-"view, which we purpoſe to do in our "next number." Accordingly in the very next number* appeared this Eſſay, which you now call your own.

There are ſeveral other things in your letters to me that are almoſt as unaccountable as this. I am very far from having a mean opinion of your underſtanding, and men of ſenſe are generally candid; at leaſt they are able to perceive the real meaning of a writer, who wiſhes to be underſtood, and they are above little cavils. And yet†, you aſcribe to me what I am profeſſedly refuting, and only ſuppoſe for the ſake of that refutation, viz. the ſolidity of the atoms, or the ultimate conſtituent parts of bodies. You write variouſly, and perhaps not very conſiſtently with reſpect to me; but, in general, you ſeem to think that I

* September 1775. † P. 64.

write with tolerable *perſpicuity*, as well as readineſs; you ſhould therefore have conſidered the paſſages which you except againſt. I ſee little, if any thing, that I can amend in them; and yet you ſay that "with the beſt diſpoſition in the world to "comprehend me, you cannot poſſibly con-"ceive what I am about."

Your cavil * appears to me to be equally ill founded: for by the *ſmalleſt parts* of bodies, I evidently mean thoſe that are *ſuppoſed to be* the ſmalleſt, or the ſolid indiſcerptible atoms of other philoſophers; which I maintain to be reſolvable into ſtill ſmaller parts. I do not wonder to find this wretched cavil in ſuch a writer as Mr. Whitehead, but it is altogether unworthy of a perſon who has any degree of reputation, as a writer, or a man of ſenſe, and candour.

You ridicule what you call my *pompous liſt* of authors prefixed to the *Diſquiſitions*, when I barely mention thoſe of which there are *different editions*, that, as I quote the *pages*,

* P. 65.

thoſe

thoſe who had different editions of the ſame book might be apprized of it. What could the moſt modeſt writer, yourſelf for inſtance, who wiſhed to be underſtood, do leſs? Had I meant to ſwell the liſt, I ſhould have inſerted in it *all* that I have quoted; which, however, is a very common practice, and not at all exceptionable. On many occaſions you charge me with *vanity* and *conceit*; and once, in imitation, I ſuppoſe, of the ſtyle of Dr. Johnſon, you term it *an exuberance of ſelf-exaltation:* but this charge is founded upon nothing but the moſt forced and uncandid conſtruction of my expreſſions. This I conſider as an unworthy artifice. Had I affected an unuſual degree of *modeſty*, inconſiſtent with writing ſo much as I do (as it certainly implies that I think myſelf capable of inſtructing, at leaſt, ſome part of mankind) there would have been more reaſon for your conduct.

As to the work which you promiſe the public, I ſhall expect it with ſome impatience, and ſhall certainly read it with the greateſt

greateſt attention; and as you ſay that "the "*theory of phyſics*, or the ſyſtematical prin- "ciples of natural philoſophy, the ſcience "which Lord Bacon repreſents as the baſis "and foundation of all human knowledge "is the department of your peculiar pro- "feſſion," I do hope that you will throw ſome light upon it, and I have every reaſon to wiſh you ſucceſs. If you can prove, as you ſay *, that *all matter is poſſeſſed of ſome degree of perception*, you will effectually remove the only difficulty under which my ſcheme labours; which is *how* a ſentient principle is the reſult of organization. The *fact* I think indiſputable, and muſt be admitted on the received rules of philoſophizing; but that it *muſt be ſo*, from the nature of things, I own I do not yet ſee, any more than I am yet ſatisfied that "the form and "magnitude of bodies are to be conſidered "as generated by motion †," or that "every "natural phenomenon, or diſtinct object of "ſenſe, is a compound of active and paſ- "ſive phyſical powers," notwithſtanding the

* P. 277. † P. 161.

very

very ingenious obſervations that you have advanced with reſpect to them.

You frequently hint that, the reaſon why I have generally appeared to advantage in controverſy, is that I have always pitched upon *weak antagoniſts*. I can only ſay, that, if this has been the caſe, it has been becauſe I have not had the good fortune to meet with any better; and in general they have not been weak either in their own eyes, or in thoſe of the public. This character, however, can by no means apply to Dr. Brown, Dr. Balguy, Dr. Blackſtone, Dr. Reid, or Dr. Beattie, whatever you may ſay of Dr. Oſwald, on whoſe work you will find the higheſt encomiums in the Reviews of the day; and it was in fact, held in very great and general admiration.

You will alſo find the ſame to be, in a great meaſure, true of the *Letters on Materialiſm*. Beſides the ſtating of *objections actually made*, and anſwering them, has a much better effect than propoſing them in other words;

words; as it may be ſuſpected, that, by this means, the anſwerer gives himſelf an unfair advantage; and when I replied to him, no other anſwer had appeared. For as to your *Mr. Seton*, who, it ſeems, notwithſtanding the incredulity of ſome, did really *live*, and is now actually *dead*, I could not, though I endeavoured to do it, perſuade myſelf to take any notice of him; he appeared to know ſo very little of the very rudiments of theological knowledge. Many other opponents I have neglected to notice becauſe I thought them inſignificant, though they are not without their admirers, and boaſt, as you do, that I make no reply, becauſe I am not able to do it. As to yourſelf, pretend what you will, I cannot conſider you in the light of an adverſary.

You aſk me repeatedly, why, ſince I deny all ſolidity or impenetrability, I ſhould chuſe to make uſe of ſo obnoxious a term as *matter*, when the leſs exceptionable one of *ſpirit* would anſwer my purpoſe full as well. I anſwer, that the cauſe of truth is beſt anſwered

ſwered by calling every thing by its *uſual name*, and I think it a mean ſubterfuge to impoſe upon mankind by the uſe of words.

Man, I believe, was wholly made of *the duſt of the ground*, or of the ſame ſubſtance with the earth itſelf. Now by what term has the earth, and all the ſubſtances that belong to it, been diſtinguiſhed, but that of *matter*? I ſuppoſe the ſentient principle in man to be the brain itſelf, and not any *inviſible ſubſtance* reſiding in the brain, and capable of ſubſiſting when the brain is deſtroyed. Now of what has the brain been always ſaid to conſiſt, but *matter*, another ſpecies indeed from that of the duſt of the ground, but ſtill compriſed under the ſame common appellation of matter? In what other manner than that which I have choſen, is it poſſible to rectify the miſtakes of men? To call matter by the name of *ſpirit* might tend to give them an idea that my opinions were, in fact, the ſame with theirs, though expreſſed in different words; and by this means, I might ſcreen myſelf from their cenſure;

cenſure; but I ſhould only *deceive*, and ſhould not *inſtruct* them at all.

In this manner too many chriſtian preachers, and writers, adopting the phraſeology of the Athanaſian ſyſtem, paſs for orthodox, without, as they think, any violation of truth. But what accrues from this conduct? No advantage to the cauſe of *truth*; nothing but the mere *ſafety of the preacher, or writer*.

This, Sir, is not my object. I have hitherto purſued a different plan, and have ſeen no reaſon to repent of it. Upon this general principle, I have choſen to ſay that *man is wholly material*, rather than *wholly ſpiritual*, though both the terms were in my option.

You muſt give me leave to cloſe this letter with ſome notice of a paſſage of yours to me, which is in the ſame ſtrain with many others, and of which we have but too many examples in ſuch writers as Voltaire and

and Mr. Hume. You ſay *, "As to your "concern for the converſion of infidels, I "look upon it as the cant of a philoſophi- "cal cruſader, and am ſorry I cannot coin- "cide with you in your projected conciliа- "tion of the *rational truths* of philoſophy, "with the *myſterious truths* of chriſtianity. "I am apprehenſive that it is impoſſible, "without endangering the cauſe of both, "to bring them into too cloſe a contact." In a note †, you add, "It is a moot point "with me, whether the really thinking and "intelligent philoſophers, whom Dr. Prieſt- "ley wiſhes to convert, are greater infidels, "in their preſent ſtate of unbelief, than "they would be, if converted by him into "rational chriſtians."

Now I muſt take it for granted, that a man of much leſs diſcernment than you, cannot but be ſenſible, that no propoſition can be *true* and *falſe* at the ſame time, or true with reſpect to philoſophy, and falſe with reſpect to theology, or *vice verſa*; ſo that if what is called a *myſtery in chriſtianity*,

* P. 489. † Ibid.

be

be really a *falſehood in philoſophy, i. e.* reducible to a contradiction, the belief of it muſt be abandoned altogether, at any hazard; and the ſcheme of religion that neceſſarily ſuppoſes it to be true muſt be confeſſed to be ill founded, and an impoſition on mankind.

If, for example, *bread and wine*, philoſophically, *i. e.* ſtrictly and juſtly conſidered, cannot be *fleſh and blood*, the popiſh doctrine of *tranſubſtantiation* cannot be true. So alſo if *one* cannot be *three*, or *three*, *one*, mathematically conſidered, neither can the Athanaſian doctrine of the *Trinity* be true. It certainly, therefore, behoves every rational chriſtian to prove the conſiſtency of the articles of his faith with true philoſophy and the nature of things. This is the only method of effectually ſilencing ſuch unbelievers as, with the low view of impoſing on the weakeſt chriſtians, pretend to believe chriſtianity, at the ſame time that they maintain it is *not founded on argument*; thinking to loſe no character with men of ſenſe, like themſelves, who will eaſily perceive the deſign

deſign with which ſuch abſurd profeſſions are made, and will be ready to join in the laugh at the credulity of thoſe who are taken with them. If I were really an unbeliever, I think I ſhould not ſcruple to avow it, rather than debaſe my mind by ſuch paltry evaſions. But it muſt be owned, that an unbeliever has not the ſame cauſe for *a ſtrict attachment to truth*, that a chriſtian has.

I am, Sir,

Your very humble ſervant,

CALNE,
June 1778. J. PRIESTLEY.

To Mr. WHITEHEAD.

SIR,

AN attack from a perſon of your religious perſuaſion is a thing that is new to me; and as I have frequently mentioned your people with reſpect, and have always had very agreeable connexions with individuals of your body, it would have been a real ſatisfaction to me to have found that, even in their *oppoſition* to me, they were reſpectable; and therefore to have had it in my power to ſpeak as handſomely of you *all*, as I have hitherto done. However, though an individual has ſhewn that want of civility and candour, which I had thought inſeparable from all Quakers, and, alſo too little acquaintance with his ſubject, I ſhall by no means impute theſe faults to the whole body to which you belong; many of whom I know to be equally diſtinguiſhed for their candour and knowledge.

You know, Sir, I preſume, that I profeſs to believe in a *God*, a *providence*, and a *future ſtate*, in the *divine miſſion of Chriſt*, and the *authority of the ſcriptures*. I have written not a little in the direct defence of theſe principles, and I hope my general character and conduct does not give the lie to my profeſſion. Why then ſhould you ſuppoſe me not to be *ſincere*, and to be *ſecretly undermining* theſe great principles of religion? Might not I, if I were ſo diſpoſed, retort the ſame ſurmiſes and calumnies reſpecting you? You are certainly at liberty to urge me with what you apprehend to be the real conſequences of my doctrine, but this you might do without intimating, as you frequently do, that I was *apprized* of the immoral and dangerous conſequences of my principles, and wiſhed to propagate them *on that account*.

"Materialiſm," you ſay *, "muſt ter-
"minate in Atheiſm;" and † "The doc-

* P. 163. † P. 90.

"trine

"trine of materialiſm muſt be attended "with the moſt deſtructive and fatal con- "ſequences. It ſuppoſes that this life is "our only place of exiſtence, and by this "means takes away all confidence in God, "all hope of future rewards, and fear of "puniſhment. It tears up all religion by "the very roots, and renders all our moral "powers and faculties wholly uſeleſs, or "ſuppoſes them to be mere creatures of "education and human policy. In ſhort, "its language is, *let us eat and drink, for "to-morrow we die.*" You are pleaſed to add, "I do not ſay that Dr. Prieſtley will "*directly* defend theſe principles, or that he "*altogether* believes them to be the conſe- "quences of his doctrine." This how- ever, is an inſinuation, that, though not *altogether*, I do *in part* believe them to be the conſequences of my doctrine; and other paſſages in your work ſufficiently ſhew, that you think me capable of advancing and ſup- porting theſe principles, even though I ſhould be altogether perſuaded of their hor- rid conſequences.

"It muſt be owned," you ſay *, "that "our author ſhews no great delicacy re- "ſpecting the character of the ſacred pen- "men. He very freely, though indirectly, "beſpatters them with dirt; from whence "one might naturally ſuſpect, that he owes "them no very good will. Profeſſions of "this kind," you ſay †, "from one who "profeſſes to believe the goſpel, looks ſo "much like a *feigned friendſhip*, in order "to deliver it more ſecurely into the hands "of the deiſts, that it will not fail to re- "cal to memory the treatment of our "Lord by one of his profeſſed diſciples, to "which, with reſpect to the goſpel revela- "tion, it bears a ſtriking reſemblance. "There," you ſay ‡, "is an end of all "ſcripture authority at once, which per- "haps would not be very diſagreeable to "this writer." Laſtly you ſcruple not to ſay §, "I ſhould not wonder to hear this "learned gentleman, armed cap-a-pee, with "logic and philoſophy, repreſent his Lord "and Saviour as a greater deceiver than

* P. 108. † P. 110. ‡ P. 112. § P. 106.

"Ma-

"Mahomet. To ſuch miſerable and pro-
"fane ſhifts, may raſh reaſoning bring an
"unguarded man."

For the honour of the chriſtian name, and of the particular profeſſion to which you belong, I hope that, on reflection, yourſelf, or at leaſt your friends, will bluſh for theſe things. In the preceding quotation, I hope, Sir, you will be thought to have given a very unfair account of my *moral principles* and *views*; let us now ſee whether you be any better acquainted with the *profeſſed deſign* of my work, and the *nature of the argument*.

"The great object in view," you ſay *, "it ſeems, in contriving and modelling "theſe enquiries into matter and ſpirit, "was to lay a foundation for the better "ſupport of *Arianiſm*." Now, Sir, ſo much are you miſtaken, that the great object in view was the very reverſe of what you ſuppoſe, viz. the radical overturning of

* P. 171.

the ſyſtem of Arianiſm, by proving the abſurdity, and explaining the origin, of the doctrines of a *ſoul*, and of *pre-exiſtence*, which are neceſſarily ſuppoſed in the Arian ſyſtem; and a very great part of my work is, not indirectly, but *openly*, and both *really*, and *by name*, an attack upon Arianiſm, and both what is called the *high* and the *low Arian hypotheſis*, which I conſider ſeparately.

Let us now ſee the light in which my account of *the opinions of the chriſtian Fathers* has happened to ſtrike you; and in this you are no leſs unfortunate. "The thing "he propoſes to prove," you ſay*, "is that "the chriſtian Fathers believed that the "ſoul can have no exiſtence ſeparate from "the body, that thought and conſciouſneſs "may be the reſult of an organized ſyſtem "of matter. Conſequently," you ſay †, "our author's grand boaſt, that the apoſtles "and primitive Fathers thought with him, "that the ſoul is material and mortal, va-"niſhes into air; where, perhaps, this ex-

* P. 140. † P. 149.

"perimental

"perimental philoſopher may be able to "make more of it than we can do in theſe "lower regions."

Again *, after reciting the opinion of Cl. Mamertus, who ſays of the ſoul, that it is neither *extended*, nor *in place*, you ſay, "Theſe ſeem to me moſt extraordinary aſ- "ſertions, to prove that the ſoul is mate- "rial, and dies with the body. It re- "quires more ſkill in Logic than I am "maſter of to find this concluſion in ei- "ther of the premiſes."

A very extraordinary concluſion indeed; but, if that had been my idea, it would not have been more extraordinary than your miſtake of the whole drift of my argument in this buſineſs. I had aſſerted that the idea of *refined ſpirituality*, maintained, I find, by yourſelf, was unknown to all antiquity; and therefore I have ſhown, that though, according to the notion of the heathen philoſophers, the ſoul was conſidered as a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, being a de-

* P. 148.

tached

tached part of the great ſoul of the univerſe, it had the property of *extenſion*, and was, in reality, what we ſhould now call *a more refined kind of matter*; and that true *ſpiritualiſm* was introduced gradually; but, if any more diſtinct æra can be fixed on, it was that of this very Mamertus.

I farther prove, that, according to the true ſyſtem of revelation, though the ſentient and thinking principle may be ſpoken of as diſtinct from the other functions of the man, it was always ſuppoſed to reſide in ſome part of his body, and to be inſeparable from it. For the ſacred writers never ſpeak of the ſoul as in one place, and the body in another; and it was not till the introduction of the heathen philoſophy into chriſtianity, that it was imagined that the ſoul retained its perceptivity and activity while the body was in the grave. Of this, I preſume, I have given ſufficient proof.

You are pleaſed, indeed, to alledge *, as a proof that the early chriſtians thought

* P. 144.

dif-

differently, a paſſage in the epiſtle of Polycarp, who ſays that "Paul, and the reſt of "the apoſtles, are in the place appointed "for them, παρα τω κυριω, with the Lord." But if you had attended to the Greek, you would have perceived that this is not the *neceſſary* ſenſe of the paſſage, and Archbiſhop Wake renders it "the place that "was due to them, from the Lord." Indeed, had you been ſufficiently converſant with *eccleſiaſtical hiſtory*, you would have known, that it was not till many centuries after the time of Polycarp, that any chriſtian thought that the ſeparate ſoul, whether ſentient or not, was in any other place than that which is diſtinguiſhed by the term *hades*. It was univerſally thought that good men were not *with God and Chriſt* till after the reſurrection, which is clearly the ſcripture doctrine.

Our Lord ſays, *I will come again, and receive you unto myſelf, that where I am, ye may be alſo* *. Here is a plain limitation of the time when the diſciples of our Lord,

* John xvi. 3.

and

and even the apoſtles themſelves, were to be admitted to his preſence, and live with him, viz. at his return to raiſe the dead, and not before.

What you ſay on the ſubject of the ſtate of the ſoul between death and the reſurrection, is too trifling to deſerve a particular notice. As you ſeem not to have given ſufficient attention to this ſubject, I would take the liberty to recommend to your careful peruſal, what the excellent Biſhop of Carliſle has written on it, Archdeacon Blackburne's *Hiſtorical View of this Controverſy*; the Diſſertation prefixed to *Alexander's Commentary on* 1 *Cor.* xv. and a ſummary of the principal arguments in the third part of my *Inſtitutes of Natural and Revealed Religion.*

It is upon this ſubject that you note, with great triumph, that I have quoted as one, two ſimilar paſſages in the book of *Revelation.* Another perſon would have ſuppoſed this to have happened through *inadvertency*, and not, as you will have it, *with deſign.*

It

It muſt have been infatuation to have done this in a work ſo inviting of criticiſm as mine is. A new edition of the work will ſhew you that my argument loſes nothing by the rectification of that miſtake.

I ſhall mention one more miſtake of my meaning, though in a thing of no great conſequence. "It is a great miſtake," you ſay *, "to ſuppoſe with Dr. Prieſtley, and "ſome other philoſophers, that there is "ſome unknown ſubſtance in material na-"ture, diſtinct from the properties of ſo-"lidity and extenſion." Now what I have ſaid, and repeated many times, is, that when all the properties of ſubſtance are taken away, the ſubſtance itſelf is gone; and that the terms, *ſubſtance*, *eſſence*, &c. &c. are merely a convenience in ſpeech.

You triumph exceedingly in my ſpeaking of the *ſmalleſt particles of matter* being reſolved into others ſtill *ſmaller*. For an explanation of this, I refer you to my letter to Dr. Kenrick.

* P. 10.

Your

Your ſtrictures on the ſubject of *perſonal identity* I freely leave to have their full effect on the minds of our readers, without any apprehenſion of the conſequence.

Before I cloſe this letter, I ſhall briefly mention a few particulars, which ſhow that you are not ſufficiently acquainted with the *ſtate of opinions* for a controverſial writer on ſuch ſubjects as thoſe of the *Diſquiſitions*.

"Nor do I preſume," you ſay *, "that "any philoſopher will contend for an earlier "and earlier exiſtence of this world, and "the creatures in it, *ad infinitum*." Now, Sir, many philoſophers and divines maintain the very doctrine that you think not to exiſt. It was the opinion of the Platoniſts, it is aſſerted by Dr. Hartley, it is what I have given in my Inſtitutes, and I believe it is that of Dr. Price, who is far from thinking with me on the ſubject of the *Diſquiſitions*.

* P. 25.

"Our

"Our learned author," you ſay*, "in-
"deed, affects to diſbelieve the continual
"flux of the particles of the human body;
"but this I preſume no one will ſeriouſly
"deny, who has a competent knowledge
"of its ſtructure and œconomy."

Now many perſons, Sir, and even Dr. Watts, whom you quote with ſo much reſpect, ſeriouſly believed that there are parts of the body, ſome *ſtamina*, that never change.

There is another thing that you take for granted, in which I believe you are quite ſingular, and it is, indeed, ſufficiently curious. You ſay†, that "where body is,
"ſpace is neceſſarily excluded," and from this extraordinary ſuppoſition you draw many curious inferences, in your reaſoning about the nature of ſpirit, and of the deity. Now I have heard of ſpace being *occupied*, but never of its being *excluded* before.

I muſt not quite conclude without acknowledging myſelf obliged to you for

* P. 81. † P. 167.

furniſh-

furniſhing me with a proof, which you will find, by Dr. Price's remarks, was in ſome meaſure wanting, of its being the *real opinion* of any perſon, that *ſpirit bears no relation to ſpace*. You do it in the ampleſt manner, and build upon it your argument againſt the materiality of the human ſoul. According to you Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, and others, who maintain the *locality*, and conſequently the *extenſion* of ſpirit, are as much materialiſts as myſelf. I leave them and you to diſpute that point; and you may imagine I ſhall not feel unpleaſantly in the ſituation of a *ſpectator*. It will give me ſome reſpite, and I ſhall expect to derive ſome advantage from the iſſue of the conteſt, in whoſe favour ſoever it may be.

"No corporeal ſubſtance," you ſay *, "whatever can poſſibly be the ſeat of ſen- "ſation; for all of them have extenſion, "and muſt be of ſome figure or form. "On the ſame principles †, we may ex- "plain the omnipreſence of God, not by

* P. 63. † P. 128.

exten-

" extenſion through all bodies, as this writer
" ſeems to believe, which is an idea ſo groſs
" that it deſerves a name which, for the ſake
" of the author, I ſhall not beſtow upon it."

Now, as you have not ſcrupled to make uſe of the terms *materialiſt*, and *atheiſt* in this controverſy, I have really a good deal of curioſity to know what dread name it is, that, *out of regard to me*, you ſuppreſs the mention of. If it be too dreadful for the *public ear*, could you not favour me with the intimation of it in a private letter? I ſhall communicate it to my friend Dr. Price, whom it concerns as much as it does myſelf. Dr. Clarke, you will alſo find, and in the opinion of Dr. Price, all the moſt diſtinguiſhed immaterialiſts, will fall under this dread cenſure. But, being ſo many of us, materialiſts and immaterialiſts, we ſhall bear it the better; for bodies, and large companies of men, we know, are not eaſily affected either by *ſhame* or *fear*.

I am, Sir,

Your very humble ſervant,

CALNE,
June 1778. J. PRIESTLEY.

To Dr. HORSELEY.

DEAR SIR,

I THINK myſelf particularly happy that a perſon of your abilities, and mathematical and philoſophical knowledge, has vouchſafed to allude to my work, though only in a *ſermon*, as it gives me an opportunity of explaining myſelf more fully with reſpect to the ſtate of the queſtion concerning *liberty* and *neceſſity*, and likewiſe of ſhowing that the *ſect* of neceſſarians, though almoſt *every where ſpoken againſt*, is more numerous and reſpectable than is generally imagined; for that you, Sir, belong to it as much as I do; with this only difference, that you chuſe to make uſe of one ſet of phraſes, and I of another.

It is impoſſible for me to expreſs in ſtronger terms than you do, the abſolute certainty of every determination of the will

of man, as depending upon the circumſtances he is in, and the motives preſented to him. "A moral motive and a mechanical force," you ſay*, "are equally certain cauſes, each of its proper effect. A "moral motive," you ſay, "is what is "more ſignificantly called the final cauſe, "and can have no influence but with a being that propoſes to itſelf an end, chuſes "means, and thus puts itſelf in action. It "is true that while this is my end, and "while I conceive theſe to be the means, "a definite action will as certainly follow "that definite choice and judgment of my "mind, provided I be free from all external reſtraint and impediment, as a determinate motion will be excited in a body "by a force applied in a given direction. "There is, in both caſes, an equal certainty of the effect."

Having granted this, it is not poſſible that you and I can have any difference that is not merely *verbal*. Our *ideas* are preciſely the ſame; nor have I indeed any ob-

* P. 10.

jection

jection to your *language*, in any ſenſe in which it can be conſiſtent with the above aſſertions.

You are too good a mathematician to require being told, that, if every determination of the mind of man certainly depends upon preceding cauſes, whether the cauſes be moral, or phyſical, it is not poſſible that any determination, or conſequently that any event, in which men are concerned, could have been otherwiſe than it *has been*, *is*, or *is to be*; or that the Divine Being, who, as you juſtly ſay, "knows things by their "cauſes, as being himſelf the firſt cauſe, "the ſource of power and activity to all "other cauſes," ſhould not have *intended* every thing to be juſt as it is. On this ground only can you affirm, as you do, that "to him every thing that ſhall ever be is "at all times infinitely more certain, than "any thing, either paſt or preſent, can be "to any man," &c. This, I ſay, you need not be told. It is an immediate and neceſſary inference from your own principle.

Indeed, it is little more than repeating the ſame thing in other words.

You even apply theſe principles to a caſe of the greateſt virtue that was ever exerted by man, viz. the voluntary ſufferings and death of Chriſt, and likewiſe to a caſe of the greateſt wickedneſs, viz. that of his enemies in voluntarily inflicting thoſe ſufferings upon him. No perſon can expreſs this with more perſpicuity or energy than you have done.

"Now therefore," you ſay*, "he be-
"gins to ſhew them" (his diſciples) "that
"he *muſt* go to Jeruſalem, and, after much
"malicious perſecution from the leaders
"of the Jewiſh people, he *muſt* be killed.
"The form of expreſſion here is very re-
"markable in the original, and it is well
"preſerved in our Engliſh tranſlation. He
"*muſt* go, he *muſt* ſuffer, he *muſt* be killed,
"he *muſt* be raiſed again on the third day.
"All theſe things were fixed and deter-

* P. 3.

"mined

" mined—muſt inevitably be—nothing could
" prevent them—and yet the greater part of
" them were of a kind that might *ſeem* to
" depend intirely upon man's free-agency.
" To go, or not to go to Jeruſalem, was in
" his own power, and the perſecution he
" met with there, ariſing from the folly
" and the malice of ignorant and wicked
" men, ſurely depended upon the human
" will; yet, by the form of the ſentence,
" theſe things are included under the ſame
" *Neceſſity of Event* as that which was evi-
" dently an immediate effect of divine
" power, without the concurrence of any
" other cauſe, the reſurrection of Jeſus from
" the dead. The words which in the ori-
" ginal expreſs the *going*, the *ſuffering*, the
" *being killed*, the *being raiſed again*, are
" equally ſubject to the verb which anſwers
" to the word *muſt* of our language, and in
" its proper meaning predicates *neceſſity*.
" As he *muſt* be raiſed on the third day, ſo
" he *muſt* go, he *muſt* ſuffer, he *muſt* be
" killed. Every one of theſe events, his
" going to Jeruſalem, his ſuffering, and his
" death there, and that theſe ſufferings, and

" that death ſhould be brought about by " the malice of the elders and chief prieſts " and ſcribes; every one of theſe things " is plainly announced, as no leſs unal- " terably fixed, than the reſurrection of " our Saviour, or the time of his reſur- " rection, that it was to happen on the " third day."

If then the virtuous determinations of Chriſt, and the wicked determinations of his enemies, were equally neceſſary (for I have no other idea to the word *muſt be*, and indeed you yourſelf uſe them as ſynonymous) every other act of virtue, or act of vice, is equally neceſſary, or *muſt be*, and nothing but a miracle, or an arbritrary infringement of the laws of nature, can prevent its taking place. Though you do not chuſe to call this a *phyſical*, but a *moral* neceſſity, you allow it to be a *real* neceſſity, ariſing from the operation of the eſtabliſhed laws of nature, implying an impoſſibility of the thing being otherwiſe than it is, which is all that I wiſh you to grant.

For

For any man to have acted differently from what he did, in any given caſe, he muſt have been differently diſpoſed at the time, or muſt have had different views of things preſent to his mind; neither of which, properly ſpeaking, depends upon himſelf. For though it does ſo *immediately*, it does not do ſo *ultimately*: for ſince every particular determination depends upon his immediately preceding circumſtances, it neceſſarily follows that the whole chain of his determinations and actions depends upon his *original make*, and *original circumſtances*. And who is our maker but God? or who is it that diſpoſes of us but the ſame God?

You could not, dear Sir, have written what you have done, if you had not felt, and enjoyed this moſt important truth. Let us do it freely and without reſerve, let us not ſcruple to expreſs it in its proper language, and let us openly acknowledge, and chearfully embrace, all the fair conſequences of it. I need not with you, Sir, make any encomium on our common prin-

principles. The doctrine of neceſſity (moral neceſſity, if you chuſe to call it ſo) contains, or implies, all that the heart of man can wiſh. It leads us to conſider ourſelves, and every thing elſe as at the uncontrolled diſpoſal of the greateſt and beſt of beings; that, ſtrictly ſpeaking, nothing does, or can, go wrong; that all *retrograde motions*, in the moral as well as in the natural world, are only *apparent*, not *real*. Being under this infallible guidance, our final deſtination is certain and glorious. In the language of Pope.

All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction, which thou canſt not ſee;
All diſcord, harmony, not underſtood;
All partial evil, univerſal good;
And, ſpite of pride, in erring reaſon's ſpite,
One truth is clear, *whatever is, is right.*

Let us now conſider why it is that you object to the term *phyſical*, as applied to the cauſes of human actions. For I am ready to diſuſe it, if it imply any thing more than we both agree in maintaining. The word itſelf is derived from φυσις, *nature*, and therefore

fore literally rendered, ſignifies *agreeable to nature*, or the *laws of nature*. A phyſical cauſe, therefore, is ſimply that which, according to the eſtabliſhed laws of nature, will produce a given effect; and of courſe reſpects the laws to which the mind is ſubject, as well as thoſe by which the external world is governed, both being equally within the compaſs of *nature*. I therefore apply it to both caſes indiſcriminately.

If you ſay the *operations*, and therefore the *laws*, are of a very different nature, I readily acknowledge it. For, with reſpect to this, it is impoſſible that we can really differ. The compaſs of nature is great, and comprizes very various things. *Chemiſtry*, for inſtance, and common *mechanics* are very different things; and accordingly we have different *kinds of laws*, or *rules*, by which to expreſs, and explain, their operations; but ſtill they are equally branches of *Phyſics*. So alſo though the *phenomena*, and conſequently the *laws of the mind*, are different from thoſe of the *body*, that is no

ſuffi-

ſufficient reaſon why we ſhould not comprize them under the ſame general term of *phyſics*. However, if you diſlike the word, in the extenſive application in which I uſe it, I am very well content to uſe it in your more reſtrained ſenſe, and will call the things that influence the mind *moral*, and not phyſical cauſes. Only allow that there *are* laws, and cauſes, by which the mind is truly and properly *influenced*, producing certain definite effects in definite circumſtances, and I ſhall not quarrel with you for the ſake of a term.

You ſay *, that I confound moral and phyſical neceſſity, or, to uſe your own words, that "when I repreſent the influ-"ence of moral motives, as ariſing from "a phyſical neceſſity, the very ſame with "that which excites and governs the mo-"tions of the inanimate creation, I con-"found nature's diſtinctions, and contra-"dict the very principles I would ſeem to "have eſtabliſhed; and that the ſource of

* P. 10.

"the

"the miſtake is, that I imagine a ſimili-
"tude between things which admit of no
"compariſon."

Now, Sir, I will allow as much difference as you *can* ſuppoſe between moral and phyſical cauſes. Inanimate matter, as the pen that I write with, is not capable of being influenced by *motives*, nor is the *hand* that holds the pen, but the *mind* that directs both. I think I diſtinguiſh theſe things better by the terms *voluntary* and *involuntary*; but theſe are mere *words*, and I make no compariſon between them, or between moral and phyſical cauſes, but in that very reſpect in which you yourſelf acknowledge that they agree, *i. e.* the *certainty* with which they produce their reſpective effects. And this is the proper foundation of all the *neceſſity* that I aſcribe to human actions. My concluſion, that men could not, in any given caſe, act otherwiſe than they do, is not at all affected by the *terms* by which we diſtinguiſh the laws and cauſes that reſpect the mind from thoſe which reſpect the external world. That there

there are *any laws*, and that there are *any cauſes*, to which the mind is ſubject, is all that my argument requires. Give me the thing, and I will readily give you the name.

Again, you diſtinguiſh between *efficient* and *final* cauſes, and ſay that, by means of the latter, a perſon *puts himſelf in motion*. But ſtill, if it be true, as you allow, that, notwithſtanding this, a definite act will certainly follow a definite choice and judgment of the mind, there is, in no caſe, any more than *one way* in which the mind can put itſelf in motion, or only one direction that it can take, which is all the neceſſity that I contend for. I chuſe to ſay that *motives determine the mind*, whereas you ſay that the *mind determines itſelf according to the motives*; but, in both caſes, the determination itſelf is the very ſame, and we both agree that it *could not have been different*. Our difference, therefore, is merely verbal, and cannot poſſibly be any thing more.

Turn over this ſubject, Sir, in your own mind as you pleaſe, you will find that one who

who controverts the doctrine of neceſſity, has the choice of no more than *two things*. He muſt either ſay that, in a given ſituation of mind, with reſpect to diſpoſition and motives, the determination is *definite*, *i. e.* agreeable to ſome general rule, or that it is *indefinite*, *i. e.* ſubject to no rule at all. If the former be admitted, which is what you allow, you are, to all intents and purpoſes, a neceſſarian. You may (unknown to yourſelf) conceal your principles under the cover of ſome ſpecious and ambiguous phraſeology, but you certainly maintain the *thing*. If, on the other hand, you ſay, that the determination is *indefinite*, you are very ſenſible that you ſuppoſe *an effect without a cauſe*, which is impoſſible. This ſide of the dilemma, therefore, you carefully avoid. In ſhort, Sir, there is no choice in the caſe, but of the doctrine of neceſſity (diſguiſed, perhaps, under ſome other name) or abſolute nonſenſe. There is no poſſibility of finding any medium.

Incidit in Scyllam qui vult vitare Charybdim.

You

You are pleaſed, Sir, to call philoſophical neceſſity the doctrine of the *ſubtle moderns*, and that of predeſtination that of their *more ſimple anceſtors*, ſaying, that we ſubtle moderns, are *deeply verſed in phyſics, and maintain the regular operation of ſecond cauſes*; and you candidly acknowledge, that we are both actuated by the *ſame humble ſpirit of reſigned devotion*. This, Sir, is frank and generous, and I hope true. I only object to your characterizing us neceſſarians as *ſubtle*, when, in reality, Sir, our doctrine is the plaineſt thing in the world, and it requires no ſmall degree of ſubtlety to believe any thing elſe.

What are your diſtinctions between things *moral* and *phyſical*, *efficient* and *final*, *certain* and *neceſſary*, thoſe relating to *ſelf-determination*, or *ſelf-motion*, &c. &c. &c. but *ſubtleties*, to which we have no recourſe. We are content to call all things by their common names. With us laws are laws, and cauſes cauſes. If the laws are invariable, and the cauſes certain in their operation (and without this they are, in reality, *no laws*,

laws, and *no cauſes* at all) we ſay that all that follows is *neceſſary*, or what *could not but be*. What is there, Sir, of *ſubtlety* in all this?

As you are a man of undoubted ſenſe, and candour, and particularly well verſed in mathematical and philoſophical knowledge, I doubt not you will carefully attend to theſe few plain conſiderations; and I am confident that, with the honeſt mind that I believe you to be poſſeſſed of, you will henceforth avow yourſelf to be what, without hitherto knowing it, you really are, a believer in "the great and glorious, though "unpopular doctrine of *philoſophical neceſ-* "*ſity*."

I am,

With the greateſt reſpect,

Dear Sir,

Yours, very ſincerely,

CALNE,
June 1778.

J. PRIESTLEY.

P. S. I ſhall take it as a particular favour, if you will oblige me and the public with your *ſecond thoughts* on this ſubject. I have had, and expect, ſo many weak and haſty anſwers, that, I own, I am eager to lay hold of a man who is equal to the diſcuſſion of the ſubject, and eſpecially one who is, at the ſame time, truly liberal and candid. The doctrine of Neceſſity is very far from being well underſtood by the generality of ſcholars, and it is certainly of great conſequence to have their attention drawn to it. I ſhall be happy, likewiſe, to walk with you over *all* the ground marked out in the *Diſquiſitions*, with reſpect to which I perceive that you hold a ſyſtem very different from mine.

APPEN-

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

A FARTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE OBJECTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS FAVOURING INDOLENCE, AND VICE.

NOTWITHSTANDING all that I have advanced in anſwer to the objection that has been made to the doctrine of neceſſity, as *leading to indolence, indifference,* and even *vice,* ſome perſons, I find, wiſh I had been ſtill more particular; the popular cry againſt it ſtill being, "Why ſhould I "exert myſelf, if my fate be determined? "What *muſt be, muſt be,* and cannot be "prevented." I do not know that I can urge any thing more ſatisfactory than I have already done in anſwer to this objection, and which I think abundantly ſuf-

ficient for the purpoſe; but I will try another view of the ſubject.

On the principle of the doctrine of neceſſity, man is a machine, moved by motives, as ſhips are by the winds. That *within himſelf*, by which he is ſubject to be acted upon, are his *appetites* and *paſſions*, which reſemble the *ſails* of the ſhip. If theſe be raiſed, and the wind blow, the ſhip moves of courſe. Thus, alſo, man being furniſhed by nature with appetites and paſſions, if the objects that are adapted to gratify them come in view, his *deſires* are neceſſarily excited, and he is prompted to exert himſelf, in order to attain them. In this manner, it will not be denied, mankind in general are *put in motion*, as we may ſay, and thus is the buſineſs of the world carried on.

Now, by becoming *neceſſarians* we do not ceaſe to be *men*. We ſtill retain every natural ſpring or principle of action, and occaſions of calling them forth occur to us as

as much as to others. All the difference that can take place in conſequence of becoming neceſſarians is, that we are thereby *apprized* of this mechanical ſtructure of our minds. But it is impoſſible that this circumſtance ſhould make us abate our endeavours to gain any favourite object, unleſs either the object ſhould become leſs a favourite one with us, or we ſhould ſee that our endeavours were leſs neceſſary to gain it. But neither of theſe things takes place.

It cannot be denied but that, feeling as men, our *objects* are the ſame with thoſe of other men, and a neceſſarian is ſo far from thinking that his *endeavours* are leſs ſtrictly connected with his *end*, that he ſees them to be more ſo; every thing in nature being, in his perſuaſion, an indiſſolubly connected chain of *cauſes and effects*; ſo that if any one link, his own endeavours among the reſt, be interrupted, his object is unattainable. It may, therefore, be expected, that a neceſſarian, having any favourite object in view, will be more attentive to the means that he believes to be abſolutely requiſite

to gain his end, than other men will be. And this is certainly the caſe, as far as a man is a *practical neceſſarian*, or reduces to practice the knowledge he has of the mechanical ſtructure of his own mind, and of every thing elſe in nature.

It is ſaid the *final iſſue* of his endeavours is *fixed*. But it is only fixed *as connected with his endeavours*, and he has no means of *knowing* how it is fixed, but by its *ſuppoſed* connexion with his endeavours; ſo that the moment he begins to ſlacken his endeavours, he neceſſarily begins to think that the end is not fixed as he wiſhed it to be, he himſelf putting an effectual bar to its taking place. He, therefore, will not ſlacken his endeavours, unleſs he either ceaſes to deſire the end, or begins to believe that his endeavours are not neceſſary to gain it, which is the caſe with the Calviniſts. This, at leaſt, would be the caſe with them, if other principles, more conſonant to nature, did not intervene, and check the natural operation of their religious tenets. But if Calviniſts are ſeldom able to act up

to

to their principles, which really favour indolence, on what grounds can it be apprehended that neceſſarians ſhould give way to indolence, when their principles lead them from it?

If it was poſſible for a neceſſarian to conſider his fate as depending on the caſt of a die, or any thing elſe equally *independent of himſelf*, and unconnected with his efforts, he might feel himſelf diſpoſed to ſit with folded hands, in patient or anxious expectation of the event. But ſurely when his own opinion of his ſituation is ſo very different, it muſt be impoſſible that he ſhould *feel* as if it was the ſame. An objection which goes upon the idea of things ſo very different, and *apprehended* to be ſo very different, having the ſame effect on any human mind, neceſſarian or not neceſſarian, cannot be well founded.

If it be ſaid that the ſuppoſition of *certainty in the event*, univerſally conſidered, will preclude all endeavours, it will affect

all mankind, neceſſarians and thoſe who are not neceſſarians, without diſtinction; becauſe, admitting the *divine preſcience*, every thing future is abſolutely certain in the eye of God. Or, without any reſpect to preſcience, as *time* and the *courſe of nature* are continually going on, every thing muſt have ſome termination or other; and this, whether known to any being or not, may be conſidered as *certain in itſelf*. But it is not a fact, that any perſon's endeavours are at all affected by ſuch views and ſpeculations as theſe; becauſe while the thing is *depending*, and the event is *unknown to ourſelves*, the expectation of it cannot affect us one way more than another. If it could have any operation, it would be that of equal weights in oppoſite ſcales, and therefore could not incline us either *to* or *from* any purſuit. In this ſituation, therefore, we are actuated by our natural deſires, juſt as if no ſuch certainty as this had any exiſtence. A thing altogether *unknown* cannot poſſibly have influence; becauſe it is the *knowledge* of it that gives it all the influence it can have. It is impoſſible, therefore,

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in any caſe, that a regard to what will be future ſhould affect our conduct, unleſs we knew what the future event will be; and therefore this knowledge is wiſely concealed from us.

Let me exemplify this reaſoning by my own purſuits. I may be ſuppoſed to wiſh to aſcertain ſome particular fact in natural philoſophy; this wiſh, ariſing from my conſtitution and the uſual objects of my attention. In ſpeculating on the ſubject, it occurs to me, that, by a very eaſy and ſimple experiment, I cannot fail to aſcertain the fact in queſtion. So far, all my readers will ſay, the proceſs is mechanical and neceſſary; for *volition* and *action* are not concerned. But ſome, pretending to feel for me, will ſay I may ſtop here, and never proceed to make the experiment, becauſe it is in itſelf certain either that I ſhall aſcertain this fact, or that I ſhall not do it. If I *ſhall not*, nothing that I can do will anſwer; and if I abſolutely *ſhall*, nothing that I can neglect to do will prevent it.

He muſt, I think, be a very poor logician, who does not perceive a flaw in this chain of reaſoning. In the firſt place, I do not know which of the two poſſible events is that which *will be future*, and therefore I cannot be affected as I ſhould be if I did know which of them it was. If this conſideration could have any weight, it would incline me to *act*, and *not to act* with equal force, and therefore leave me as much at liberty as if it had never interfered at all. In the ſecond place, I do perfectly well know, that unleſs I make the experiment I never can make the diſcovery; and this circumſtance alone would be a proof that I ſhould not make it. But, on the contrary, if I make the experiment, which depends upon myſelf, I cannot fail to obtain the knowledge I want.

With this ſtate of mind, which neceſſarily ariſes from my ſituation, let any perſon ſay, whether it be poſſible for me to ſtop without making the experiment, unleſs the object of it ſhould ſuddenly become indifferent

ferent to me, any more than I could ſtop in any other part of the proceſs, in which *direct volitions* were not at all concerned. Having, therefore, all the neceſſary materials, and a proper apparatus at hand, neceſſarian as I am, I ſhall certainly take the firſt opportunity of doing what I had projected; the connexion between the *deſire* and the *action* not being at all broken by any conſideration of an unknown future event.

This alſo muſt be the caſe with reſpect to any other event that depends upon my endeavours or volitions. If I ſee my child ſtruggling for life in the water, it is impoſſible I ſhould refrain from endeavouring to ſave him, unleſs the life of my child ſhould ſuddenly become indifferent to me, or I ſhould perceive that all my endeavours could avail nothing to relieve him. I cannot conceive how any ſpeculations about the event being *previouſly certain*, one way or the other ſhould influence my conduct, ſo long as that certainty is unknown to me. Let a perſon conſider this caſe in every poſ-

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ſible light, and he muſt be ſatisfied, that there muſt be ſome fallacy or other in any chain of reaſoning, in conſequence of which it may be pretended that a father ſhould be reſtrained from endeavouring to ſave the life of his child.

The like may be obſerved with reſpect to the education of my child. It is certainly known to God, and therefore a thing certain in itſelf, that he will be either virtuous or vicious, a credit or a diſgrace to me. But can the knowledge of this make me indifferent about his education, ſo long as I believe that my inſtructions have a neceſſary connexion with his future conduct. This, though certain in itſelf, is altogether uncertain with reſpect to me; but I know that if I conduct myſelf right, I ſhall moſt probably determine the event in my favour.

It may be ſaid that, whatever becomes of myſelf, my ſchemes, or my children, the *final iſſue* is ſure to be *right in itſelf*; being agree-

agreeable to the divine plan, which it is not in my power to defeat. Whether, therefore, this plan requires that myſelf, or my children, be happy or miſerable, I ought to acquieſce in it; leaving all concern about that to him who is the beſt judge concerning it, and who has the appointment of it.

But ſo long as it is *unknown to me* whether the general plan of providence requires my happineſs or my miſery, it can operate no more than the idea of *future certainty* in general; and therefore could not incline me either to negligence or to vigilance with reſpect to my conduct. For if my negligence may favour the divine plan, it may alſo be inconſiſtent with it. In this caſe, therefore, my regard for myſelf and my children muſt operate uncontrolled, juſt as if no idea whatever about the divine plan had interfered. Beſides, the general ſcheme of providence being manifeſtly in favour of virtue and happineſs, the antecedent preſumption is, that it requires my virtue and hap-

happineſs, and alſo that of my children, rather than our miſery, though this cataſtrophe *may* be conſiſtent with it.

There is, moreover, a fallacy in the general expreſſion, that it is *not in our power* to obſtruct the divine purpoſes. That no man, by ſetting himſelf againſt God, can ſucceed, ſo as to carry his own ſchemes againſt thoſe of his Maker, is true; and a great and comfortable truth it is. But to ſay that human endeavours and exertions are not *neceſſary* to the divine purpoſes, is to ſay that the Divine Being never employs the volitions and exertions of men to gain his purpoſes, which is far from being true. And if theſe be neceſſary means to gain his ends, thoſe ends certainly could not be gained, at leaſt ſo well gained, without them; and therefore there is likewiſe a ſenſe in which, though it may be ſtrictly true, that it is not in the power of man to *obſtruct* the deſigns of God, yet that it is in the power of man to *promote* the deſigns of God; and the reflection that we are doing

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ſo is a great ſatisfaction to a virtuous mind, when we are acting ſuch a part, as, from the general plan of providence, we have reaſon to conclude that we are favouring it, not indirectly, as we may be doing by our vice and miſery, but directly and properly, by our virtue and happineſs.

Having heard this objection to the doctrine of neceſſity frequently urged, and by perſons whoſe judgment I reſpect, I have given all the attention to it that I poſſibly can, and I am ſatisfied that it turns upon a fallacy exactly ſimilar to that by which it is pretended, that the *will itſelf* is the cauſe of its own determinations. In this caſe the will itſelf cannot be the cauſe of any one particular determination in preference to another, any more than the motion of the air can be an adequate and proper cauſe of the wind blowing from the North rather than from the South; becauſe the will itſelf, independent of *motives*, bears an equal relation to all particular determinations, juſt as the motion of the air is equally concerned

cerned in all particular winds. In like manner, no reſpect to any thing *future*, to any thing as *right in the plan of providence*, &c. &c. can poſſibly influence the mind to indolence or exertion, or to one mode of exertion in preference to another, ſo long as it is *unknown to us* what is to be future, or what is the plan of providence, &c. becauſe while it is unknown, it bears an equal relation to indolence or exertion, and to all modes of exertion without diſtinction. In all caſes, therefore, the mind will be decided by other conſiderations, and ſuch as are common to neceſſarians and to all mankind.

I have alſo frequently endeavoured to ſcrutinize my own feelings with reſpect to this objection, with the greateſt rigour. But though I believe the doctrine as firmly as perhaps any perſon ever did, without ſtarting at any of the conſequences of it; and in the courſe of writing ſo much about it, have given as much attention to it as perhaps any other perſon ever did, I cannot perceive

ceive the leaſt tendency that it has to abate my ardor in any purſuit.

Before the various controverſies in which I have been engaged on this ſubject, it may be ſuppoſed that theſe principles, not having been particularly attended to, might have no particular influence; but ſince I have given ſo much attention to them, I am conſcious that my activity is in no reſpect abated. On the contrary, I rather flatter myſelf that my views of the great ſyſtem to which I belong being thereby more juſt and enlarged, I feel a growing ſatisfaction in my contemplation of it, juſt and proper objects of purſuit are at leaſt not leſs frequently occurring to me, and I feel perhaps an increaſing ardor in the proſecution of them. Feeling this in myſelf, I cannot help concluding that other perſons muſt feel the ſame; and therefore I am ſo far from apprehending any ill conſequences from the doctrine, that I ſincerely rejoice in finding ſo many proſelytes continually making to it.

No perſon will be afraid of the doctrine of neceſſity but he who miſtakes its nature and tendency, and therefore will not be a neceſſarian, and conſequently will not be influenced by it at all; and the moment that any perſon becomes a neceſſarian, all theſe fears will vaniſh. A man of a bad diſpoſition, and bad views, may *pretend* to avail himſelf of *any* principles, in excuſe of his conduct; but with reſpect to the doctrine of neceſſity, it can be nothing more than a pretence, the thing itſelf having no ſuch aſpect. On the contrary, it will tend, as far as it is underſtood, to correct and enlarge a man's views of things, and conſequently will tend to better his diſpoſition, and to correct his conduct, as I think I have ſufficiently ſhewn in the courſe of this treatiſe, and of my ſeveral defences of it.

I am very ſenſible that I have advanced nothing materially new in this *Appendix*; but I have acquitted myſelf in the beſt manner that I can with reſpect to a doctrine

trine which I value, by endeavouring to remove an impediment, which, without feeling myſelf, I find to be an obſtruction to the hearty reception of it with others.

For the benefit of many perſons who are altogether unprepared for the diſcuſſion of this ſubject, I ſhall conclude all that I ſhall probably ever write about it, with repeating what I obſerved at the very entrance on it, viz. in the Preface to my *Examination of the writings of Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Oſwald*, and which has been fully verified in the courſe of this controverſy.

" As to the doctrine of *neceſſity*, it may " poſſibly ſave ſome perſons (who will " think that I would not ſpeak at random) " not a little trouble, if I here give it as " my opinion, that unleſs they apply them- " ſelves to the ſtudy of this queſtion pretty " early in life, and in a regular ſtudy of " Pneumatology and Ethics, they will " never truly underſtand the ſubject, but " will always be liable to be impoſed

" upon, ſtaggered, confounded, and terri-
" fied, by the repreſentations of the gene-
" rality of writers. The common Armi-
" nian doctrine of *free-will*, in the only
" ſenſe of the words in which mankind
" generally uſe them, viz. *the power of*
" *doing what we pleaſe*, or *will*, is the
" doctrine of the ſcriptures, and is what
" the philoſophical doctrine of neceſſity
" ſuppoſes; and farther than this no man
" does, or need to look, in the common
" conduct of life or of religion."

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